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The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
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INTRODUCTION
Courts, legislators, and scholars alike have essentially forgotten the
Woman Suffrage Amendment.1 The prevailing view is that the provision
merely requires that states extend the franchise to women on equal terms
with men: because states long ago complied with the Nineteenth
Amendment’s mandate, the prevailing view holds, the provision possesses
only historical significance, with little or no modern relevance.2 Most
court decisions concerning the Nineteenth Amendment consist of mere
perfunctory rejections of undeveloped, unsupported arguments by pro se
litigants.3 Those few legal scholars who discuss the Nineteenth
Amendment focus on its impact in areas other than voting.4
Several years ago, I offered a (surprisingly) novel take on the
Nineteenth Amendment: that a provision protecting “[t]he right . . . to
vote”5 can and should play a role in protecting the right to vote. 6 Noting
that “[i]n recent years, states across the country have engaged in an
extraordinary effort to make it harder to register to vote, to cast a ballot,
and to have that vote counted,” I observed that “the extent to which these
restrictions on voting may disproportionately affect women had gone

1. See Steve Kolbert, The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power (But First, Which One Is
the Nineteenth Amendment, Again?), 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 507, 508–09 (2016). In fact, I settled on
the “Which One?” subtitle when I noticed that it was everyone’s first question when I discussed the
article with others. Known at the time of ratification as the “Woman Suffrage Amendment,” the
provision became the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See Ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment, 41 Stat. 1823, 1823 (1920). Although today’s terminology refers to “women’s suffrage”
using a plural possessive noun, the language of the era used a singular, non-possessive noun: “woman
suffrage.” See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 66-1, at 1 (1919).
2. See Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129
YALE L.J.F. 450, 451 (2020).
3. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Newark Hous. Auth., 515 F. App’x 122, 125 (3d Cir. 2013); Chapman
v. Baker, 430 F. App’x 731, 731 (10th Cir. 2011); New v. Pelosi, 374 F. App’x 158, 159 (2d Cir.
2010); Kohnke v. Reed, 18 F.3d 936, 1994 WL 83724, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 1994) (unpublished
table decision).
4. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 509 n.7. The literature criticizes this focus of scholarly attention
away from the Nineteenth Amendment’s application to voting. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Text,
the Whole Text, and Nothing but the Text, so Help Me God: Un-Writing Amar’s Unwritten
Constitution, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385, 1420–25 (2014) (book review). The Nineteenth Amendment
has received more scholarly attention due to the 2020 centennial celebration of the provision’s 1920
ratification, but not all of the new literature considers the provision’s impact on voting. Compare Neil
S. Siegel, Why the Nineteenth Amendment Matters Today: A Guide for the Centennial, 27 DUKE J.
GENDER L. & POL’Y 235, 252 (2020), with Richard L. Hasen & Leah M. Litman, Thin and Thick
Conceptions of the Nineteenth Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to Enforce It, 108
GEO. L.J. (19TH AMEND. SPECIAL EDITION) 27, 55–59 (2020).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 1.
6. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 572. Discussions in this Article of the Nineteenth Amendment’s
legislative history and background legal principles stemming from the Fifteenth and Eighteenth
Amendments draw heavily from this earlier work. See infra Sections II.B, IV.A.2, IV.B.2, and
IV.C.1.ii.
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largely unnoticed.”7 To combat these barriers to the ballot, I defended a
robust interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause
as a bulwark against efforts to restrict access to the franchise
disproportionately impacting women.8 Importantly, I left open
“the possibility that the Nineteenth Amendment could protect the voting
rights of men.”9
This Article—part of the Seattle University Law Review’s
symposium on the centennial of the ratification of the Woman Suffrage
Amendment—examines that open possibility. Concluding that the
Nineteenth Amendment does protect men’s voting rights, this Article
explores why and how that protection empowers Congress to address felon
disenfranchisement and military voting. This Article also examines the
advantages of using Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation
compared to legislation enacted under other constitutional provisions.
Part I discusses the unique barriers to voting faced by voters with
criminal convictions (Section I.A) and voters in the armed forces (Section
I.B). This Part also explains how existing efforts to address the voting
rights of these two populations have fallen short.
Part II covers the Nineteenth Amendment itself. This Part explains
why the Woman Suffrage Amendment protects men’s voting rights
(Section II.A). It also examines the congressional power to enforce those
rights (Section II.B.1), including how Congress is most justified in
targeting voting barriers which impact electoral outcomes, full
participation in society (especially in a war effort), or caregiving and the
family (Section II.B.2).
Part III demonstrates that the Nineteenth Amendment empowers
Congress to tackle the barriers to voting posed by felon
disenfranchisement (Section III.A) and military service (Section III.B).10
This part shows that men make up the overwhelming majority of both
7. Id. at 510–11. For a discussion of specific barriers and their disproportionate impact on
women, see id. at 510–29.
8. See generally id. The thirty-nine words of the Nineteenth Amendment are spread across two
unnumbered paragraphs each consisting of a single sentence; the second unnumbered paragraph is the
Enforcement Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 2. This is unique among the constitutional
amendments with enforcement clauses: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth, Twentythird, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments each subdivide into numbered sections, with
each provision’s Enforcement Clause constituting its own numbered section. See id. amend. XIII, § 2;
id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. XVIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIII, § 2; id. amend. XXIV, § 2;
id. amend. XXVI, § 2.
9. Id. at 529 n.125.
10. This Article’s thesis—that the Nineteenth Amendment protects men as well as women and
that it therefore empowers Congress to address both felon disenfranchisement and military voting—
should not be confused with a policy argument that Congress should take any particular action. To
that end, this Article does not endorse or oppose any particular policy proposal concerning felon
disenfranchisement or military voting.
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military servicemembers and disenfranchised felons, and that the barriers
attendant to both criminal convictions and military service correspond to
all three areas of legitimate Nineteenth Amendment enforcement action.
Part IV addresses possible objections. First, this part establishes that,
whether or not the Nineteenth Amendment (like its Fifteenth Amendment
constitutional counterpart) prohibits only purposeful discrimination, such
a requirement poses no barrier to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation (Section IV.A). Second, this Part demonstrates that courts may
subject Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to only
deferential “reasonable relation” review, not the more stringent
“congruence-and-proportionality” review courts apply to Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation (Section IV.B). Third, this Part
discusses the disadvantages of relying on other constitutional authorities
to address felon disenfranchisement and military voting and examines how
the Nineteenth Amendment fills the gaps left by these other provisions’
shortcomings (Section IV.C). Fourth, this Part explains why the sparse
though potentially adverse Nineteenth Amendment caselaw does not
impact the analysis in this Article (Section IV.D). Finally, this Part
contests the theory that the decreasing political popularity of
felon disenfranchisement and the sustained popular support for military
voters preclude the need for Nineteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation (Section IV.E).
I. BACKGROUND: BARRIERS TO THE BALLOT
A. Felon Disenfranchisement
As of 2019, forty-eight states plus the District of Columbia bar at
least some individuals from voting on the basis of a felony conviction.11
Some states disenfranchise only current or recently released prisoners,
while other states also disenfranchise parolees and still others also exclude
probationers.12 The remaining states disenfranchise some offenders even
after the completion of their sentence.13 Sometimes the disqualification
turns on the nature of the felony, the passage of time, the number of
convictions, or the payment of financial obligations associated with the

11. See JEAN CHUNG, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT: A PRIMER,
1–2 tbl.1 & fig.A (2019).
12. See, e.g., 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301(a) (2020) (prisoners); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 2101(a)
(2020) (parolees); TEX. ELEC. CODE. ANN. § 11.002(a)(4) (2020) (probationers).
13. See CHUNG, supra note 11.
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conviction.14 Some states bar all felons from voting.15 Many states offer a
clemency process which can restore a disenfranchised person’s voting
rights,16 although these procedures may not provide a realistic path to the
ballot box.17 Even among those states where the restoration of voting rights
is automatic, bureaucratic misunderstandings may, as a practical matter,
preclude felons from registering to vote.18
The result is that an estimated 6.1 million Americans were not
eligible to vote in 2016 as a result of a felony conviction—up slightly from
5.85 million in 2010 and up substantially from 3.34 million in 1996 and
1.17 million in 1976.19 The current figure represents approximately 2.5%
of the total U.S. voting age population, or 1 in 40 adults.20 The felony
disenfranchisement rate also varied significantly from state to state: from
a low of 0.21% (Massachusetts) to a high of 10.43% (Florida), while
Vermont and Maine do not disenfranchise anyone on account of a felony
conviction.21 Popular support for felon disenfranchisement is mixed.22
Legal attacks on felon disenfranchisement laws have generally not
succeeded.23 Absent unique circumstances,24 courts generally hold that
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 17-3-30.1(c) (2020) (nature); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-313(1) (2020)
(time); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-907(A) (2020), 16-101(A)(5) (2020) (number); FLA. STAT.
§ 98.0751(2)(a)(5) (2020) (payment).
15. For instance, the Iowa Constitution disenfranchises any “person convicted of an infamous
crime.” See IOWA CONST., art. II, § 5. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the term “infamous crime”
included all felonies. See Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 205 (Iowa 2016).
16. See, e.g., VA. CONST., art. II, § 1.
17. See, e.g., Hand v. Scott, 285 F. Supp. 3d 1289, 1299–1300 (N.D. Fla. 2018), vacated as moot,
946 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2020); Nora V. Demleitner, Felon Disenfranchisement, 49 U. MEM.
L. REV. 1275, 1286–87 (2019); Jennifer L. Selin, The Best Laid Plans: How Administrative Burden
Complicates Voting Rights Restoration Law and Policy, 84 MO. L. REV. 999, 1035 (2019); Emily
Rong Zhang, New Tricks for an Old Dog: Deterring the Vote Through Confusion in Felon
Disenfranchisement, 84 MO. L. REV. 1037, 1046–47 (2019).
18. See Jessie Allen, Documentary Disenfranchisement, 86 TUL. L. REV. 389, 417–424 (2011).
19. See CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, 6 MILLION LOST VOTERS:
STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT, 2016, at 3, 9 (2016).
20. See id. at 3.
21. See id. at 15 tbl.3.
22. Bruce E. Cain & Brett Parker, The Uncertain Future of Felon Disenfranchisement, 84 MO.
L. REV. 935, 942–47 (2019); Jeff Manza et al., Public Attitudes Toward Felon Disenfranchisement in
the United States, 68 PUB. OPINION Q. 275, 283 (2004); Brian Pinaire et al., Barred From the Vote:
Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1519, 1540–44
(2003).
23. See Robin Miller, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Criminal
Disenfranchisement Provisions, 10 A.L.R.6th 31 § 2 (2006).
24. For instance, a felon disenfranchisement provision violates the Equal Protection Clause when
the state enacted the provision with the intent to discriminate against a particular racial group. See
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 226–33 (1985); Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313,
1321–24 (M.D. Ala. 2017). In certain circumstances, the Equal Protection Clause bars a state from
disenfranchising a voter for conviction of a misdemeanor. See McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F.
Supp. 954, 973–76 (S.D. Miss. 1995); Hobson v. Pow, 434 F. Supp. 362, 366–67 (N.D. Ala. 1977).
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felon disenfranchisement provisions do not violate the Equal Protection
Clause.25 Procedural due process claims generally fall flat.26 Most
Fifteenth Amendment litigation meets a similar fate.27 Because courts
often characterize felon disenfranchisement provisions as non-punitive
voter qualifications rather than as a form of punishment for the underlying
felony, challenges under the Bill of Attainder Clause,28 the Ex Post Facto
Clause,29 and the Eighth Amendment30 rarely succeed. Neither the
Privileges or Immunities Clause,31 the First Amendment,32 nor the TwentyFourth Amendment33 poses a significant hurdle. Felon disenfranchisement

Lower courts split on whether a felon disenfranchisement provision violates the Equal Protection
Clause if it disenfranchises some, but not all, felons on the basis of their ability to pay the legal
financial obligations associated with their criminal convictions. Compare Jones v. Gov. of Fla., 975
F.3d 1016, 1028–37 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc), with Jones v. Gov. of Fla., 950 F.3d 795, 825–28 (11th
Cir. 2020) (per curiam), and Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at 1331–32.
25. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974); see also Jones, 975 F.3d at 1028-37;
Wilkins v. County of Alameda, 571 F. App’x 621, 632 (9th Cir. 2014); Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d
742, 746–50 (9th Cir. 2010); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 172 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bush,
405 F.3d 1214, 1223–27 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Woodruff v. Wyoming, 49 F. App’x 199, 202–
03 (10th Cir. 2002); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 391–92 (5th Cir. 1998); Perry v. Beamer, 99
F.3d 1130, 1996 WL 614688, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 25, 1996) (unpublished table decision); Buckner v.
Schaefer, 36 F.3d 1091, 1994 WL 521012, at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1994) (unpublished table decision);
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1262–63 (6th Cir. 1986); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27–28 (3d
Cir. 1983); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110, 1114–15 (5th Cir. 1978).
26. See Jones, 975 F.3d at 1048–49; Williams v. Taylor, 677 F.2d 510, 514–15 (5th Cir. 1982).
But see Thompson v. Alabama, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1305–06 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
27. See Malnes v. Arizona, 705 F. App’x 499, 500–01 (9th Cir. 2017); Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d
814, 822 (2d Cir. 1995), vacated on reh’g, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1262–63.
But see Thompson v. Alabama, 293 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1321–24 (M.D. Ala. 2017).
28. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96–97 (1958) (plurality opinion) (dicta); Green v. Bd.
of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 449–50 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at
1328–30.
29. See, e.g., Simmons v. Galvin, 575 F.3d 24, 42–45 (1st Cir. 2009). But see Thompson, 293 F.
Supp. 3d at 1328–30.
30. See, e.g., Green, 380 F.2d at 450–51; Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117, 119–20 (M.D.N.C.
1972) (three-judge court), aff’d mem., 411 U.S. 961 (1973). But see Thompson, 293 F. Supp. 3d at
1313.
31. See Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 751–52 (6th Cir. 2010).
32. See, e.g., Hand v. Scott, 888 F.3d 1206, 1210–13 (11th Cir. 2018); Hayden v. Pataki, No. 00
Civ. 8586 (LMM), 2004 WL 1335921, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2004), aff’d on other grounds, 449
F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 2006), and 594 F.3d 150 (2d Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333,
1338 (S.D. Fla. 2002), aff’d on other grounds, 405 F.3d 1214 (11th Cir. 2005).
33. See, e.g., Jones v. Gov. of Fla., 975 F.3d 1016, 1037-39 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Johnson,
624 F.3d at 751–52; Harvey v. Brewer, 605 F.3d 1067, 1080 (9th Cir. 2010); Johnson v. Bush, 405
F.3d 1214, 1216 n.1 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc).
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laws generally withstand Voting Rights Act challenges.34 With limited
exceptions,35 litigation under state law has not succeeded.36
Beyond the judiciary, other branches of government have taken only
limited action to address felon disenfranchisement. Despite committee
hearings,37 floor consideration,38 and even passage of a bill in one
chamber,39 Congress has not enacted legislation that would prohibit states
34. See, e.g., Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 623 F.3d 990, 993–94 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); Simmons,
575 F.3d at 42; Hayden v. Pataki, 449 F.3d 305, 328–29 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Johnson, 405 F.3d
at 1234; Muntaqim v. Coombe, 366 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2004), vacated for lack of standing, 449 F.3d
371, 376–77 (2d Cir. 2006) (en banc); Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam);
Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v. Ward, 352 F.2d 329, 331 n.1
(5th Cir. 1965). A fact-specific claim under the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. § 20501 et
seq.—concerning a state voter registration form’s language relating to felon eligibility—survived a
motion to dismiss. See Thompson v. Alabama, 428 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1309–10 (M.D. Ala. 2019).
35. See Sterling v. Archambault, 332 P.2d 994, 995 (Colo. 1958) (en banc); Crothers v. Jones,
120 So.2d 248, 254–56 (La. 1960); State v. Rappaport, 128 A.2d 270, 273 (Md. 1957); Mixon v.
Commonwealth, 783 A.2d 763, 763 (Pa. 2001) (mem.); Gaskin v. Collins, 661 S.W.2d 865, 868 (Tenn.
1983).
36. See Young v. Hosemann, 598 F.3d 184, 192 (5th Cir. 2010); Johnson, 624 F.3d at 752–54;
Harvey, 605 F.3d at 1080–81; Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 388, 390–91 (5th Cir. 1998); Williams v.
Lide, 628 So.2d 531, 533–34 (Ala. 1993) (per curiam); Merritt v. Jones, 533 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Ark.
1976); Jarrard v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Registrars, 425 S.E.2d 874, 875 (Ga. 1993), overruled on
unrelated grounds, Cook v. Bd. of Registrars of Randolph Cnty., 727 S.E.2d 478, 483 (Ga. 2012);
Snyder v. King, 958 N.E.2d 764, 788 (Ind. 2011); Griffin v. Pate, 884 N.W.2d 182, 198–205 (Iowa
2016); Dane v. Bd. of Registrars of Voters of Concord, 371 N.E.2d 1358, 1372 (Mass. 1978);
Middleton v. Evers, 515 So.2d 940, 944 (Miss. 1987); Emery v. State, 580 P.2d 445, 449 (Mont. 1978);
Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321, 330 (N.H. 2000); State ex rel. Chavez v. Evans, 446 P.2d 445,
450 (N.M. 1968); Hughes v. Okla. State Election Bd., 413 P.2d 543, 545–46 (Okla. 1966); Bailey v.
Baronian, 394 A.2d 1338, 1344 (R.I. 1978); Madison v. State, 163 P.3d 757, 763–66 (Wash. 2007);
Mills v. Campbell Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 707 P.2d 747, 750–51 (Wyo. 1985).
37. In 1999, a House of Representatives subcommittee held hearings on bills to abrogate certain
state felon disenfranchisement provisions. See Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999:
Hearing on H.R. 906 Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th
Cong. 1 (1999). The renamed subcommittee held a hearing on a successor bill in 2010. See Democracy
Restoration Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 3335 Before the Subcomm. on the Const., Civil Rights, and
Civil Liberties of the H.R. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1 (2010). In 2014, a Senate
subcommittee held a hearing on several bills, including a bill concerning felon disenfranchisement.
See The State of Civil and Human Rights in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Const., Civil Rights, and Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 23 (2014).
38. During the 2002 debate on an election reform bill, the Senate voted by a two-to-one ratio to
reject an amendment which would abrogate state felon disenfranchisement provisions in federal
elections except for voters serving a felony sentence of incarceration, probation, or parole. See 148
CONG. REC. 1501 (2002) (recording a 31–63 vote to reject the amendment); see also id. at 1489 (text
of amendment).
39. In 2019, the House of Representatives passed an omnibus election reform bill which, among
other things, provided that a U.S. citizen’s right “to vote in any election for Federal office shall not be
denied or abridged because that individual has been convicted of a criminal offense unless such
individual is serving a felony sentence in a correctional institution or facility at the time of the
election.” H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1402 (as passed by the House, Mar. 8, 2019); see also 165 CONG.
REC. H2602 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2019) (recording a 234–193 vote for passage of H.R. 1). The Senate
has precluded further action on the bill. See 165 CONG. REC. S1855 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2019)
(statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell); see also S. DOC. 101-28, at 244 (1992).
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from barring individuals from voting on the basis of a criminal
conviction.40 Felon disenfranchisement is an increasingly visible issue in
state legislatures, but reform efforts have had mixed results. 41 Unilateral
action by state executives was more successful.42 However, unilateral
executive action can be vulnerable to litigation or reversal by the successor
state executive.43 Even popular referenda can fall victim to judicial or
legislative interference.44
Felon disenfranchisement has spawned a vast literature.45 Most of the
discussion has concerned constitutional claims—the First,46 Eighth,47

40. Neither chamber in the present 116th Congress has taken action on stand-alone legislation.
See Democracy Restoration Act of 2019, H.R. 196 § 3 (2019); Democracy Restoration Act of 2019,
S. 1068 § 3 (2019).
41. See Jason Belmont Conn, Note, Felon Disenfranchisement Laws: Partisan Politics in the
Legislatures, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 495, 516–36 (2005). Compare An Act Concerning the Voting
Rights of Persons Serving a Sentence of Parole, ch. 283, sec. 5, § 1-2-101(3), 2019 Colo. Laws 2642,
2644, and An Act Relative to Registration and Voting, ch. 636, sec. 1, § 18:102(A)(1)(b), 2018 La.
Acts 1970, 1970, and Felony Voter Disqualification Act, ch. 2017–378, sec. 1, § 17-3-30.1(e), 2017
Ala. Laws 1204, 1208, with James Drew, Bill to Restore Felons’ Voting Rights Faster Dies, OLYMPIAN
(Olympia, Wash.), Feb. 21–22, 2020, at 3A, and Stephen Gruber-Miller, Senate GOP Denies Passage
of Voting Rights Amendment, DES MOINES REGISTER, June 15, 2020, at 2A.
42. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 7, at 2 (Iowa Aug. 5, 2020); Exec. Order No. 181 (N.Y. Apr. 2,
2018). Unilateral state executive action has its critics. See Amanda J. Wong, Note, Locked Up, Then
Locked Out: The Case for Legislative—Rather Than Executive—Felon Disenfranchisement Reform,
104 CORNELL L. REV. 1679, 1701–13 (2019).
43. See Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 724–25 (Va. 2016); Exec Order No. 2015-052 § 1
(Ky. Dec. 22, 2015), repealed, Exec. Order No. 2019-003 § 11 (Ky. Dec. 12, 2019); Exec. Order No.
70 § I (Iowa Jan. 14, 2011). But see Lindsey Turok, Comment, Howell v. McAuliffe: Felon
Disenfranchisement in Virginia and the “Cautious and Incremental Approach” to Voting Equality, 28
GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 341, 342–43 (2018).
44. See FLA. STAT. § 98.0751(2)(a)(5) (2019); Adv. Op. re: Voting Restor’n Amend., 288 So.
3d 1070, 1084 (Fla. 2020).
45. See, e.g., ELIZABETH HULL, THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF EX-FELONS 17 (2006); JEFF
MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT: FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 7–9 (2006); KATHERINE IRENE PETTUS, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN AMERICA 8
(2d ed. 2013).
46. See, e.g., Erika Stern, “The Only Thing We Have to Fear is Fear Itself”: The Constitutional
Infirmities With Felon Disenfranchisement and Citing Fear as the Rational For Depriving Felons of
Their Right to Vote, 48 LOYOLA L.A. L. REV. 703, 752–54 (2015); Anthony Gray, Securing Felons’
Voting Rights in America, 16 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 3, 28–30 (2014); Janai S. Nelson,
The First Amendment, Equal Protection, and Felon Disenfranchisement: A New Viewpoint, 65 FLA.
L. REV. 111, 171–72 (2013).
47. See, e.g., Rebecca Harrison Stevens et al., Handcuffing the Vote: Diluting Minority Voting
Power Through Prison Gerrymandering and Felon Disenfranchisement; 21 ST . MARY’S L. REV. ON
RACE & SOC. JUST. 195, 216–23 (2019); Pamela A. Wilkins, The Mark of Cain: Disenfranchised
Felons and the Constitutional No Man’s Land, 56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 85, 136–42 (2005); Pamela S.
Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation, and the Debate over Felon
Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1147, 1164–69 (2004).
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Thirteenth,48 Fourteenth,49 Fifteenth,50 or Twenty-Fourth51 Amendments,
both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments combined,52 the Privileges
or Immunities Clause,53 the Elections Clause,54 the Bill of Attainder
Clause,55 or the One-Person-One-Vote56 principle. Other commentators
have debated claims under the Voting Rights Act.57 Some of the literature
has even touched on the applicability of international law.58 The role of
48. See, e.g., Alec Ewald, Escape From the “Devonian Amber”: A Reply to Voting and Vice,
122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 319, 337–39 (2013); Shadman Zaman, Note, Violence and Exclusion: Felon
Disenfranchisement as a Badge of Slavery, 46 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 233, 277 (2015).
49. See, e.g., Virginia E. Hench, The Death of Voting Rights: The Legal Disenfranchisement of
Minority Voters, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 727, 783–89 (1998).
50. See, e.g., Kyrstal J. Williams, Criminal Disenfranchisement: Taking a Closer Look at
Fifteenth Amendment Remediation, 2 HUM. RTS. & GLOBALIZATION L. REV. 73, 111 (2009); Marc
Edwards Rivera & Shimica D. Gaskins, Note, Previous Conditions of Servitude: A Fifteenth
Amendment Challenge to Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 1 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRIT. RACE PERSP.
153, 162 (2008).
51. See, e.g., David Schultz & Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of
the Twenty-fourth Amendment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 423–26 (2011); Allison R. Hayward,
What Is an Unconstitutional “Other Tax” on Voting? Construing the Twenty-fourth Amendment, 8
ELECTION L.J. 103, 103–04 (2009); Ryan A. Partelow, The Twenty-first Century Poll Tax, 47
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 425, 465 (2020).
52. See, e.g., John Crain, How Congress Can Pass a Felon Enfranchisement Law That Will
Survive Supreme Court Review, 29 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 60–63 (2019); Richard M. Re & Christopher
M. Re, Voting and Vice: Criminal Disenfranchisement and the Reconstruction Amendments, 121
YALE L.J. 1584, 1656–62 (2012); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the
Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO.
L.J. 259, 316 (2004).
53. See John Benjamin Schrader, Note, Reawakening “Privileges or Immunities”: An
Originalist Blueprint for Invalidating State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1285,
1311–14 (2009).
54. See, e.g., Roger Clegg, Who Should Vote?, 6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 159, 166–68 (2001);
Richard L. Hasen, The Uncertain Congressional Power to Ban State Felon Disenfranchisement Laws,
49 HOW. L.J. 767, 783 (2006); Daniel M. Katz, Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution, the Voting
Rights Act, and Restoration of the Congressional Portion of the Election Ballot: The Final Frontier
of Felon Disenfranchisement Jurisprudence?, 10 J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 47, 64–78 (2007); Hans A. von
Spakovsky & Roger Clegg, Felon Voting and Unconstitutional Congressional Overreach, 85 MISS.
L.J. 1373, 1379–83 (2017).
55. See George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement As Punishment: Reflections on the Racial Uses
of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895, 1904–06 (1999).
56. See Katherine Shaw, Comment, Invoking the Penalty: How Florida’s Felon
Disenfranchisement Law Violates the Constitutional Requirement of Population Equality in
Congressional Representation, and What to Do About It, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1439, 1476–77 (2006).
57. See, e.g., Matthew E. Feinberg, Suffering Without Suffrage: Why Felon Disenfranchisement
Constitutes Vote Denial Under Section Two of the Voting Rights Act, 8 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY
L.J. 61, 79–103 (2011); Thomas G. Varnum, Let’s Not Jump to Conclusions: Approaching Felon
Disenfranchisement Challenges Under the Voting Rights Act, 14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 109, 141–42
(2008); Bertrall L. Ross II, Not a Mere Omission: Reconciling the Clear Statement Rule and the Voting
Rights Act, 7 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 200–02 (2006).
58. See, e.g., John Ghaelian, Restoring the Vote: Former Felons, International Law, and the
Eighth Amendment, HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 757, 789–96 (2013); John Reuven “Ruvi” Ziegler, Legal
Outlier, Again? U.S. Felon Suffrage: Comparative and International Human Rights Perspectives, 29
B.U. INT’L L.J. 197, 239–264 (2011).

2020] The Woman Suffrage Amendment & the Voting Rights of Men 1157
legal financial obligations receives some attention.59 Commentators have
explored both state-level activity and potential federal legislation.60
Scholars have also discussed the theoretical justifications and policy
consequences of felon disenfranchisement.61 So much scholarship exists
on this subject that one experienced voting rights litigator wrote an entire
article—”not about the policy or wisdom of such disenfranchisement laws,
nor even about whether such laws would pass muster if measured
against the Constitution and federal law—just about how courts have
ducked these issues.”62
Scant Nineteenth Amendment literature addresses felon
disenfranchisement. One commentator contends that the Nineteenth
Amendment operates to sub silentio repeal section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, on which the Supreme Court had relied to prohibit an attack
against felon disenfranchisement under the Equal Protection Clause of
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.63 Another scholar argues that “the
history of debate over women’s suffrage sheds light upon the flaws in
felony disenfranchisement legislation, both as a matter of public policy
and constitutional rhetoric,” and that “[m]any of the same retorts used to
defeat paternalistic anti-suffragist arguments and usher in the [Woman
Suffrage] Amendment can be similarly deployed to undermine
paternalistic arguments to disenfranchise felons.”64 A footnote by one
commentator suggests in passing that, in light of a Supreme Court decision
59. See, e.g., Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 VAND. L. REV. 55,
143–48 (2019); Marc Meredith & Michael Morse, Discretionary Disenfranchisement: The Case of
Legal Financial Obligations, 6 J.L. STUDIES 309, 334 (2017); Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: Felony
Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PA. ST. L. REV. 349, 405 (2012).
60. Compare L. Michael Berman, Comment, Howell v. McAuliffe, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 251,
270–71 (2017), and Conn, supra note 41, at 516–36, and Lynn Eisenberg, Note, States As Laboratories
for Federal Reform: Case Studies in Felon Disenfranchisement Law, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 539, 582–83 (2012), and Brian McWalters, Note, A Vote for Those Who Can’t: Strategies for
Felon Voting Rights Reform, 10 GEO. J.L. & MOD. CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 145, 151 (2018), with
Christina Beeler, Felony Disenfranchisement Laws: Paying and Re-Paying a Debt to Society, 21 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1071, 1099–1102 (2019), and Otis H. King & Jonathan A. Weiss, The Courts’ Failure
to Re-Enfranchise “Felons” Requires Congressional Remediation, 27 PACE L. REV. 407, 426–30
(2007), and von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1375–76.
61. See, e.g., Cammett, supra note 59, at 405; Roger Clegg et al., The Case Against Felon Voting,
2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 17–19 (2008); Alec C. Ewald, An “Agenda for Demolition”:
The Fallacy and the Danger of the “Subversive Voting” Argument for Felony Disenfranchisement, 36
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 109, 142–43 (2004); Jason Schall, The Consistency of Felon
Disenfranchisement with Citizenship Theory, 22 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 53, 93 (2006).
62. Armand Derfner, How the Courts Keep Ex-Felons Disenfranchised, 85 MISS. L.J. 1179, 1179
(2017).
63. See John R. Cosgrove, Four New Arguments Against the Constitutionality of Felon
Disenfranchisement, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 157, 192–96 (2004); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24, 41–56 (1974).
64. Michael Gentithes, Felony Disenfranchisement and the Nineteenth Amendment, 53 AKRON
L. REV. 431, 441 (2019).
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“stating that the Nineteenth Amendment ‘applies to men and women
alike,’” federal legislation abrogating state felon disenfranchisement laws
“could potentially . . . be upheld under the Nineteenth Amendment, given
that the overwhelming majority of felons are male.”65 No other scholarship
discusses whether Congress may exercise its power under the Nineteenth
Amendment’s Enforcement Clause to abrogate state felon
disenfranchisement provisions.
B. Military Voting
Unlike individuals with felony convictions, the country’s
approximately 1.3 million active duty military personnel66 enjoy
constitutional protection from outright disenfranchisement because of
their military service.67 However, servicemembers nonetheless face both
logistical barriers and legal hurdles when registering to vote or casting a
ballot.68 “With frequent deployments to war zones, constant moves
between duty stations, and confusing state absentee voting laws, military
members face an uphill battle trying to register and request an absentee
ballot.”69 Military voters’ “geographic distance from local election
officials often magnifies the challenges of registering, receiving ballots,
returning them, and having them counted.”70 State law, too, can create

65. See Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 YALE L.J.
1168, 1230 n.274 (2012) (quoting Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937)).
66. DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY
PERSONNEL BY RANK/GRADE 1 (Jan. 31, 2020) [hereinafter DMDC, TOTAL MIL. PERS. JAN. 2020]
(on file with Seattle University Law Review).
67. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93–97 (1965).
68. See Military and Overseas Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th
Cong. 39 (2013) (testimony of Matt Boehmer, Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program, U.S.
Department of Defense); DAVID MERMIN ET AL., FED. VOTING ASS’T PRGM., UNIFORMED AND
OVERSEAS CITIZENS ABSENTEE VOTING ACT VOTING: SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES 73–77 (Nov.
2014); Donald S. Inbody, Voting by Overseas Citizens and Military Personnel, 14 ELECTION L.J. 54,
59 (2015).
69. HANS VON SPAKOVSKY & M. ERIC EVERSOLE, HERITAGE FOUND., LEGAL MEMO NO. 71, A
PRESIDENT’S OPPORTUNITY: MAKING MILITARY VOTERS A PRIORITY 2 (July 19, 2011); see also
Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 434 (6th Cir. 2012).
70. PRES. COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE: REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 59 (Jan.
2014) [hereinafter PCEA REPORT].
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problems for military voters.71 Taken as a whole, the combined “result is
that those barriers restrict practical access to a ballot.”72
Even just the delivery of election materials to military voters or the
return of those materials to election administrators can pose challenges.73
For decades, policymakers have struggled to ensure that servicemembers
can request, receive, and return ballots with enough time to ensure they
arrive in election officials’ possession on or before the deadline to count.74
The problem persists today. The Government Accountability Office
identified the “unpredictable postal delivery of absentee ballots to and
from [military] voters” as one of the primary election-related challenges
facing servicemembers, especially for military voters without access to the
military postal system or for U.S. Navy voters stationed at sea with limited
technological connectivity.75 Transport issues often cause military voters’
ballots or registration applications to miss statutory deadlines, a major
reason why election administrators rejected approximately 2.8% of
military voters’ registration applications and 5.7% of military voters’
absentee ballots in the 2018 election.76 In fact, sometimes servicemembers
do not receive their ballots at all: 4.3% of ballots transmitted to military
71. See Military and Overseas Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th
Cong. 39 (2013) (testimony of Matt Boehmer, Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program); Federal
Voting Assistance Program: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the H.R. Comm.
on Armed Services, 112th Cong. 12, 67 (2012); (testimony of Pamela S. Mitchell, Director, Federal
Voting Assistance Program); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong.
27–28, 39 (2009) (testimony of Rokey W. Suleman, II, General Registrar, Fairfax County Office of
Elections); Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 59; Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, 114
MICH. L. REV. 747, 761 (2016).
72. DONALD S. INBODY, THE SOLDIER VOTE: WAR, POLITICS, AND THE BALLOT IN AMERICA 89
(1st ed. 2016); CLAIRE M. SMITH, CONVENIENCE VOTING AND TECHNOLOGY: THE CASE OF MILITARY
AND OVERSEAS VOTERS 128–29 (1st ed. 2014).
73. See Paul S. Herrnson et al., Message, Milieu, Technology, and Turnout Among Military and
Overseas Voters, 39 ELECTORAL STUD. 142, 143 (2015). The analysis leading to this conclusion
includes overseas civilians. Id.
74. See Voting in the Armed Forces: Hearings on H.R. 7571 and S. 3061 Before the Subcomm.
on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 82d Cong. 34 (1952) (testimony of Col. Thomas B.
Blocker, Office of Armed Forces Information and Education).
75. BRENDA S. FARRELL, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, NO. GAO-16-378, DOD
NEEDS MORE COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING TO ADDRESS MILITARY AND OVERSEAS ABSENTEE
VOTING CHALLENGES 18–19 (Apr. 2016); see also INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 94,
230–31 n.16.
76. U.S. ELECTION ASS’T COMM’N, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING SURVEY: 2018
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 92, 97 (June 2019) [hereinafter EAVS 2018 REPORT]. These figures can
vary widely by election jurisdiction. See, e.g., R. Michael Alvarez et al., Whose Absentee Votes are
Returned and Counted: The Variety and Use of Absentee Ballots in California, 27 ELECTORAL STUD.
673, 679 (2008); Thad E. Hall, Voting From Abroad: Evaluating UOCAVA Voting, in THE MEASURE
OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 141, 163 (Barry C. Burden & Charles Stewart III, eds. 2014); Kosuke Imai
& Gary King, Did Illegally Counted Overseas Absentee Ballots Decide the 2000 U.S. Presidential
Election?, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 537, 538 (2004).
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voters in connection with the 2018 election were undeliverable.77
“Compared with a traditional absentee voter, [a military] voter is much
less likely to return his or her absentee ballot and is much more likely to
have a successfully returned ballot rejected and not included in the
final tabulation.”78
Beyond the practical challenges, servicemembers also face legal
hurdles. For instance, social science evidence demonstrates that “statelevel procedural barriers also seem to hinder” military voters.79
One major legal hurdle is determining a servicemember’s legal
residence, also known as domicile.80 The Constitution permits states to
restrict the franchise to bona fide residents of the state.81 “Unlike many of
their civilian counterparts, military service members are in the unique
position of having ties to many states.”82 “After all, service members
frequently change homes pursuant to assignment orders,” and “have little
predictability as to when they will receive military orders to a new duty
location.”83 State law defining residence or domicile for voting purposes
sometimes excludes those—like military personnel—who lack
an intention to remain in the state indefinitely.84 Restrictive state
domicile law could pose problems for servicemembers seeking to legally
register to vote.85
77. EAVS 2018 REPORT, supra note 76, at 96. This figure also covers overseas civilian voters.
Id.
78. Hall, supra note 76, at 163. The analysis leading to this conclusion includes overseas
civilians. See id.
79. Id. at 142. The analysis leading to this conclusion includes overseas civilians. See id.
80. “Domicile” means “[t]he place at which a person has been physically present and that the
person regards as home; a person’s true, fixed, principal, and permanent home, to which that person
intends to return and remain even though currently residing elsewhere.” Domicile, BLACK’ S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “The words ‘domicile,’ ‘legal residence,’ ‘permanent home,’ and the
like, are essentially interchangeable terms.” Thomas R. Sanftner, The Serviceman’s Legal Residence:
Some Practical Suggestions, 26 JAG J. 87, 87–88 (1971). For purposes of state election laws, the use
of the term “residence” usually means “domicile.” Mack Borgen, The Determination of Domicile, 65
MIL. L. REV. 133, 137 (1974).
81. See, e.g., Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978). For arguments
that the Constitution requires states to restrict the franchise to bona fide residents, see Brian C. Kalt,
Unconstitutional But Entrenched: Putting UOCAVA and Voting Rights for Expatriates on a Sound
Constitutional Footing, 81 BROOK L. REV. 441, 457–462 (2016); Alan Gura, Ex-Patriates and
Patriots: A Constitutional Examination of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act,
6 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 179, 185–87 (2001).
82. Wendy P. Daknis, Home Sweet Home: A Practical Approach to Domicile, 177 MIL. L. REV.
49, 50 (2003).
83. Id. at 54 (“frequently change homes”); Dean W. Korsak, The Hunt for Home: Every Military
Family’s Battle with Domicile Law, 69 A.F. L. REV. 251, 307 (2013) (“little predictability”).
84. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 89–90 (1965); John M. Greabe, A Federal Baseline for
the Right to Vote, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 62, 64-67 (2012).
85. Military voters do have some constitutional protections. For instance, states may not deny
the vote to servicemembers because the state fears how servicemembers will vote nor because the state
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The difficulties facing military voters are not new: throughout the
nation’s history, the realities of military service have burdened voters in
the armed forces, especially during wartime.86 Although Congress
eventually enacted legislation to combat many of these barriers, the law
has only recently come to support military voters. In fact, most military
voters serving away from their home generally could not vote at all before
the mid-Nineteenth Century because states conducted elections at inperson polling places with no provision for absentee balloting.87
Servicemember voting first saw wide-spread adoption during the
Civil War when a host of states enacted laws authorizing voters serving in
the military to vote from their duty station. 88 As was typical of midNineteenth Century voting, election irregularities abounded.89 These
experiments were short-lived: state courts invalidated many military
voting statutes while others were repealed or expired.90
By World War I, military voting laws existed in eighteen states.91
However, military voting suffered even in these jurisdictions because the
War Department refused to facilitate absentee voting in combat theaters,
ensuring few soldiers in Europe’s trenches could participate in the 1918
wartime midterm elections.92 For example, when New York assembled a
faces the administrative difficulty of determining whether servicemembers qualify as bona fide
residents. See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 93–97.
86. See, e.g., SEC’Y HENRY L. STIMSON, U.S. WAR DEP’T, REPORT BY THE SECRETARY OF WAR
TO THE UNITED STATES WAR BALLOT COMMISSION ¶¶ 32–33 (1944), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 796, at 55–58 (1945); Voting in the Armed Forces: Hearings on H.R. 7571 and S. 3061 Before the
Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 82d Cong. 25 (1952) (testimony of Hon.
Thad Eure, North Carolina Secretary of State).
87. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 2–3; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 121 (rev. ed. 2009); SMITH,
supra note 72, at 40–41.
88. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 4; KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 83; id. at 121;
SMITH, supra note 72, at 40–42. For a more complete look at absentee voting during the Civil War,
see JOSIAH HENRY BENTON, VOTING IN THE FIELD: A FORGOTTEN CHAPTER OF THE CIVIL WAR 3–
26, 306–22 (1915); INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 13–44; Jonathan W. White, Canvassing
the Troops: The Federal Government and the Soldiers’ Right to Vote, 50 CIVIL WAR HIST. 291, 298–
303, 309–11 (2004).
89. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 41–43; JAMES M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY
OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA 804–05 & n.69 (1988); White, supra note 88, at 303–09, 312–15,
Oscar Osburn Winther, The Soldier Vote in the Election of 1864, 25 N.Y. HIST. 440, 449–53 (1944).
90. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 47–49 & tbl.4.1; SMITH, supra note 72, at 41–
42; John C. Fortier & Norman J. Ornstein, The Absentee Ballot and the Secret Ballot: Challenges for
Election Reform, 36 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 483, 496–99, 501 (2003); Pamela Karlan, Ballots and
Bullets: The Exceptional History of the Right to Vote, 71 U. CINCINNATI L. REV. 1345, 1351 (2003).
91. See P. Orman Ray, Military Absent-Voting Laws, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 461, 461 (1918).
Contemporary scholarship challenges this figure, arguing that “by 1918, nearly all states had made
provisions for men serving in the military to cast their ballots, at least in time of war.” KEYSSAR, supra
note 87, at 121.
92. See Letter from Adjutant Gen. H.P. McCain, U.S. War Dep’t, to Sen. James K. Vardaman,
U.S. Senate (Apr. 22, 1918), reprinted in 56 CONG. REC. 5886 (1918); Thomas F. Logan,
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six-member Overseas Election Commission to administer the state’s
election for its voters stationed overseas, the War Department blocked the
six commissioners from traveling to Europe to do so.93
Following America’s entry into World War II, forty-five states
permitted absentee balloting by military personnel, but the patchwork of
state rules often presented considerable barriers to servicemembers hoping
to cast a ballot.94 Congress attempted to standardize the process of
military voting by enacting legislation in 1942, wartime amendments
in 1944, and postwar amendments in 1946.95 Unfortunately, all three
proved inadequate.96
Following the war, military voters faced increasingly greater burdens
when states repealed or allowed to expire many of the flexible registration
and voting laws aimed at servicemembers.97 However, nearly a decade
passed after World War II without any new military voting legislation. 98
Congress eventually took action with the Federal Voting Assistance Act
of 1955 and subsequent amendments in 1968.99 These enactments issued

Correspondence, Soldier Vote in War, 62 AM. ECON. 122, 122 (1918); see also INBODY, SOLDIER
VOTE, supra note 72, at 52–53; SMITH, supra note 72, at 43.
93. Compare To Take Ballots to Men in France, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1918, at 10, with Guns
the Best Ballots, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1918, at 12. The War Department may have taken a more lenient
view of states like Mississippi that chose to poll their deployed voters by mail-in absentee ballot. See
56 CONG. REC. 5952–53 (1918) (statement of Rep. Pat Harrison).
94. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 56; SMITH, supra note 72, at 44; Boyd A.
Martin, The Service Vote in the Elections of 1944, 39 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 720, 724–25 (1945).
95. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 301–15 (Supp. II 1942), amended by 50 U.S.C. §§ 301–03, 321–354 (Supp.
IV 1944), amended by 50 U.S.C. §§ 301–03, 321–31, 341–42, 351–55 (1946) (repealed 1955). For an
overview of each enactment, see PAUL T. DAVID ET AL., SPECIAL COMM. ON SERV. VOTING, AM. POL.
SCI. ASS’N, VOTING IN THE ARMED FORCES (1952), reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 15–18, 20–
21 (1952).
96. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 62–64, 68–71, 73–74; SMITH, supra note 72,
at 45–46; Molly Guptill Manning, Fighting to Lose the Vote: How the Soldier Voting Acts of 1942 and
1944 Disenfranchised America’s Armed Forces, 19 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 335, 353–54, 368–
71 (2016).
97. See Voting in the Armed Forces: Hearings on H.R. 7571 and S. 3061 Before the Subcomm.
on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 82d Cong. 75–76 (1952) (testimony of Paul T. David,
staff member, Brookings Institution & member, American Political Science Association); DAVID ET
AL., supra note 95, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 21–22. The outbreak of conflict on the
Korean Peninsula lead a minority of states to reverse course. See id. at 22–23.
98. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 75–78; SMITH, supra note 72, at 46–47.
Congress did enact minor amendments in 1950. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 324(d), 329(a), 352 (Supp. IV 1950)
(repealed 1955).
99. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 2171–73, 2181–85, 2191–96 (Supp. III 1955), amended by 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1451–54, 1461–65, 1471–76 (Supp. IV 1968) (repealed 1986); see also DAVID ET AL., supra note
95, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 5–8.
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a series of non-binding recommendations regarding military voting that
states were free to ignore—and many did.100
Congress began flexing its constitutional muscle in the Overseas
Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 and its 1978 amendments.101 This
statute obligated states to grant each otherwise-qualified voter residing
outside the United States the right to vote in federal elections and to afford
these voters absentee registration procedures and absentee ballots.102 In
1978, Congress amended the Federal Voting Assistance Act to expressly
require states to offer absentee registration procedures and absentee ballots
to active duty servicemembers, whether stationed domestically or
internationally.103 However, both the Federal Voting Assistance Act and
the Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act still left states to implement the
laws as they saw fit.
In 1986, Congress consolidated and updated the statutes concerning
military and overseas civilian voting into the Uniformed and Overseas
Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which governs military voting
today.104 In contrast to the hands-off approach of earlier decades, federal
law (including UOCAVA) now imposes a host of obligations on states,
resulting in a wide range of legal protections for military voters.105
These legal protections for military voters spawn some litigation.
While litigants file fewer cases to protect military voters than to challenge
felon disenfranchisement provisions, military voting lawsuits succeed
more often than felon disenfranchisement challenges.106 Litigation seeking
to ensure that election officials dispatch absentee ballots to military voters
on or before the forty-fifth day prior to the election—the deadline set by
federal law—invariably succeeds.107 Sometimes, litigation seeks to enjoin
100. See also INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 79–83; SMITH, supra note 72, at 47–
49. Congress achieved at least some voluntary compliance. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-1385, at 2 (1968);
S. REP. NO. 90-397, at 2 (1967).
101. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973dd to 1973dd-5 (Supp. V 1975), amended by 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973dd
to 1973dd-5 (Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1986).
102. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 83–85; SMITH, supra note 72, at 49.
Although the statute applied to military voters stationed overseas, “[v]irtually all States [already] ha[d]
statutes expressly allowing military personnel . . . to register and vote absentee from outside the
country.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-649, pt. 1, at 3 (1975); S. REP. NO. 94-121, at 3 (1975).
103. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973cc(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1986).
104. See 52 U.S.C. § 20301–11; see also INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 86–87;
SMITH, supra note 72, at 50.
105. See infra Section III.B.5.
106. See Military and Overseas Voting: Effectiveness of the MOVE Act in the 2010 Elections:
Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 112th Cong. 36–37 (2011) (statement of Thomas E. Perez,
Assistant Att’y Gen. for C.R.); Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 1973ff et seq., 1 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 251 § 2 (2005).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia, 778 F.3d 1202, 1204–05 (11th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Alabama, 778 F.3d 926, 929 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. New York, No. 1:10-cv-1214
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election officials from rejecting a service member’s ballot; these cases also
usually succeed.108 Conversely, litigation to invalidate military ballots
usually fails.109 One high-profile lawsuit, taking advantage of a
complex history of legislative and administrative activity, succeeded in
obtaining for all voters a special dispensation previously afforded to only
military voters.110
As one scholar put it, “difficulties persist for military and overseas
voters.”111 Election professionals across the political spectrum agree that,
while recent federal enactments have dramatically enhanced the voting
experience for members of the armed forces, more work remains to protect
servicemembers’ votes.112 Although the Uniform Law Commission
proposed uniform state legislation to protect a state’s military voters, only
a handful of jurisdictions have adopted some version of it.113 Even the
adopting states do not always enact the proposed uniform legislation in its
entirety.114 Despite several hearings,115 and even the passage by one
(GLS/RFT), 2012 WL 254263, at *3–5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012). But see Doe v. Walker, 746 F. Supp.
2d 667, 674 (D. Md. 2010).
108. See United States v. West Virginia, Civil Action No. 2:14-27456, 2014 WL 7338867, at *8
(S.D.W.V. Dec. 22, 2014); Bush v. Hillsborough Cnty. Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1317–
18 (N.D. Fla. 2000).
109. See Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm’n, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1325 (N.D. Fla.),
aff’d, 235 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Casarez v. Val Verde County, 16 F. Supp. 2d 727,
732 (W.D. Tex. 1998); aff’d mem., 194 F.3d 1308 (5th Cir. 1999).
110. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012). For a detailed look at the
complex circumstances in which this case arose, see Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial
Backstops, and the Resurrection of Bush v. Gore, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1865, 1879–87 (2013).
111. Steven F. Huefner, Lessons from Improvements in Military and Overseas Voting, 47 U.
RICH. L. REV. 833, 878 (2013).
112. See, e.g., Examining the Voting Process—How States Can Build on the Recommendations
From the Bauer-Ginsburg Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on
H. Admin., 113th Cong. 148–49 (2014) (statement of Robert Bauer, Co-Chair, Pres. Comm’n on
Election Admin.); id. at 149 (statement of Benjamin Ginsburg, Co-Chair, Pres. Comm’n on Election
Admin.).
113. See UNIFORM MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT §§ 1–22 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010). For the uniform legislation as enacted, see CAL. ELEC. CODE §§ 3101–23 (2020); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 1-8.3-101 to -119 (2020); D.C. CODE §§ 1-1061.01 to .20 (2020); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 15D1 to -18 (2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 117A.005 to .190 (2020); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 115.900 to
.936 (2020); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-21-101 to -228 (2020); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 293D.101 to .540
(2020); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-6B-1 to -17 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-258.1 to .25 (2020); N.D.
CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-07-18 to -33 (2020); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26 §§ 14-136 to -155 (2020); 25 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 3501–19 (2020); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 7-15-600 to -760 (2020); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A16-101 to -506 (2020); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-451 to -470 (2020).
114. See Huefner, Lessons, supra note 111, at 844 n.75.
115. See Compilations of Hearings and Markups: Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm.
on Rules & Admin., 113th Cong. 123 (2015) (statement of Sen. Angus King); Military and Overseas
Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th Cong. 1 (2013) (statement of Rep.
Candice S. Miller, Chair, Comm. on H. Admin.); Military and Overseas Voting: Effectiveness of the
MOVE Act in the 2010 Election: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 112th Cong. 1 (2011)
(statement of Rep. Daniel E. Lungren, Chair, Comm. on H,. Admin.)
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chamber of two omnibus bills with updates to military voting law,116
Congress has not enacted substantial military voting legislation in over a
decade.117 Oversight agencies have determined that even the military’s
own internal procedures need some degree of improvement.118
Military voting has attracted little attention from legal scholars.
Some of the literature takes a theoretical approach: one scholar considers
the history of military enfranchisement and its ramifications for modernday voting restrictions;119 another argues that “UOCAVA created a voter
qualification standard for federal elections, illustrating that the states’
authority [to set the qualifications of voters] under Article I, Section 2
cannot be completely segregated from federal power.”120 Some scholars
focus on more concrete policy proposals to improve servicemembers’
voting experience.121 Other scholarship explores the way in which military
voting procedures impact election administration for all voters.122 One
scholar conducted a case study on the role of military ballots in the
Florida’s contested 2000 presidential election.123 The literature also

116. In 2019, the House of Representatives passed an omnibus election reform bill which, among
other things, contained a host of updates to UOCAVA. See H.R. 1, 116th Cong. §§ 1701–05 (as passed
by the House, Mar. 8, 2019); H.R. REP. NO. 116-15, pt. 1, at 163–64 (2019); see also 165 CONG. REC.
H2602 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2019) (recording a 234–193 vote for passage of H.R. 1). The Senate has
precluded further action on the bill. See 165 CONG. REC. S1855 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 2019) (statement
of Sen. Mitch McConnell); see also S. DOC. 101-28, at 244 (1992). In 2017, the House passed a
defense authorization bill which, among other things, included language providing that a
servicemember does not gain or lose a domicile by virtue of registering to vote in a state where the
servicemember is present by virtue of military orders. See H.R. 2810, 115th Cong. § 573 (as passed
by the House, July 14, 2017); see also 163 CONG. REC. H5867–68 (July 14, 2017) (recording a 344–
81 vote for passage of H.R. 2810). The Senate amended the bill without including similar language,
and the conference committee did not insist that the final bill contain the provision. See H.R. REP. NO.
115-404, at 831 (2017).
117. See Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, secs. 575–89,
§§ 101–05A, 123 Stat. 2190, 2318–35 (2009) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–11).
Congress has enacted more recent military voting legislation, but these enactments contained only
minor, technical, or clerical amendments. See, e.g., National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-92, §§ 580C, 580D, 133 Stat. 1198, 1409 (2019); Ike Skelton National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-383, sec. 1075(d)(3)–(6), §§ 581–
89, 124 Stat. 4137, 4372–73 (2011).
118. See FARRELL, supra note 75, at 37; OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
NO. DODIG-2019-065, EVALUATION OF DOD VOTING ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR 2018, at 13–14,
17–20 (2019).
119. See Karlan, Ballots and Bullets, supra note 90, at 1346–62.
120. See Franita Tolson, The Spectrum of Congressional Authority Over Elections, 99 B.U. L.
REV. 317, 372 (2019).
121. See R. Michael Alvarez et al., Military Voting and the Law: Procedural and Technological
Solutions to the Ballot Transit Problem, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935, 990–96 (2007); Hall, supra note
76, at 142; Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 58–59.
122. See Huefner, Lessons, supra note 111, at 880.
123. See Diane H. Mazur, The Bullying of America: A Cautionary Tale About Military Voting
and Civil-Military Relations, 4 ELECTION L.J. 105, 105 (2005).
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addresses the constitutionality of UOCAVA’s guarantee of voting rights
to civilians indefinitely residing outside the United States.124
No scholarship addresses the Nineteenth Amendment’s application to
military voting.
II. “ON ACCOUNT OF SEX”: WHY AND HOW THE NINETEENTH
AMENDMENT PROTECTS THE VOTING RIGHTS OF MEN
As the above discussion illustrates, felon disenfranchisement and
military service both pose severe yet unique barriers to the ballot. As the
below discussion will illustrate, those barriers impact significantly more
men than women. “The question then is what, if anything, can the
Nineteenth Amendment do to help?”125
Prior scholarship demonstrates how the Nineteenth Amendment’s
Enforcement Clause conferred on Congress “extraordinary power to
combat the voting restrictions that proliferate today” in light of the
restrictions’ disproportionate impact on women.126 But the Nineteenth
Amendment also endows Congress with similar authority to protect the
voting rights of men. Given the manner in which felon disenfranchisement
and military service impacts the voting rights of significantly more men
than women, the Nineteenth Amendment’s congressional enforcement
power enables Congress to tackle these obstacles.
A. Why: The Gender-Neutral Nineteenth Amendment
The Woman Suffrage Amendment concerns sex-based barriers to the
ballot irrespective of whether those barriers harm men as opposed to
women because the Nineteenth Amendment provides gender-neutral
protection. Its operative clause contains a gender-neutral prohibition,
barring restrictions on the franchise “on account of sex”127 without limiting
its protection to women. One of the only things the Supreme Court has
said about the Nineteenth Amendment is that it “applies to men and
women alike.”128
Other constitutional provisions are similarly neutral in their
application. The Fourteenth Amendment, originally intended to protect
124. See Kalt, supra note 81, at 516; Gura, supra note 81, at 204.
125. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 529.
126. Id. at 551.
127. U.S. CONST. amend XIX, para. 1 (emphasis added).
128. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937), overruled in part by Harper v. Va. State
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (overruling only the Fourteenth Amendment holding).
Multiple scholars have questioned Breedlove’s continuing viability. See Hasen & Litman, supra note
4, at 35–38; Kolbert, supra note 1, at 539. Whatever other aspects of the decision warrant scrutiny, the
literature generally does not criticize the decision’s endorsement of a constitutional protection that
extends to both sexes.
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black former slaves, nonetheless protects white voters.129 The Fifteenth
Amendment, originally intended to protect black voters, nonetheless
protects white voters.130 The Twenty-sixth Amendment, originally
intended to protect young voters, nonetheless protects older voters.131 The
Fifteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments contain language nearly
identical to the Nineteenth Amendment, and if read in pari materia132 with
one another, suggest that the Nineteenth Amendment applies in a genderneutral fashion.133
Of course, the presumption that similar constitutional provisions
should be interpreted to have similar meanings can be overcome.134 But no
serious evidence exists to challenge the presumption that the Nineteenth
Amendment shares the neutral application of its constitutional
counterparts. Although the Sixty-sixth Congress that proposed the Woman
Suffrage Amendment to the states originally intended the new
constitutional provision to benefit women,135 nothing in the legislative
history of the Nineteenth Amendment suggests that the drafters intended
to deny men this new constitutional protection. The legislative record
is similarly devoid of floor statements, committee reports, hearing
testimony, or other legislative material that would otherwise cast doubt
on the gender-neutral nature of the Nineteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, the Nineteenth Amendment protects the voting rights of men
as well as women.

129. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657–58 (1993); KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 71–72.
130. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 521–22 (2d Cir.
1975), aff’d, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 74–83. Courts have acknowledged that
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation also protects non-Black voters. See League of United
Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 436–42 (2006) (Latinx voters); DNC v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d
989, 1032 (9th Cir. 2020) (American Indian voters); United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420, 433–35
(5th Cir. 2009) (white voters); Favors v. Cuomo, 881 F. Supp. 2d 356, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (Asian
American voters).
131. See KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 225–28; Fish, supra note 65, at 1222–24.
132. The “rule of in pari materia provides that legal texts should be interpreted in ways that
preserve consistency among closely related laws and constitutional provisions dealing with the same
subject matter.” David Gray, Dangerous Dicta, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2015).
133. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 789 (1999); Jenny Diamond
Cheng, Voting Rights for Millennials: Breathing New Life Into the Twenty-sixth Amendment, 67
SYRACUSE L. REV. 653, 674–75 (2017); Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a
Constraint on the Voting Rights Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1198 n.12 (2012).
134. See, e.g., Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 800 n.202; Cheng, supra note 133, at
668, 673.
135. See, e.g., KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 139–78.
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B. How: The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power136
The Nineteenth Amendment does more than merely protect men’s
voting rights: it also provides Congress with a robust authority to enforce
those rights.137 The legislative history of the Nineteenth Amendment offers
guidance on the appropriate use of that authority.
1. Scope of the Enforcement Power
When the Sixty-sixth Congress proposed the Nineteenth Amendment
to the states for ratification, it engrafted onto the Woman Suffrage
Amendment an Enforcement Clause that provided Congress with
substantial, expansive authority to protect voting rights from sex-based
barriers to the ballot as Congress, in its discretion, saw fit. This fact is
confirmed by the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1138—the
legislative vehicle for proposing the Nineteenth Amendment to the
states—as well as other period legal sources that shed light on the intent
of the Sixty-sixth Congress.
That Congress recognized the extraordinary power the Enforcement
Clause would confer on the legislative branch. Debate over House Joint
Resolution 1 frequently discussed its enormous shift of power over
elections from states to the federal government.139 Yet this shift did not
bother Congress: the Senate rejected an amendment to weaken the
Enforcement Clause by greater than a three-to-one margin.140 Both
chambers took similar action when debating the Woman Suffrage
Amendment in the Sixty-fifth Congress just a year earlier.141 Legal
scholars of the era agreed that the Woman Suffrage Amendment endowed
Congress with substantial enforcement power.142
Strengthening this point is the legal environment of 1919: the Sixtysixth Congress adopted House Joint Resolution 1 against a constitutional
136. For a more complete survey of the scope of the Enforcement Clause, see Kolbert, supra
note 1, at 543–59.
137. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 543–51.
138. See H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th. Cong. (1919). This legislative history includes material from prior
Congresses considering a Woman Suffrage Amendment because the Sixty-sixth Congress explicitly
relied on the vast record built by its legislative predecessors when considering House Joint Resolution
1. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 534–38.
139. See H.R. REP. NO. 66-1, pt. 2, at 1–3 (1919) (minority views); 58 CONG. REC. 563 (1919)
(statement of Sen. William Borah); id. at 90 (statement of Rep. Frank Clark); id. at 81–82 (statement
of Rep. Rufus Hardy).
140. See 58 CONG. REC. 634 (1919).
141. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,986–87 (1918) (Senate); id. at 810 (House).
142. See Emmet O’Neal, The Susan B. Anthony Amendment. Effect of Its Ratification on the
Rights of the States to Regulate and Control Suffrage and Elections, 6 VA. L. REV. 338, 355 (1920);
Charles Hall Davis, Note, Shall Virginia Ratify the Federal Suffrage Amendment?, 5 VA. L. REG. 354,
363 (1919); Raeburn Green, Book Review, 30 HARV. L. REV. 406, 406–07 (1917) (reviewing HENRY
ST. GEORGE TUCKER, WOMAN’S SUFFRAGE BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (1916)).
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backdrop which included nearly identical Enforcement Clauses in the
Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendments.143 This identical language
suggests the clauses should be read in pari materia with one another,144
absent evidence to rebut this presumption.
By 1919, a host of Fifteenth Amendment decisions construed that
provision’s Enforcement Clause.145 Taken as a whole, the lessons of these
Fifteenth Amendment decisions are two-fold. First, these decisions
imposed limits on the Fifteenth Amendment’s congressional enforcement
power: the Fifteenth Amendment “required some connection, some hook,
into race- or color-based discrimination” to justify congressional action.146
Second, the Court acknowledged that once Congress satisfied this race-orcolor prerequisite, the Fifteenth Amendment empowered Congress with
significant authority to take the actions Congress deemed necessary to
protect voting rights—without judicial interference.147 If the Sixty-sixth
Congress intended to incorporate these Fifteenth Amendment decisions
into the Nineteenth Amendment, this jurisprudence supports a powerful
congressional enforcement authority with only minor limits.
Eighteenth Amendment jurisprudence had yet to develop by 1919,
but the Eighteenth Amendment informs the interpretation of the
Nineteenth Amendment in other ways. When Congress proposes to the
states a constitutional amendment with an enforcement clause, later
legislative activity by members of the proposing Congress aids the
understanding of the scope of that enforcement clause.148 In the case of the
Sixty-sixth Congress, both proposed Nineteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation and enacted Eighteenth Amendment enforcement legislation
provide interpretive assistance and suggest a broad reading of the
Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.
Following ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, members of
the Sixty-sixth Congress proposed enforcement legislation which would
exercise a significant level of authority—at the expense of states—over

143. Compare U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2; and id. amend XVIII, § 2, repealed by id. amend.
XXI, § 1, with id. amend. XIX, para. 2.
144. See Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 789; Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–75;
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?, supra note 133, at 1198 n.12.
145. See James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139 (1903); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 664–
67 (1884); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 637 (1883); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542, 551–56 (1875); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217–22 (1875).
146. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 551.
147. See id.
148. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Originalism and Congressional Power to Enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 33, 41 (2018); Franita Tolson, The
Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 422–25 (2014).
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the election process.149 Although insufficient time remained to enact this
proposed enforcement legislation before the expiration of the Sixty-sixth
Congress,150 that same Congress did enact legislation pursuant to its
Eighteenth Amendment enforcement power. The National Prohibition Act
targeted a much larger swath of activity than the Eighteenth Amendment
and created a sweeping regulatory regime, complete with a private right of
action and criminal penalties—both to be enforced in federal court.151 The
committee reports accompanying the legislation (1) outlined why this
sweeping proposal constituted “appropriate legislation” despite the more
narrow scope of the Eighteenth Amendment itself, (2) emphasized that the
authority to determine the appropriateness of legislation rested with
Congress (and not the courts), and (3) explained congressional
expectations that a deferential judiciary would uphold any enforcement
legislation reasonably related to the enforcement of Prohibition. 152 A few
years later, the Supreme Court agreed on largely the same grounds,
upholding the National Prohibition Act and other similar legislation
against a variety of constitutional challenges.153
In short, the Sixty-sixth Congress proposed Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation and enacted Eighteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation which both assumed a great deal of congressional authority.
This proposed and enacted legislation, together with the legislative history
of House Joint Resolution 1 and the backdrop of Fifteenth Amendment
enforcement jurisprudence, demonstrate the extraordinary power the
Sixty-sixth Congress understood itself to possess under the Woman
Suffrage Amendment.
2. Appropriate Enforcement Targets
The legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 demonstrates
more than the scope of congressional power under the Enforcement
149. See S. 4739, 66th Cong. §§ 1–5 (1920); H.R. 15018, 66th Cong. §§ 1–5 (1920); S. 4323,
66th Cong. §§ 1–5 (1920). Two scholars observe that this proposed legislation could be viewed as
“consistent with a narrow conception of Congress’s enforcement power that allows Congress only to
remedy constitutional violations,” because the legislation, despite its extensive reach into state election
administration, generally tracked the language of the Nineteenth Amendment’s operative prohibition.
See Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 68. However, as these scholars point out, this “does not prove
that supplying a remedy against unconstitutional conduct exhausts the full scope of Congress’s
enforcement power under the Nineteenth Amendment.” Id.
150. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 545 n.213.
151. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, tit. II, §§ 1––39, 41 Stat. 305, 307–319 (1919)
(repealed 1935); id. tit. III, §§ 1–21, 41 Stat. at 319–21.
152. H.R. REP. NO. 66-91, at 4–6 (1919); S. REP. NO. 66-151, at 12 (1919).
153. See Nat’l Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387–88 (1920); see also Lambert v. Yellowley,
272 U.S. 581, 593–97 (1926); James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559–60 (1924);
Selzman v. United States, 268 U.S. 466, 468–69 (1925); Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U.S. 403, 408–
09 (1922).
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Clause; it also guides subsequent Congresses as to what types of voting
restrictions Congress should target: those with a political impact, those that
cut against full participation in society (especially participation in a war
effort), and those that burden caretakers (especially caretakers of children)
and the family.154
First, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress may
appropriately direct Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation at
restrictions with a political or ideological impact. All elected policy
makers care deeply about the legislative success of their policy vision.
Likewise, politicians universally share an almost primal concern for their
own electoral success and that of their allies. The Sixty-sixth Congress
was no exception.155 In the debate over House Joint Resolution 1, members
spoke often of the electoral impact of women voters in states with woman
suffrage and the expected impact of women voters in the remaining
states.156 Members made similar statements in the woman suffrage debates
in the Sixty-fifth Congress.157 Committees in earlier Congresses heard
testimony concerning the expected electoral impact of newly enfranchised
women.158 Other testimony focused on how women’s political
participation impacted public policy, as did a House committee report and
floor debate.159
154. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 552–59.
155. The political self-interest motivating members of the Sixty-sixth Congress to propose the
Woman Suffrage Amendment to the states thus resembled the political self-interest motivating
Reconstruction-era members of Congress to propose the Fifteenth Amendment to the states. Cf. Travis
Crum, Reconstructing Racially Polarized Voting, 70 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at pt.
III).
156. See 58 CONG. REC. 627 (1919) (statement of Sen. James Reed); id. at 564 (statement of
Sen. William Borah); id. at 8834 (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy); id. at 91 (statement of Rep. Frank
Clark); id. at 87 (statement of Rep. William Vaile).
157. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,979 (1918) (statement of Sen. Irvine Lenroot); id. at 764 (statement
of Rep. James Cantrill).
158. See Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.J. Res. 200, Before the H.
Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 51 (1918) (testimony of Maude Wood Park); Woman
Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 47 (1917)
(testimony of Rheta Childe Dorr); id. at 14, 29 (testimony of Sen. John B. Kendrick); Woman Suffrage:
Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt. 5, 65th Cong. 184–85 (1917)
(testimony of Anne Martin, Chairman, Nat’l Woman’s Party); Woman Suffrage: Hearings on S.J. Res.
1 and S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 64th Cong. 66 (1916) (testimony of A.J.
George, Exec. Sec’y of the Cong. Comm., Nat’l Ass’n Opposed to Woman Suffrage); Woman
Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pts. 2 & 3, 64th Cong. 48
(1916) (testimony of Helen Todd); Woman Suffrage: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on
Woman Suffrage, 63d Cong. 84 (1913) (testimony of Helen H. Gardener); id. at 44 (statement of Rep.
Burton L. French).
159. See Woman Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th
Cong. 51 (1917) (testimony of Madeline Z. Doty, Correspondent of the New York Tribune); id. at 13
(testimony of Sen. John B. Kendrick); Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.R.J.
Res. 200 Before the H. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 327 (1918) (reprinting Seward A.
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Second, restrictions that burden a voter’s participation in society
(especially participation in a war effort) also constitute appropriate targets
for Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. Congressional
concerns extended beyond mere partisan or political self-interest: the
recently concluded “Great War” weighed heavily on members’ minds.
During the war, President Woodrow Wilson appealed directly to Congress
with a speech from the Senate floor, arguing that woman suffrage was
necessary to the war effort.160 Committees of both chambers heard witness
after witness testify to their support of woman suffrage in light of women’s
contributions to the military campaign.161 Supporters of woman suffrage
in both the Sixty-sixth Congress and its predecessors repeatedly praised
women’s work in support of the military effort in World War I, citing that
work as additional justification for the Woman Suffrage Amendment.162
Members of Congress also recognized that women’s service in the war
effort portended a larger role in society—a role members sought to
protect.163 “Congress was proud of women’s new role in society—
especially, but not limited to, women’s role in the war effort—and sought
to reward them with the franchise.”164
Finally, Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation reflects the
will of the Sixty-sixth Congress when that legislation takes aim at burdens
on caretakers and their families. Members of Congress valued women’s
roles as caretakers—especially caretakers of children—believing that their
contributions to the institution of family warranted enfranchisement.165
For years, congressional committees considering woman suffrage heard
witnesses testify about the positive role women played as mothers and how

Simons, A Survey of the Results of Woman Suffrage in California (1917)); H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, at 2
(1918); 58 CONG. REC. 8832 (1919) (statement of Rep. Henry Osborne).
160. See 56 CONG. REC. 10,928–29 (1918), reprinted in S. DOC. 65-284 (1918).
161. See Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.J. Res. 200 Before the H.
Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 235–36 (1918) (testimony of Maud Wood Park, Cong.
Chairman, Nat’l Am. Woman Suffrage Ass’n); id. at 165–67 (testimony of Maud Younger); Woman
Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 40–45 (1917)
(testimony of Mary Ritter Beard, Member, Nat’l Adv. Council of Woman’s Party Last Year); id. at
36–37 (testimony of Carrie Chapman Catt).
162. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, at 2 (1918); S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 2 (1916); 58 CONG. REC.
8833–34 (1919) (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy); id. at 8829 (statement of Rep. James C. Cantrill);
id. at 84 (statement of Rep. John MacCrate); id. at 83 (statement of Rep. Adolphus Nelson); 57 CONG.
REC. 3061 (1919) (statement of Sen. Gay); id. at 3055–56 (statement of Sen. William Calder); 56
CONG. REC. 10,979 (1918) (statement of Sen. Irvine Lenroot); id. at 10,977 (statement of Sen. Albert
Cummins).
163. See 58 CONG. REC. 8834 (1919) (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy); id. at 8832 (statement of
Rep. Israel Foster); id. at 87 (statement of Rep. William Vaile).
164. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 556; see also Vikram David Amar & Alan Brownstein, The Hybrid
Nature of Political Rights, 50 STAN. L. REV. 915, 967–70 (1998).
165. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 164, at 963–67.
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suffrage for women would improve their care of children.166 Reflecting on
this testimony, committee reports on woman suffrage in both chambers
reflected a concern for mothers and caretakers.167 Members made similar
arguments in floor debate over woman suffrage.168
In short, the concerns of the Sixty-sixth Congress centered on three
points: (1) elections and public policy, (2) participation in society and the
war effort, and (3) caregiving for children and family. Enforcement
legislation therefore enjoys heightened legitimacy when targeting voting
restrictions that touch on one or more of these concerns.
III. NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT LEGISLATION TO
PROTECT THE VOTING RIGHTS OF MEN
A. Legislation Concerning Felon Disenfranchisement
Felon disenfranchisement represents one area for legitimate
congressional action under the Nineteenth Amendment. Not only does the
burden of felon disenfranchisement fall disproportionately on men,
but felon disenfranchisement raises all three of the concerns the Sixtysixth Congress discussed when proposing the Woman Suffrage
Amendment to the states.
1. Burden on Men vs. Women
First, states disqualify substantially more men than women from
voting as a consequence of felony convictions. While the racially disparate
impact of felony disenfranchisement receives the bulk of the attention,169
the gender gap is likewise substantial: in 2000, states disenfranchised
4,686,539 individuals with felony convictions, of which only 676,730
(14%) were women; in 2004, the number rose to 5,266,207
166. See Extending the Right of Suffrage to Women: Hearings on H.J. Res. 200 Before the H.
Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong. 100 (1918) (letter from Mrs. H.C. Davis); id. at 26 (testimony
of Mrs. Henry Ware Allen); Woman Suffrage: Hearing on S.J. Res. 2 Before the S. Comm. on Woman
Suffrage, 65th Cong. 50–51 (1917) (testimony of Madeline Z. Doty, Correspondent of the New York
Tribune); id. at 40–45 (testimony of Mary Ritter Beard, Member, Nat’l Advisory Council of Woman’s
Party Last Year); Woman Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt.
5, 65th Cong. 178–79 (1917) (testimony of Mrs. Donald R. Hooker); Woman Suffrage: Hearings
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt. 2, 64th Cong. 23 (1915) (testimony of Mrs.
Harriet Stokes Thompson); Woman Suffrage: Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 Before the S. Comm. on Woman
Suffrage, 63d Cong. 72 (1913) (testimony of Elizabeth Kent).
167. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, at 2 (1918); S. REP. NO. 63-64, at 8 (1913).
168. See 58 CONG. REC. 8834 (1919) (statement of Rep. Rufus Hardy); id. at 8832 (statement of
Rep. Henry Osborne); id. at 79–80 (statement of Rep. Edward Little); 56 CONG. REC. 10,945 (1918)
(statement of Sen. James Phelan); id. at 10,785 (statement of Sen. Kenneth McKellar).
169. See, e.g., Aman McLeod, Ismail K. White & Amelia R. Gavin, The Locked Ballot Box: The
Impact of State Criminal Disenfranchisement Laws on African American Voting Behavior and
Implications for Reform, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 66 (2003).
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disenfranchised individuals with felony convictions, of which 792,197
(15%) were women.170 In other words, felon disenfranchisement bars
substantially more men than women from the polls.
2. Political Impact of Felon Disenfranchisement
Second, felon disenfranchisement laws today have exactly the
political effect with which the Sixty-sixth Congress concerned itself.
Debate over felon disenfranchisement tends to break down along partisan
lines.171 Social science evidence suggests the impact of felony
disqualification rules may have a similar partisan slant.
One widely-cited analysis estimates that permitting disqualified
felons to vote would have reversed party control of the U.S. Senate
between 1986 and 2002 by altering the result of up to seven U.S. Senate
contests and would also have reversed the outcome of the hotly disputed
2000 presidential election.172 Subsequent research suggests that limiting
the re-enfranchised population to non-incarcerated felons, or even to nonincarcerated felons no longer on probation or parole, creates a lesser but
still pronounced impact on election results.173
A more recent study found that between 1998 and 2012, “in states
that replaced a full post-sentence ban with a partial ban, and thus allowed
some ex-felons to vote,” candidates of one major political party “saw a
statistically significant increase in general election vote share of 4.1
percentage points, relative to” candidates of the opposing major party—an
effect that “increase[d] to 6.49” percentage points “[w]hen district fixed
effects [we]re added and the sample [wa]s restricted to 2002–2010.”174 The
same study estimated that one major party would have gained additional
seats in the U.S. House of Representatives at the expense of the opposing
party in five of the eight election years between 2002–2010: a generous

170. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT RATES FOR WOMEN 2 (2008).
171. See Cain & Parker, supra note 22, at 946 tbl.3 & n.37.
172. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political Consequences of
Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 794 (2002). The authors offer
a number of important caveats to their work, suggesting caution against reading their findings too
broadly. See id. at 795–96.
173. Jeff Manza & Christopher Uggen, Punishment and Democracy: Disenfranchisement of
Nonincarcerated Felons in the United States, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 491, 497–99 (2004). The authors
recognized that their “analysis is subject to qualifications,” requiring “appropriate caution in
interpreting [these] results.” Id. at 499.
174. See Tilman Klumpp et al., The Voting Rights of Ex-Felons and Election Outcomes in the
United States, 59 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 40, 47 (2019). Further analysis in the study suggests
exercising caution concerning these results. See id.
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model estimated changed results for between four and ten seats, enough to
switch party control of the chamber for the 1998 and 2000 elections.175
Some scholars believe the social science literature may overstate the
political impact of felon voting.176 Nonetheless, supporters of felon
disenfranchisement fear the prospect of voters with criminal convictions
“dilut[ing] the vote of law-abiding citizens,” and raise the specter of
“‘jailhouse blocs’ banding together to oust sheriffs and government
officials who are tough on crime.”177
Beyond election outcomes, the addition of disenfranchised felons to
the voting population introduces different views into the political
discourse. A poll conducted for a nonprofit journalism outfit found that
incarcerated felons hold substantially different views than the population
at large on a host of political issues, including assault weapons, marijuana
legalization, the minimum wage, immigration, and (perhaps obviously)
criminal justice reform.178 Interviews with prison inmates suggest that
experience with the criminal justice system made them more likely to
engage with public policy and the political process, but the loss of the right
to vote dampened that enthusiasm.179
The potential impact of disenfranchised felons on election outcomes
and their contributions to political discourse parallels the impact and
contributions expected from newly enfranchised women in 1919. For that
reason, felon disenfranchisement hits squarely on the concern of the Sixtysixth Congress about the political and public policy impact of the
disenfranchised population.

175. Id. at 50. The authors cautioned that these results benefited from the use of the study’s most
generous model, which the authors considered implausible. Id. A less generous model predicted that
party control of the chamber would not have switched in any of the election years considered. Id.
176. See Traci Burch, Did Disenfranchisement Laws Help Elect President Bush? New Evidence
on the Turnout Rates and Candidate Preferences of Florida’s Ex-Felons, 34 POL. BEHAV. 1, 21
(2012); Traci Burch, Turnout and Party Registration Among Criminal Offenders in the 2008 General
Election, 45 L. & SOC’Y REV. 699, 725 (2011); Randi Hjalmarsson & Mark Lopez, The Voting
Behavior of Young Disenfranchised Felons: Would They Vote if They Could?, 12 AM. L. & ECON.
REV. 356, 391 (2010); Thomas J. Miles, Felon Disenfranchisement and Voter Turnout, 33 J. LEGAL
STUD. 85, 122 (2004).
177. 148 CONG. REC. 1495 (2002) (statement of Sen. Mitch McConnell). Social scientists
caution that “no empirical evidence supports” the proposition that newly enfranchised offenders
“would band together to vote a certain way that would produce an improper outcome of some kind.”
Christopher Uggen et al., Criminal Disenfranchisement, 1 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI. 307, 313
(2005).
178. See Nicole Lewis et al., What Do We Really Know About the Politics of People Behind
Bars?, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/03/11
/what-do-we-really-know-about-the-politics-of-people-behind-bars [https://perma.cc/BR73-7VZY].
179. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Lost Voices: The Civic and Political Views of
Disenfranchised Felons, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION
165, 180–83 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004).
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3. Reintegration into Society
Third, the link between voting rights restoration and successful
reintegration into society ties directly into one of the primary concerns of
the Sixty-sixth Congress: the disenfranchised population’s full
participation in society. Interviews with disenfranchised felons
demonstrate that the loss of voting rights creates feelings of alienation and
rejection from society, as well as anger at and distrust of government
institutions.180 These feelings can impede successful reintegration into
society.181 On the macro level, felon disenfranchisement contributes to an
“inability to influence political processes [which] weakens leverage and
access to important services that can moderate the risks of crime, from
educational resources to trash removal and recreation.”182
Even law enforcement stakeholders understand the burden that felon
disenfranchisement imposes on an offender’s successful reintegration into
society. The American Probation and Parole Association—a trade
association for community corrections professionals—found that
“disenfranchisement laws work against the successful reentry of
offenders.”183 A former Philadelphia District Attorney later elected to the
U.S. Senate spoke in favor of federal legislation to extend the franchise
to felons, arguing that extending voting rights to offenders assists with
their reintegration into society.184 The then-Attorney General of the
United States described felon disenfranchisement as “counterproductive.
By perpetuating the stigma and isolation imposed on formerly incarcerated
individuals, these laws increase the likelihood they will commit
future crimes.”185
These comments are not empty rhetoric: “some evidence suggests a
strong negative association between political participation and

180. See MATTHEW CARDINALE, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, TRIPLE-DECKER
DISENFRANCHISEMENT: FIRST-PERSON ACCOUNTS OF LOSING THE RIGHT TO VOTE AMONG POOR,
HOMELESS AMERICANS WITH A FELONY CONVICTION 7–11 (2004); Uggen & Manza, Lost Voices,
supra note 179, at 184–88.
181. See Christopher Uggen et al., ‘Less than the Average Citizen’: Stigma, Role Transition and
the Civic Reintegration of Convicted Felons, in AFTER CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: PATHWAYS TO
OFFENDER REINTEGRATION 258, 277 (Shadd Maruna & Russ Immarigeon eds., 2004); Gordon
Bazemore & Jeanne B. Stinchcomb, Civic Engagement and Reintegration: Toward a CommunityFocused Theory and Practice, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 241, 259–60 (2004).
182. Jeffrey Fagan et al., Neighborhood, Crime, and Incarceration in New York City, 36 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 100 (2004).
183. See Resolution: Restoration of Voting Rights, Am, Prob’n & Parole Ass’n (Sept. 2007),
https://www.appa-net.org/eweb/Dynamicpage.aspx?webcode=IB_Resolution&wps_key=3c8f56129e1c-4f60-8e8b-1bf46c00138e [https://perma.cc/6XP5-ZUDU].
184. See 148 CONG. REC. 1496–97 (2002) (statement of Sen. Arlen Specter).
185. Eric Holder, Remarks on Criminal Justice Reform at Georgetown University Law Center,
26 FED. SENT’G REP. 238, 239 (2014).
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recidivism.”186 For instance, the Florida Commission on Offender Review
(FCOR) reported that of the 879 offenders granted restoration of their civil
rights in 2017 and 2018, only one reoffended with a new felony
conviction.187 The social science literature suggests that FCOR’s report is
no anomaly. Existing scholarship demonstrates “a robust negative
correlation between voting and subsequent recidivism, suggesting that the
prosocial nature of voting may contribute to the civic reintegration of
current and former felons.”188
One study analyzed the data from the Youth Development Study, a
long-term survey that followed former St. Paul, Minnesota public school
students from ninth grade in 1988 into adulthood in 2000.189 The study’s
analysis determined that 16% of non-voters but only 5% of voters were
arrested between 1997 and 2000.190 Among individuals with prior arrest
records, 27% of the non-voters but only 12% of the voters were arrested
again between 1997 and 2000.191 The result held when considering selfreported criminal behavior: 11% of voters but 18% of non-voters reported
committing a property crime, while 27% of voters but 42% of non-voters
reported committing a violent crime.192 The study’s authors concluded
“that a relationship between voting and subsequent crime and arrest is not
only plausible, but also supported by empirical evidence.”193
A second study analyzed data from a U.S. Department of Justice
survey of 272,111 prisoners across fifteen states released from
incarceration in 1994, representing two-thirds of all prisoners released in
the United States that year.194 The study found that “individuals who are
released in states that permanently disenfranchise are roughly [19%] more
likely to be rearrested than those released in states that restore the franchise
post-release,” suggesting that “disenfranchisement is directly related to
recidivism.”195 The study’s authors noted that although the “effect of
186. Christopher Uggen et al., Citizenship, Democracy, and the Civic Reintegration of Criminal
Offenders, 605 ANNALS OF AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 281, 303 (2006).
187. See FLA. COMM’N ON OFFENDER REVIEW, RESTORATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS RECIDIVISM
REPORT FOR 2017 AND 2018, at 3 tbl.II (2019).
188. Christopher Uggen & Robert Stewart, Piling On: Collateral Consequences and Community
Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 1903–04 (2015).
189. See JEYLAN T. MORTIMER, WORKING AND GROWING UP IN AMERICA 32–33, 36 (2003).
190. See Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Voting and Subsequent Crime and Arrest: Evidence
from a Community Sample, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 193, 204–05 & fig.1 (2004).
191. See id. at 205–06 & fig.2.
192. See id. at 207 & fig.3.
193. Id. at 213. The authors also cautioned that other factors may contribute to the lower
incidents of criminal recidivism. See id. at 214.
194. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, NO. NJC 193427, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (June 2002).
195. See Guy Padraic Hamilton-Smith & Matt Vogel, The Violence of Voicelessness: The Impact
of Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, 22 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 407, 426 (2012).
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permanent disenfranchisement policy on recidivism was slightly
diminished” after considering a released prisoner’s “race, gender, criminal
history, and the state unemployment rate,” state disenfranchisement rules
“remained a significant predictor [of recidivism] nonetheless.”196
The study concluded that “states which permanently disenfranchise
ex-felons experience significantly higher repeat offense rates than states
that do not.”197
A third study matched voting records and criminal records of
individuals on probation or parole in Oregon, which permits these
supervised populations to vote.198 This study found lower recidivism rates
among probationers who vote (5.9%) than those who do not (7.8%).199 The
difference in recidivism rates widened among parolees: parolees who vote
(19.3%) reoffended at a much lower rate than parolees who did not
(26.1%).200 The study noted that the recidivism difference may be even
greater in states with in-person voting at polling places than in states like
Oregon which conduct elections entirely by mail.201
All of this is to say that ample evidence demonstrates the correlation
between the restoration of felon voting rights and the successful re-entry
of felons into society. Even supporters of felon disenfranchisement agree
that “[r]eintegration of felons into the community is an important goal,
and . . . restoration of voting rights can be a part of that process.”202
Felon disenfranchisement, then, hits directly on point with the concern
of the Sixty-sixth Congress about disenfranchised voters’ full participation
in society.
4. Felons, Fatherhood, and the Family
Finally, because many disenfranchised felons are also fathers, felon
disenfranchisement impacts voters who serve as caregivers of their
families, aligning directly with the concerns of the Sixty-sixth Congress.
In 2007, the country’s 1,518,535 state and federal prisoners included an
estimated 809,500 parents (53.3%) of approximately 1,706,600 children
196. Id. at 427.
197. See id. at 429. The study also cautioned that “what is borne out by the data is simply an
association between disenfranchisement and recidivism, but the nature of that relationship—whether
it is simply correlational or causal—remains unclear.” Id.
198. See Christopher Uggen & Michelle Inderbitzen, The Price and the Promise of Citizenship:
Extending the Vote to Non-Incarcerated Felons, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY 61, 63–64 (Natasha A. Frost et al. eds., 2010).
199. See id. at 64 fig.3.
200. See id.
201. See id. at 63. The study also cautioned that “it is difficult to make strong causal claims on
the basis of available data.” Id.
202. See von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1392. Supporters and opponents differ on
the best way for restoration of rights to serve that goal. See id. at 1392–93.
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under age 18 (2.3% of all such children in the United States).203 These
prisoner-parents included an estimated 744,200 fathers (91.9%) compared
to an estimated 65,600 mothers (8.8%).204 These numbers increase when
adding the jail population to the prison population: the nation’s 2.3 million
prisoners and jail inmates include 1.2 million parents—120,000 mothers
and 1.1 million fathers—of 2.7 million children under age 18.205
Just over half of the prisoner-parents—52% of mothers and 54% of
fathers—provided the primary financial support for their minor children
before entering prison.206 Over 78% of prisoner-parents reported keeping
in contact with their children during the period of incarceration.207 While
not every person convicted of a felony receives a sentence of
incarceration,208 these statistics concerning fatherhood among incarcerated
felons nonetheless suggest that felon disenfranchisement touches on the
concern of the Sixty-sixth Congress about caregivers and the family.
5. Potential Legislative Remedies
Not only does felon disenfranchisement disproportionately burden
the voting rights of men, but it directly touches on the all three concerns
the Sixty-sixth Congress expressed when proposing the Woman Suffrage
Amendment to the states. Accordingly, the Nineteenth Amendment
empowers Congress to protect voting rights against state action to
disqualify felons from voting. Given the broad enforcement power granted
to Congress under the Nineteenth Amendment, Congress may
constitutionally choose from a wide array of policy options to combat
felon disenfranchisement.
The most commonly discussed option is direct modification or
elimination of state felon disenfranchisement provisions. However,
proposals vary about which classes of felons to enfranchise. Some propose
letting all felons vote, even those currently incarcerated.209 Other
proposals would bar the disenfranchisement of most felons but exempt
203. See LAUREN E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP’T
2 tbl.2, 13 app. tbl.1
(rev. 2010).
204. See id. at 2.
205. See ECON. MOBILITY PROJ. & PUB. SAFETY PERF. PROJ., PEW CHARITABLE TRS.,
COLLATERAL COSTS: INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 18 (2010).
206. See GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra note 203, at 5.
207. See id. at 6 tbl.10.
208. n 2006, 69% of state felony convictions and 86% of federal felony convictions resulted in
a sentence of either jail or prison. See SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., NO. NCJ 226846, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATS., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL
TABLES 9 tbl.1.6 (rev. 2010).
209. See, e.g., April McCullum, Sanders Would Let Felons Vote in Prison, BURLINGTON FREE
PRESS, Apr. 25, 2019, at 10A.
OF JUSTICE, NO. NCJ 222984, PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN
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either current inmates or anyone still serving a criminal sentence
(including probationers and parolees).210 Some proposals would condition
the restoration of voting rights on the type of crime.211 Still others would
restore a felon’s voting rights only after an individualized review of that
particular’s felon’s circumstances.212
Congress could also provide for lesser remedies. For instance,
Congress might prohibit states from conditioning the restoration of a
felon’s voting rights on the payment of the financial obligations associated
with the felony conviction, such as fines and court costs.213 Congress might
also require state courts, before accepting a plea or proceeding to trial, to
instruct defendants about a conviction’s impact upon the defendant’s
voting rights.214
Alternatively (or additionally), Congress might require states to
designate probation and parole offices and corrections institutions as voter
registration agencies under the National Voter Registration Act
(NVRA).215 Following the NVRA’s statutory scheme, Congress might also
require state probation, parole, and corrections officers to assist their
supervised or incarcerated population with determinations of voting
eligibility and (for those eligible to vote) with voter registration.216
Congress might also impose similar requirements on federal criminal
justice agencies.
Congress need not limit itself to these ideas. Whatever approach
Congress takes,217 the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause
authorizes congressional action to address felon disenfranchisement.

210. Compare H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1402 (as passed by the House, Mar. 8, 2019), with 148
CONG. REC. 1490 (2002).
211. See, e.g., Adv. Op. re: Voting Restor’n Amend., 215 So. 3d 1202, 1204 (Fla. 2017).
212. See, e.g., von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1392.
213. For a taxonomy of the varying types of legal financial obligations that individuals can incur
as a result of a criminal conviction, see Cammett, supra note 59, at 378–81.
214. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1).
215. See 52 U.S.C. § 20506(a)(2) (2018). The NVRA requires that a government office
designated as a voter registration agency, in addition to its normal duties, also assist visitors to the
office with voter registration and transmit completed voter registration applications to appropriate state
election officials. See id. § 20506(a)(4)(A), (6).
216. See id. § 20506(a)(4)(A), (6). There is evidence that efforts to inform eligible felons of their
right to vote increases the likelihood that this population will register and vote. See Alan S. Gerber et
al., Can Incarcerated Felons Be (Re)Integrated into the Political System? Results from a Field
Experiment, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 912, 924–25 (2015).
217. This Article takes no position on the merits of any of these proposals. Given the breadth of
policy ideas—consider the wide between, for instance, requiring states to permit prison inmates to
vote and requiring state probation officers merely to discuss voting with probationers—policy
questions lie beyond this Article’s scope. This Article seeks only to establish the bounds of
congressional authority, not to attempt a normative defense of any particular idea.
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B. Legislation to Protect Military Voters
In addition to felon disenfranchisement, military voting represents
another area for legitimate congressional action under the Nineteenth
Amendment. As discussed above, military service creates legal and
logistical challenges for servicemembers registering to vote, receiving and
returning ballots, and having those ballots counted. These challenges fall
disproportionately on men, given the gender breakdown of the military
population. Military service also touches on all three of the concerns that
the Sixty-sixth Congress discussed when proposing the Woman Suffrage
Amendment to the states, making military voters prime subjects for
Nineteenth Amendment protection.
1. Burden on Men vs. Women
First, the barriers to voting faced by the country’s servicemembers
fall primarily on men. Women constitute only 17.1% of the nation’s active
duty military personnel.218 Women make up a small minority of both
officers (18.5% female) and enlisted personnel (16.7% female).219 Each
military service—the Army (15.4% female), Navy (20.1% female), Air
Force (21.0% female), and Marines (9.0% female)—features a similar
gender disparity.220 The nation’s armed forces—and therefore, the nation’s
military voters—are overwhelmingly male, causing the burdens of
military service to fall disproportionately on male voters.
2. Political Impact of Military Voters
Second, servicemembers play precisely the type of political and
electoral role the Sixty-sixth Congress saw as desirable. While a military
tradition of political neutrality inhibited voting among the officer corps in
the first half of the Twentieth Century, “the American armed forces have
become steadily more politically involved since World War II.” 221
Anecdotal evidence suggests that military personnel overall tend to lean
more in one ideological direction than the other and tend to identify with
the corresponding major political party rather than the opposing party.222
218. See DEFENSE MANPOWER DATA CENTER, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., TABLE OF ACTIVE DUTY
FEMALES BY RANK/GRADE AND SERVICE 1 (Jan. 31, 2020) (on file with Seattle University Law
Review).
219. See id.
220. See id.; DMDC, TOTAL MIL. PERS. JAN. 2020, supra note 66, at 1.
221. Paul P. Van Riper & Darab B. Unwalla, Voting Patterns of Military Officers, 80 POL. SCI.
Q. 48, 61 (1965).
222. See THOMAS E. HICKS, MAKING THE CORPS 279–83 (1st Touchstone ed. 1998); Russell A.
Burgos, An N of 1: A Political Scientist in Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 551, 553–54
(2004); Ole R. Holsti, Politicization of the United States Military: Crisis or Tempest in a Teapot?, 57
INT’L. J. 1, 9–14 (2002).
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Empirical support exists for this thesis.223 For instance, surveys
between 1976 and 1996 of both military personnel studying at the National
War College and senior uniformed Pentagon officers support both the
political ideology and party affiliation hypotheses.224 Multiple scholars
have analyzed a 1998–1999 survey of military leadership as well as
officers and officer candidates situated to enter leadership, largely
confirming the findings of the earlier study.225 A 2004 survey of both
enlisted Army personnel and Army officers found similar results for the
Army overall—with more pronounced results for officers than for enlisted
personnel.226 A 2008–2009 survey of both enlisted personnel and officers
across all service branches corroborated these findings, including the more
pronounced results among officers than among enlisted personnel.227 The
findings of a 2009 survey of Army officers between the ranks of second
lieutenant and colonel match the findings of earlier studies.228 A 2015–
2016 survey of military officers attending the National Defense University
and cadets attending U.S. Military Academy at West Point shows similar
results.229 This tendency towards one end of the ideological spectrum and
one of the two major political parties extends to the highest ranks of
military leadership.230 One scholar posits that the nature of military service
makes servicemembers more likely to identify with one of the major

223. Federal law prohibits polling military personnel about their electoral choices or publishing
or releasing the results of such a poll. See 18 U.S.C. § 695 (2018). As a result, no robust survey data
exists concerning servicemember voting choices. See Donald S. Inbody, Partisanship and the
Military: Voting Patterns of the American Military, in INSIDE DEFENSE 139, 143 (Derek S. Reveron
& Judith Hicks Stiehm eds., 2008). “The law does not, however, prohibit other types of polling,
including those seeking information on party preference or political attitudes.” Id.
224. See Ole R. Holsti, A Widening Gap between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society?: Some
Evidence, 1976-96, INT’L SEC., Winter 1998–99, at 5, 11 tbl.1, 13 tbl.2.
225. See THOMAS S. SZAYNA ET AL., RAND ARROYO CTR., PROJ. UNIQUE ID CODE
DAPRRW008, THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP IN THE UNITED STATES: DOES IT EXIST, WHY, AND DOES
IT MATTER? 81 tbl.4.2, 83 tbl.4.3 (2007); James A. Davis, Attitudes and Opinions Among Senior
Military Officers and a U.S. Cross-Section, 1998–98, in SOLDIERS AND CIVILIANS: THE CIVILMILITARY GAP AND AMERICAN NATIONAL SECURITY 101, 104–06 & tbl.2.2 (Peter D. Feaver &
Richard H. Kohn eds., 2001); Ole R. Holsti, Identity of the U.S. Military: Comments on “An N of
One,” 2 PERSP. ON POL. 557, 558 tbl.1 & tbl.2 (2004); Inbody, Partisanship and the Military, supra
note 223, at 145–46.
226. See JASON K. DEMPSEY, OUR ARMY: SOLDIERS, POLITICS, AND AMERICAN CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS 75 tbl.5.3, 102 tbl.6.2 (2010).
227. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 138 tbl.10.2, 147 tbl.10.6.
228. Heidi Urben, Party, Politics, and Deciding What Is Proper: Army Officers’ Attitudes After
Two Long Wars, 57 ORBIS 351, 357 tbl.1, 358 tbl.2 (2013).
229. See HEIDI A. URBEN, LIKE COMMENT, RETWEET: THE STATE OF THE MILITARY’S
NONPARTISAN ETHIC IN THE WORLD OF SOCIAL MEDIA 14 tbl.1, 16 tbl.3 (2017).
230. See James J. Dowd, Connected to Society: The Political Beliefs of U.S. Army Generals, 27
ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 343, 352 (2001).
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political parties in light of the shared values between that party
and the military.231
These ideology and party affiliation trends hold even after returning
to the civilian world: data show that veterans identify with the same
political party and tend to lean toward the same end of the ideological
spectrum as active duty servicemembers.232 This matters for electoral
outcomes because research shows that prior military service is correlated
with an increased likelihood of voting.233
Government data shows that servicemembers would vote if not for
the obstacles presented by military service. For the 2018 midterm election,
data from the Federal Voting Assistance Program (FVAP), the federal
agency responsible for military voting, show that between 61% and 67%
of active duty military personnel were registered to vote and between 26%
and 31% cast a ballot.234 For the most recent presidential election in 2016,
FVAP data show that 68% of active duty military personnel were
registered to vote and 46% cast a ballot.235 These numbers are particularly
noteworthy in the context of the substantial barriers to registration and
voting servicemembers face as a consequence of their military service.
The political impact of the military reaches beyond the votes of
servicemembers. One scholar describes the military as “a recognizable
interest group” which “is larger, more bureaucratically active, more
political, more partisan, more purposeful, and more influential than
anything similar in American history.”236 A 2009 study of Army officers
found that officers engage in a host of political activity beyond casting
ballots: the vast majority discussed their political beliefs and opinions with
others or encouraged other military personnel to vote, while a substantial
minority donated money to a political campaign.237 The pervasive political
activity of high-level military leaders has spawned an entire taxonomy of
231. See Lance Betros, Political Partisanship and the Military Ethic in America, 27 ARMED
FORCES & SOC’Y 501, 504–12 (2001).
232. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, WAR & SACRIFICE IN THE POST-9/11 ERA 16 (2011); David
L. Leal & Jeremy M. Teigen, Military Service and Political Participation in the United States:
Institutional Experience and the Vote, 53 ELECTORAL STUD. 99, 107 (2018); Mackubin Thomas
Owens, Is Civilian Control of the Military Still an Issue?, in WARRIORS AND CITIZENS: AMERICAN
VIEWS OF OUR MILITARY 69, 84 (Kori Schake & Jim Mattis eds., 2016).
233. See Jeremy M. Teigen, Enduring Effects of the Uniform: Previous Military Experience and
Voting Turnout, 59 POL. RESEARCH Q. 601, 606 (2006).
234. See FED. VOTING ASS’T PRGM., REFID NO. 3-A67BD81, 2018 REPORT TO CONGRESS 15
fig.1, 16 fig.2 (2019). Figures were dependent on methodology. See id. at 13–14.
235. See FED. VOTING ASS’T PRGM., REFID D-3BBEADD, 2016 POST-ELECTION REPORT TO
CONGRESS 9 fig.2, 10 fig.2 (2017).
236. Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States
Today, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV., Summer 2002, at 8, 22.
237. See Heidi A. Urben, Wearing Politics on Their Sleeves? Levels of Political Activism of
Active Duty Army Officers, 40 ARMED SERVICES & SOC’Y 568, 577 tbl.3 (2013).
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political tactics—some public, others private—that military brass use to
influence public policy.238 Commentators defend this political activity as
necessary to further the military’s ability to defend the nation’s interests,
even suggesting “advanced specialized training and assignments to billets
where military members can gain experience in political settings and the
opportunity to practice political skills.”239
To be sure, U.S. Department of Defense policy prohibits partisan
political activity by active duty servicemembers.240 Commentators
generally agree that military personnel should eschew direct, public
involvement in partisan politics to help protect the armed forces from
becoming politicized.241 To that end, senior military leadership frequently
remind servicemembers about their obligation to remain apolitical.242
However, neither scholars nor senior military leadership consider
registering to vote and casting a ballot to raise the types of military
professionalism and politicization concerns that attend other forms of
political activity.243 For that reason, military policy expressly permits
servicemembers to register and vote.244 These votes, along with
servicemembers’ other political activity, ensure military voters play
exactly the political and electoral role the Sixty-sixth Congress envisioned
when it proposed the Woman Suffrage Amendment to the states.

238. See Risa A. Brooks, Militaries and Political Activity in Democracies, in AMERICAN CIVILMILITARY RELATIONS: THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE IN A NEW ERA 213, 218–24 (Suzanne C. Nielsen
& Don M. Snider eds., 2009).
239. Dayne E. Nix, American Civil-Military Relations: Samuel P. Huntington and the Political
Dimensions of Military Professionalism, NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV., Spring 2012, at 88, 101; see
also Risa Brooks, Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United
States, INT’L SEC., Spring 2020, at 7, 18.
240. See Political Activities by Members of the Armed Forces, Directive No. 1344.10 ¶ 4.1.2
(U.S. Dep’t of Def. Feb. 19, 2008).
241. See Risa A. Brooks, The Perils of Politics: Why Staying Apolitical Is Good for Both the
U.S. Military and the Country, 57 ORBIS 369, 376–79 (2013); Peter D. Feaver & Richard H. Kohn,
Conclusion: The Gap and What It Means for American National Security, in SOLDIERS AND
CIVILIANS, supra note 225, at 459, 466; Hugh Liebert & James Golby, Midlife Crisis? The AllVolunteer Force at 40, 43 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 115, 125–28 (2017); Mackubin Thomas Owens,
Military Officers: Political Without Partisanship, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Fall 2015, at 88, 98–99
(2015).
242. See Joseph E. Dunford, Jr., Upholding Our Oath, JOINT FORCE Q., 3d Qtr. 2016, at 2, 3;
Martin E. Dempsey, Putting Our Nation First, JOINT FORCE Q., 2d Qtr. 2012, at 4, 4; Michael G.
Mullen, Military Must Stay Apolitical, JOINT FORCE Q., 3d Qtr. 2008, at 2, 2.
243. See Betros, supra note 231, at 514–15; Dempsey, supra note 242, at 4; Dunford, supra note
242, at 3; Feaver & Kohn, supra note 241, at 466; Liebert & Golby, supra note 241, at 128; Mullen,
supra note 242, at 2; Nix, supra note 239, at 96.
244. See Directive No. 1344.10 ¶ 4.1.1.1.
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3. War Effort
Third—and almost too obvious to point out—the burdens of military
service lie squarely within the concerns of the Sixty-sixth Congress about
enfranchising those who help with a war effort. Military voters face
challenges precisely because the demands of defending the nation often
align poorly with the needs of efficient election administration.245
Prior scholarship has noted that “using the Twenty-sixth Amendment
to protect the voting rights of soldiers is particularly appropriate given that
one of the central purposes of the Amendment was to halt the
disenfranchisement of young Americans fighting overseas in Vietnam.”246
Similarly, using the Nineteenth Amendment to protect military voters is
particularly appropriate when one of the core objectives of the Woman
Suffrage Amendment was to enfranchise women whose service in World
War I Congress deemed essential to victory.247
4. Dads on Deployment and Fatherhood in the Field: Military Families
Finally, military fatherhood touches on the concern of the Sixty-sixth
Congress regarding caregivers and the family. Military records from 2018
show that 486,495 (37.3%) of the country’s active duty military
servicemembers had dependent children.248 These records may understate
parenthood among those in the military ecosystem: when a nonprofit
military family support organization surveyed military families in 2017,
85% of respondents reported having children or stepchildren.249 Whatever
the correct figure, military men are more likely to be parents than their
female counterparts.250 Importantly, servicemembers are more likely than
civilians to have children.251
Of course, servicemembers care for more than just children: military
records from 2018 reveal that 681,570 (52.3%) of active duty
servicemembers care for a spouse or other dependent.252 In fact, those 2018
records reveal that military family members (1,596,169), including
245. See, e.g., PCEA REPORT, supra note 70, at 59; VON SPAKOVSKY & EVERSOLE, supra note
69, at 2; see also Obama for America v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 434 (6th Cir. 2012).
246. Fish, supra note 65, at 1219.
247. Cf. id.
248. See OFFICE OF THE DEP. ASSISTANT SEC’Y OF DEF. FOR MIL. CMTY. & FAM. POL’Y, 2018
DEMOGRAPHICS: PROFILE OF THE MILITARY COMMUNITY § 5.22, at 138 (2018) [hereinafter
MILITARY DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE 2018]. “Children include minor dependents age 20 or younger
and dependents age 22 or younger enrolled as full-time students.” Id.
249. See MICHELE KIMBALL ET AL., MIL. FAM. ADV. NETWORK, MILITARY FAMILY SUPPORT
SURVEY 2017 RESULTS 23 (2017).
250. See Molly Clever & David R. Segal, The Demographics of Military Children and Families,
FUTURE OF CHILD., Fall 2013, at 13, 23.
251. See id. at 20.
252. See MILITARY DEMOGRAPHICS PROFILE 2018, supra note 248, § 5.03, at 128.
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spouses, children, and adult dependents, actually outnumber active duty
servicemembers (1,304,418).253 Given the totality of this evidence,
military voters fit within the scope of the concern the Sixty-sixth Congress
demonstrated for caregivers of children and the family.
5. Potential and Existing Legislative Remedies
Because of the disproportionate burden military service imposes on
men and the way military service touches on the three concerns the Sixtysixth Congress expressed when proposing the Woman Suffrage
Amendment to the states, the Nineteenth Amendment empowers Congress
to protect voting rights against the burdens of military service. Considering
the broad enforcement power granted to Congress under the Nineteenth
Amendment, Congress can constitutionally choose from a variety of
policy options to protect military voters.
Existing law—including UOCAVA and the Servicemembers Civil
Relief Act (SCRA)—provides servicemembers with a host of broad-based
legal protections to combat the practical barriers they face when
registering to vote and casting a ballot in federal elections.254 The SCRA
contains only one voting-related provision, stating that a servicemember’s
legal residence or domicile “[f]or the purposes of voting for any Federal
office . . . or a State or local office” does not change as a result of militaryrelated absences from the servicemember’s home state.255 UOCAVA
253. See id. § 5.01, at 127.
254. See Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–11
(2018); Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901–4034. Unless otherwise indicated, the
protections of federal law discussed below apply only to federal elections.
255. See 50 U.S.C. § 4025(a). Congress first legislated on this subject in 1968 by issuing a nonbinding “recommend[ation]” that states “permit any [servicemember] who is otherwise fully qualified
to register and vote in the State to acquire legal residence in that State, notwithstanding his residence
on a military installation, and to register and vote in local, State, and national elections.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1454 (Supp. IV 1968) (repealed 1986). The current provision traces its roots to post-election
litigation involving two close 1996 contests in Val Verde County, Texas. See Casarez v. Val Verde
County, 16 F. Supp. 2d 727, 730–31 (W.D. Tex. 1998), aff’d mem., 194 F.3d 1308 (5th Cir. 1999). The
two apparent losers asked a state court to invalidate the absentee votes of military personnel registered
in Val Verde County but stationed elsewhere, arguing that these servicemembers were not legal
residents of Val Verde County for election purposes. See id. at 730. A federal court issued a preliminary
injunction barring election officials from declaring a winner pending the outcome of the state court
litigation. See id. Discovery in the state litigation revealed that some challenged voters maintained
tenuous (at best) ties to Val Verde County. For instance, one of the challenged voters had not been to
Val Verde County in two decades and owned a home in Illinois. See Jessie Katz, Enlisting Absentee
Military Voters Triggers Ballot War, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1997, at A1. Another challenged voter
registered at his wife’s grandmother’s address in Val Verde County because he had spent three days
there during his honeymoon twenty-five years earlier. See Kelley Shannon, Military Absentee Votes
Go on Trial in Lawsuit, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 22, 1997, at A1. The state court litigation
nonetheless failed to overturn the election result. See Ruling Upholds Legality of Ballots Mailed in by
Members of Military, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 20, 1997, at A2. The federal court
consequently lifted its preliminary injunction and refused to permit federal litigation over the election.
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contains a similar provision, requiring states to permit otherwise-qualified
servicemembers to vote in federal elections notwithstanding their servicerelated absence from their voting residence.256 By incorporating state law
concerning voting domicile and residency and limiting its application to
federal elections, UOCAVA does not sweep as broadly as the SCRA,
which both overrides state voting domicile law and extends its application
to both federal and non-federal elections.
UOCAVA contains a host of other safeguards for military voters. For
instance, the statute requires states to offer both absentee registration and
balloting to facilitate the electoral participation of eligible military
voters.257 If a state rejects a servicemember’s voter registration application
or absentee ballot request, the state must explain its reasons for the

See Casarez, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 730–31. One of the challenged military voters testified before a
congressional committee about having to spend hours completing intrusive interrogatories in
connection with the litigation, revealing information about his credit cards, bank accounts, and where
his wife sleeps. See Military Voting Rights Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 699 Before the H.R. Comm.
on Veterans’ Affairs, Serial No. 105-11, 105th Cong. 5 (1997) (testimony of Col. Bruce A. Brown, U.S.
Air Force). This testimony angered members of Congress: two even suggested that the federal judge
overseeing the case should be removed from the bench. See id. at 9 (statements of Rep. Sam Johnson
& Rep. Helen Chenoworth). Although the litigation was ultimately unsuccessful, members of
Congress believed that future litigation could threaten the voting rights of servicemembers. See, e.g.,
143 CONG. REC. 1222–24 (1997) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm). A representative from Texas
introduced legislation in the House to protect servicemembers from similar voting domicile
challenges. See Military Voting Rights Act, H.R. 699, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). The legislation closely
tracked existing language in the SCRA’s predecessor that protected servicemembers from state
domicile challenges for taxation purposes. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 574(1) (1994); see also H.R. REP. NO.
105-183, pt. 1, at 3–4 (1997). A committee favorably reported the bill, arguing that the frequent moves
required by military service ought not be a factor in determining a military voter’s legal residence for
election purposes. See id. at 4. The House took no further action, but the Senate later unanimously
passed an identical bill the same day it was introduced. See 143 CONG. REC. 26,445 (1997); see also
Military Voting Rights Act, S. 1566, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). The legislation did not become law until
2001 when Congress attached similar language to the annual defense authorization bill. See National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, sec. 1603, § 704(a), 115 Stat.
1012, 1276 (2001) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 4025(a)).
256. UOCAVA protects the voting rights of each “absent uniformed services voter,” defined as a
“member of a uniformed service on active duty who, by reason of such active duty, is absent from the
place of residence where the member is otherwise qualified to vote.” 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(1),
20310(1)(A) (2018). This “otherwise qualified to vote” language derives from the “otherwise eligible
to vote” language in the nonbinding Federal Voting Assistance Act of 1955. See 5 U.S.C. § 2171
(Supp. III 1955) (repealed 1986). The 1955 language derived from the “is or was eligible to register
for and is qualified to vote at any election” language of the World War II-era military voting
legislation. See 50 U.S.C. § 301 (Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1955).
257. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(1) (2018). This language traces its roots to 1975 legislation
mandating absentee registration and absentee voting procedures for overseas citizens and to 1978
legislation mandating the same for military voters irrespective of location. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973dd-2
(Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1986); 42 U.S.C. § 1973cc(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978) (repealed 1986). Congress
first enacted a series of detailed military absentee voting requirements in 1942 but made the provisions
optional for states in later years. Compare 50 U.S.C. §§ 303–09 (Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1944), with
5 U.S.C. §§ 2171–72 (Supp. III 1955) (repealed 1986).
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rejection.258 To help ensure military voters receive their ballots in time to
vote, states must (with limited exceptions) send blank ballots to military
voters at least forty-five days prior to each election.259 At a military voter’s
258. See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(d) (2018). Congress enacted this provision after hearing testimony
that election officials were rejecting large numbers of military ballots. See Voting Technology
Hearing: Hearing Before the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 107th Cong. 28 (2001) (testimony of Hon.
Ralph Munro, Washington Secretary of State). Military voting issues also featured prominently in the
then-recent controversy over the 2000 presidential election. See Mazur, supra note 123, at 106–28.
Military voting bills introduced in both chambers would have required states to inform each military
voter why election officials rejected the voter’s registration application, absentee ballot request, or
voted absentee ballot. See S. 1261, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001); H.R. 1997, 107th Cong. § 5 (2001). The
Senate sponsor explained that he introduced his bill in part because military voters “deserve to know
that their votes will be counted.” 147 CONG. REC. 14,894 (2001) (statement of Sen. Jay Rockefeller).
Neither bill received a hearing. During debate on the Senate floor over omnibus election reform
legislation, the sponsor of the earlier military voting bill introduced an amendment that would require
states to explain their reasons for rejecting a servicemember’s voter registration application or absentee
ballot request. See 148 CONG. REC. 4225–26 (2002). However, the amendment did not include the
language from the original military voting bills requiring a similar explanation for rejecting a
servicemember’s voted ballot. See id. The Senate adopted the amendment without discussion. See id.
at 4226. The language became law with the enactment of the omnibus elections bill. See Help America
Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, sec. 707, § 102, 116 Stat. 1666, 1725 (2002).
259. See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(8) (2018). The requirement for forty-five days of ballot transit
time traces its roots to 1944 military voting legislation, in which Congress “recommended that, in
States where the voters’ absentee ballot will not be available for mailing to the voter forty-five days
prior to any primary, general, or special election, such States cause to be made such changes in the
election laws of their States as will lengthen the time.” 50 U.S.C. § 327(d) (Supp. IV 1944) (repealed
1955). Over six decades later, nearly half the states failed to comply with this recommendation. See
SUSAN URAHN, PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, NO TIME TO VOTE: CHALLENGES FACING AMERICA’S
OVERSEAS MILITARY VOTERS 28 (2009). At congressional hearings in both chambers, a broad crosssection of stakeholders testified concerning both delays in postal delivery and the need for states to
transmit ballots to military voters with enough time for the unmarked ballot to reach the
servicemember and return to election officials before the state counting deadline. See Hearings and
Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 350, 356, 360, 361, 366–67, 367, 371,
468, 471, 495–96, 508, 526–27, 555–562, 568–69, 586–91, 614, 616, 619 (2009); Hearing on Military
and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections
of the Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 6–7, 28, 40, 47, 69–70, 82, 100–01, 126–33, 139–40, 172–
75, 190, 204 (2009). In response to this testimony, Congress considered legislation to require states to
send ballots earlier. The first draft of the legislation required states to transmit blank ballots at least
forty-five days before election day and required states to count ballots received within fifty-five days
after transmission (in other words, ten days after election day). See S. 1415, 111th Cong. § 5 (as
introduced, July 8, 2009). A committee amendment removed the fifty-five day requirement in light of
the consensus at the hearing that forty-five days was sufficient ballot transit time. See S. 1415, 111th
Cong. § 6 (as reported by S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009); see also Hearings and
Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 644, 648–49 (2009). The committee
favorably reported the bill as amended. See id. at 645. The chief sponsor announced he would propose
the text of the reported bill as an amendment to an upcoming defense authorization bill. See id. at 639.
With only technical changes, the sponsor’s amendment largely tracked the language in the reported
bill imposing a forty-five day deadline for ballot transmission. See 155 CONG. REC. 18,801 (2009).
Debate over the amendment on the Senate floor reiterated the need for adequate ballot transit time in
light of the postal delays servicemembers routinely faced. See, e.g., id. at 18,891 (statement of Sen.
Chuck Schumer). The Senate adopted the amendment and passed the underlying defense authorization
bill. See id. at 18,993, 19,051–52. The conference committee on the defense authorization bill kept the
provision for a forty-five day ballot transmission deadline but adopted a technical amendment. See
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request, states must use electronic means (rather than the postal system) to
transmit to the servicemember a voter registration application, an
application for an absentee ballot, and even the blank, unmarked ballot
itself.260 States must develop a system for servicemembers to track
whether the servicemember’s local election official has received the
servicemember’s voted ballot.261
H.R. REP. NO. 111-288, at 744 (2009). The provision became law along with the rest of the military
voting language attached to the defense authorization bill. See Military and Overseas Voter
Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 579(a)(1), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2322 (2009).
260. See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(6)–(7), (e)(1), (f)(1)(A) (2018). Congress enacted these
provisions after hearing testimony that electronic transmission of election documents could reduce
delays and other difficulties related to registering to vote and casting a ballot. See Hearings and
Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 353, 355–56, 361–62, 368, 369, 371,
376, 457, 468, 484–86, 492, 529–30, 560–61, 565–68, 598–99, 616–17, 619 (2009); Hearing on
Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 6, 27–28, 40, 45–46, 58–60, 66, 103–04, 131–
32, 136–39, 157, 167, 181, 193–94, 197, 204 (2009). Omnibus military voting legislation introduced
in the Senate required states to use e-mail, fax, or other electronic means to transmit voter registration
applications, absentee ballot applications, as well as blank, unmarked ballots, if requested by a
servicemember. See S. 1415, 111th Cong. §§ 3–4 (as introduced, July 8, 2009). An amendment in
committee changed references from “email” and “facsimile” transmission to a more general
“electronic” transmission to avoid requiring the use of these technologies if they later became obsolete.
See S. 1415, 111th Cong. §§ 4–5 (as reported by S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009); see
also Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 644, 649 (2009).
The committee reported the bill favorably. See id. at 645. The chief sponsor announced he would
propose the text of the reported bill as an amendment to an upcoming defense authorization bill. See
id. at 639. With minor changes, the sponsor’s amendment largely tracked the language in the reported
bill requiring electronic transmission of election materials. See 155 CONG. REC. 18,800–01 (2009).
During floor debate over the amendment, senators expressed their belief that digital transmission of
election materials would speed up the voting process and help overcome the delays associated with
traditional mail. See, e.g., id. at 18,993 (statement of Sen. Ben Nelson). The Senate adopted the
amendment and passed the underlying defense authorization bill. See id. at 18,993, 19,051–52. A
conference committee on the defense authorization bill kept the electronic transmission provisions but
adopted technical amendments. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-288, at 743–44 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). The
provisions became law along with the rest of the military voting language attached to the defense
authorization bill. See Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, secs.
577(a), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2319–20 (2009); id. sec. 578(a), § 102, 123 Stat. at 2321.
261. 52 U.S.C. § 20302(h) (2018). Congress enacted this provision after hearing testimony that
military voters often wondered whether their voted ballots had reached election officials, given the
uncertainties of the military postal system. Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules &
Admin., 111th Cong. 362–63, 364–65, 454, 475–76, 526–31, 593, 609–10 (2009); Hearing on Military
and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections
of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 34, 41–42, 100–05, 176–77, 197 (2009). In response to
this testimony, members of Congress introduced multiple bills creating a ballot tracking system. The
bills differed in their approach: two would have applied only to overseas servicemembers and made
the federal government responsible for creating and administering the system, while one would have
imposed this responsibility on the states and applied regardless of a servicemember’s location.
Compare S. 1026, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (2019), and H.R. 2393, 111th Cong. § 3(a) (as reported by
Comm. on H. Admin., Oct. 1, 2009), with S. 1415, 111th Cong. § 7(d) (as reported by S. Comm. on
Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009). The Senate attached the latter language to a defense authorization
bill for the upcoming fiscal year. See 155 CONG. REC. 18,802 (2009); id. at 18,993. The provision
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UOCAVA also establishes two federal forms—the Federal Post Card
Application (FPCA) and the Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot (FWAB)—
that military voters can use in order to register and vote.262 A single form
with two functions, the FPCA entitles a servicemember to both register to
vote and request an absentee ballot, irrespective of whether a state requires
other forms for these purposes.263 States may not refuse to process these
forms for being submitted too early under state law and must process these
forms if election officials receive them at least thirty days in advance of
an election, irrespective of any state deadline.264 For military personnel
became law following enactment of the bill. See Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub.
L. No. 111-84, sec. 580(d), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2325 (2009).
262. See Federal Post Card Application, Std. Form No. 76, OMB No. 0704-0503 (Fed. Voting
Ass’t Prgm. Apr. 2019); Federal Write-In Absentee Ballot, Std. Form No. 186, OMB No. 0704-0502
(Fed. Voting Ass’t Prgm. Apr. 2019).
263. See 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(4) (2018). Congress created the FPCA in the 1942 military voting
legislation. See 50 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1955). This legislation required states to
send ballots to servicemembers who completed and returned an FPCA. See id. § 307. Follow-up
legislation two years later repealed the mandate and merely recommended that states accept the FPCA
as both a request for an absentee ballot and a voter registration application. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 322, 324
(Supp. IV 1944) (repealed 1955). By 2001, all states voluntarily accepted the FPCA. See Federal
Election Practices and Procedures: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 107th
Cong. 113 (2001) (testimony of Samuel F. Wright, Co-Chair, Uniformed Services Voting Rights
Committee, Reserve Officers Association). Bills in both chambers of Congress would have cemented
the status quo by requiring states to accept the FPCA for both voter registration and absentee ballot
requests. See, e.g., S. 1261, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(C) (2001); H.R. 1997, 107th Cong. § 3(a)(1)(C)
(2001). Although neither bill received a hearing, a Senate committee later suggested a similar proposal.
See S. REP. NO. 107-62, at 306 (2001). The committee reported a defense authorization bill which
included language mandating use of the FPCA. See S. 1416, 107th Cong. § 575 (as reported by S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., Sept. 12, 2001). The conference committee on the defense authorization bill
combined this language with a related provision. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-333, at 734–35 (2001) (Conf.
Rep.). The FPCA mandate became law along with the rest of the defense authorization bill. See
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107, sec. 1606, § 102, 115
Stat. 1012, 1278 (2001) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(4) (2018)).
264. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(2), 20306 (2018). Although related, the two provisions date
from different eras. The thirty-day deadline for processing is a holdover from the 1975 overseas voting
legislation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973dd-2(a) (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1986). The early submission
provision dates from 2001, when members of Congress in both chambers had introduced legislation
with this language. See S. 731, 107th Cong. § 5(a) (2001); H.R. 1377, 107th Cong. § 5(a) (2001).
Neither bill received a committee hearing, but the bills’ language appeared the next year in an
amendment during Senate debate over an omnibus election reform bill. See 148 CONG. REC. 1209
(2002). A co-sponsor of the amendment stated that servicemembers needed to be able to submit early
requests for absentee ballots given the “rapid deployments, temporary duties, and unexpected
assignment changes” inherent in military service. Id. at 1210 (statement of Sen. Wayne Allard).
Another co-sponsor considered the amendment necessary for servicemembers who “are out on some
bivouac for a week someplace or are out in a combat zone somewhere for a month and don’t get back”
in time to vote. Id. at 1211 (statement of Sen. Bob Smith). A third co-sponsor observed that “[w]ith
mail delays, remote deployments and other very real circumstances, it can take literally months [for
servicemembers] to complete the multi-step process” of registering to vote and casting a ballot,
requiring legislative assistance to enable servicemembers “to plan ahead, especially when they are
going to be deployed during an election.” Id. at 1212 (statement of Sen. Dick Lugar). The Senate
adopted the amendment without a recorded vote. See id. at 1213. The language eventually became law
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who timely request an absentee ballot but do not receive that ballot in time
to vote, these voters may cast a ballot on the FWAB even if a state requires
votes to be cast on the state’s own official ballot.265 While states may
following enactment of the underlying omnibus election reform legislation. See Help America Vote
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, sec. 706(a), § 104, 116 Stat. 1666, 1725 (2002) (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. § 20306 (2018)).
265. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(3), 20303 (2018). The FWAB traces its roots to the federal “war
ballot” created by the 1944 military voting legislation. See 50 U.S.C. § 333 (Supp. IV 1944) (repealed
1946). That legislation permitted servicemembers to vote on a “war ballot” printed and distributed by
the federal government, but only if permitted by state law and then only under certain additional
conditions (which varied based on whether a servicemember was stationed domestically or overseas).
See id. § 332(b). No state law authorized use of the war ballot for domestic servicemembers, and fewer
than half the states authorized its use for servicemembers stationed overseas. See ROBERT P.
PATTERSON ET AL., U.S. WAR BALLOT COMM’N, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES WAR BALLOT
COMMISSION TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES ¶ 26(c)(3) (1945), reprinted in S. DOC. NO.
79-6, at 12 (1945). Congress repealed the provisions for war ballots in 1946 in part because of the war
ballot’s limited adoption. See DAVID ET AL., supra note 95, reprinted in H.R. DOC. NO. 82-407, at 20
(1952). Four decades later, Congress enacted the FWAB provision in response to testimony from
servicemember organizations, election administrators, and the director of the Federal Voting
Assistance Program that servicemembers often did not receive ballots in time to return them by the
relevant state deadline because of delays in the absentee voting process outside the servicemember’s
control. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-765, at 10–13 (1986); see also Uniformed and Overseas Citizens
Absentee Voting: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the Comm. on H. Admin., 99th Cong.
13–14, 29, 39, 45, 79, 89, 104, 110 (1986). During floor debate over the bill, members of Congress
commented that the FWAB was necessary in light of the unreliability of foreign postal systems: “for
those Americans overseas—particularly the men and women serving the Nation in the Armed
Forces—it has been, at times, not a right but a matter of luck to get one’s ballot back in time to be
counted,” because “[i]n many foreign countries, an absentee ballot is just as likely to disappear forever
as it is to get to the polling place on time.” 132 CONG. REC. 21,894 (1986) (statement of Sen. Wendell
Ford); see also id. at 20,976 (statement of Rep. Frank Annunzio). Other debate on the bill noted that
many states sent out ballots too late, leaving too little time for servicemembers to receive the ballot,
vote, and return the ballot by the relevant state deadline. See id. at 20,976 (statement of Rep. Al Swift).
The FWAB provision became law with the enactment of the overhaul of military and overseas civilian
voting legislation. See Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, Pub. L. No. 99-410
§ 103, 100 Stat. 924, 925–26 (1986) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20303). Congress initially
limited use of the FWAB to overseas voters (irrespective of military status) and general elections. See
id. § 103, 100 Stat. at 925–26. In 2004, a Senate committee proposed allowing domestic
servicemembers to use the FWAB because “[o]perational considerations and the mobility of military
personnel often make it difficult for them to specify accurately the mailing address they will be using
in the period immediately prior to a general election,” and “[c]hanges in deployment schedules or
receipt of orders with short notice may prevent [servicemembers] from receiving state-provided
absentee ballots in the mail in time for the election.” S. REP. NO. 108-260, at 334 (2004). The
committee reported a defense authorization bill to the Senate which included a provision expanding
FWAB use to domestic servicemembers. See S. 2400, 108th Cong. § 572(b)(2) (as reported by S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., May 11, 2004). The conference committee on the defense authorization bill
kept the provision with a technical amendment. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-767, at 679–80 (2004) (Conf.
Rep.). The provision became law with the rest of the bill. See Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, sec. 566(c)(2), § 103, 118 Stat. 1811,
1919 (2004) (codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20303 (2018)). In 2009, Congress followed up with omnibus
military voting legislation which included a provision requiring states to honor the FWAB in special,
primary, and runoff elections in addition to general elections. See Military and Overseas Voter
Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 581(a)(1), § 103, 123 Stat. 2190, 2326 (2009) (codified
at 52 U.S.C. § 20303 (2018)).
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require an oath or affirmation from military voters as part of the
registration and voting process, UOCAVA obligates states to accept the
oath drafted by the federal agency charged with overseeing military
voting.266 UOCAVA also prohibits states from requiring notarization of
voter registration applications, applications for an absentee ballot, or
FWABs.267
266. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(a)(5) (2018). This provision traces its roots to the 1942 military
voting legislation, which prescribed language for oaths to be included on both the FPCA and the war
ballot; the legislation obligated states to accept this oath as sufficient. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 303, 306(a)
(Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1944). Follow-up legislation also proscribed oath language, but Congress no
longer required that states accept it. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 327(c) (Supp. IV 1944) (repealed 1946). In
2001, two bills contained language creating a standard oath for use with military voting materials and
requiring states to accept that oath as sufficient to satisfy any oath or affirmation requirement in state
law. See S. 1261, 107th Cong. § 6(b)(2)(C) (2001); H.R. 1997, 107th Cong. § 6(b)(2)(C) (2001).
Neither bill received a hearing, but a House committee reported omnibus election reform legislation
containing similar language. See H.R. 3295, 107th Cong. § 605(b)(2)(C) (as reported by Comm. on
H. Admin., Dec. 10, 2001); H.R. REP. NO. 107-329, pt. 1, at 52–53 (2001). The Senate replaced the
mandatory provision with language requiring a federal agency to study the issue. See H.R. 3295, 107th
Cong. § 409(a)(2) (as passed by the Senate, Apr. 11, 2002). The language calling for a study originated
as an amendment during debate on the Senate floor; the Senate adopted the amendment without
discussion. See 148 CONG. REC. 4226 (2002). The conference committee on the election bill rejected
the Senate’s proposal for a study and instead kept the mandatory language from the House. See H.R.
REP. NO. 107-730, at 79 (2002) (Conf. Rep.). The “standard oath” provision became law following
enactment of the underlying election bill. See Help America Vote Act, Pub. L. No. 107-252, sec.
705(b)(2)(C), § 102(a), 116 Stat. 1666, 1725 (2002) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(a)(5)
(2018)).
267. See 52 U.S.C. §§ 20302(i)(1), 20303(f)(1) (2018). These provisions trace their roots to the
1942 military voting legislation: if a commissioned officer attested to a servicemember’s oath on the
envelope accompanying a war ballot, that would “constitute prima facie evidence that the voter is
qualified to vote, unless the statements contained in such oath indicate the contrary.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 306(a) (Supp. II 1942) (repealed 1944); see also id. § 308. However, Congress later allowed states
to choose whether or not to accept commissioned officers’ attestations. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 325(b)
(1946) (repealed 1955). Congress enacted the current notarization provisions in 2009, after committees
in both chambers heard testimony about the burdens of locating a notary while deployed overseas. See
Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 453, 469, 569–70, 608–
09 (2009); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 140–41, 168, 190,
197–98 (2009). The notarization provisions originated in a Senate bill introduced that year which
would have prohibiting states from rejecting a servicemember’s voter registration application,
absentee ballot request, marked absentee ballot, or FWAB because the servicemember failed to have
the document notarized. See S. 1415, 111th Cong. § 8(a)–(b) (as introduced, July 8, 2009). A Senate
committee removed language characterizing notarization as a “technical” requirement. See S. 1415,
111th Cong. § 9(a)–(b) (as reported by S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., July 16, 2009). The committee
favorably reported the bill as amended. See Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules &
Admin., 111th Cong. 645 (2009). The bill’s chief sponsor announced he would propose the text of the
reported bill as an amendment to an upcoming defense authorization bill. See id. at 639. The
notarization prohibition in the proposed amendment tracked the reported bill’s language exactly. See
155 CONG. REC. 18,802 (2009). During Senate debate on the amendment, the chief sponsor noted the
burden notary requirements impose on servicemembers stationed overseas: “I ask my colleagues, how
can a marine in Fallujah find a notary? Why are we making things so hard?” Id. at 18,991 (statement
of Sen. Chuck Schumer). The Senate adopted the amendment and passed the underlying defense
authorization bill. See id. at 18,993, 19,051–52. The notarization language became law along with the
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Aside from its mandates to states, federal law also requires federal
agencies to play a supporting role in military voting. For instance, certain
military offices must provide information about and assistance with the
registration and voting process.268 Additionally, federal postal agencies
will transport military election materials free of postage.269 For
servicemembers serving outside the United States, the federal government
collects marked ballots and delivers them to the appropriate election
officials in the United States.270
Congress might also enact new legislation. For instance, Congress
recently considered an omnibus election reform bill which provides,
among other things, an explicit private right of action for violations of
UOCAVA.271 The bill also provides that in a UOCAVA enforcement
action, “the only necessary party defendant is the State, and it shall not be
a defense to any such action that a local election official or a unit of local
government is not named as a defendant,”272 even if the state has
delegated election administration duties to a local jurisdiction. Because
many military voters submit a FWAB without first registering to vote, a
broad array of voices has proposed requiring states to accept the FWAB
as a voter registration instrument, potentially reducing the number of
rejected military ballots.273 Congress could also consider ordering the
rest of the military voting language attached to the defense authorization bill. See Military and
Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, sec. 582(a), § 102, 123 Stat. 2190, 2327 (2009)
(codified at 52 U.S.C. § 20302(i)(1) (2018)); id. sec. 582(b), § 103, 123 Stat. at 2327 (codified at 52
U.S.C. § 20303(f)(1) (2018)).
268. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1566–1566a (2018).
269. See 39 U.S.C. § 3406 (2018). Congress first provided for free postage in World War II-era
military voting legislation and expanded the categories of eligible materials over time. See 50 U.S.C.
§ 303 (Supp. II 1942), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 352 (Supp. IV 1944), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 352
(1946), amended by 50 U.S.C. § 352 (Supp. IV 1950) (current version at 39 U.S.C. § 3406 (2018)).
270. See 52 U.S.C. § 20304 (2018).
271. See H.R. 1, 116th Cong. § 1702(a) (as passed by the House, Mar. 8, 2019); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 116-15, pt. 1, at 164 (2019). Testimony before Congress has supported the addition to
UOCAVA of a private right of action. See Military and Overseas Voting: Effectiveness of the MOVE
Act in the 2010 Elections: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 112th Cong. 253, 260, 900 (2011).
The Uniform Law Commission recommends that states authorize a private right of action for
injunctive relief as a matter of state law. See UNIFORM MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT § 18(a)
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). For a discussion of whether UOCAVA contains an implied private right
of action or whether private parties could sue to enforce it under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Daniel P. Tokaji,
Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L.
REV. 113, 142–46 (2010).
272. H.R. 1 § 1702(a); see also H.R. REP. NO. 116-15, pt. 1, at 164. Such a provision would help
defeat state arguments that states cannot be held liable under UOCAVA for the noncompliance of their
local governments who typically administer elections. See Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism,
supra note 71, at 764–71, 796.
273. See Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 468, 485
(2009); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 59, 167 (2009); PCEA
REPORT, supra note 70, at 60; Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 57–58.
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Department of Defense to automatically update election officials with a
military voter’s new address every time the servicemember receives orders
for a permanent change of station or for a lengthy deployment (or returns
from such a deployment).274
Additionally, social science evidence suggests that voter-friendly
state rules regarding voter registration and ballot transit are positively
correlated with rates of military ballot return and negatively correlated
with military ballot rejection.275 This evidence could give credence to
proposals both in the literature and among election administration
practitioners for Congress to loosen restrictive state election regulations.
For instance, scholars, election administrators, blue-ribbon election reform
commissions, and even the Uniform Law Commission suggest that states
be required to count military ballots voted and dispatched on or before
election day but received some time after election day.276 Testimony
before Congress has suggested requiring states to accept electronic
transmission of election materials from servicemembers.277
Other proposals seek to aid military voters by leveraging existing
military infrastructure, such as the Common Access Card (CAC). Issued
by the Department of Defense to servicemembers and related civilian
personnel, the CAC is an identification card with embedded cryptographic
274. See, e.g., Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 612
(2009) (testimony of Gail McGinn, Acting Undersecretary for Personnel and Readiness, U.S.
Department of Defense); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential
Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong.
43–44 (2009) (testimony of Tom Bush, Acting Director, Federal Voting Assistance Program); cf. 52
U.S.C. § 1566a(a)–(b). A permanent change of station is “[t]he detail, or transfer of a Service member
or unit to a different [permanent duty station] under a competent travel order that does not specify the
duty as temporary, provide for further assignment to a new [permanent duty station], or direct return
to the old [permanent duty station].” Procedures for Military Personnel Assignments, Instruction No.
1315.18, at 68 (U.S. Dep’t of Def. June 24, 2019). A deployment is “[t]he movement of forces into
and out of an operational area.” OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T
OF DEF., JOINT PUB. 3-35, DEPLOYMENT AND REDEPLOYMENT OPERATIONS, at GL-7 (2018).
275. See Hall, supra note 76, at 164. The analysis leading to this conclusion includes overseas
civilians. See id.
276. See Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 111th Cong. 609
(2009) (testimony of Patricia Hollarn, former Supervisors of Elections, Okaloosa County, Florida);
Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 42 (2009) (testimony of Rokey
W. Suleman, II, General Registrar, Fairfax County Office of Elections); UNIFORM MILITARY AND
OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT §§ 10, 12 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010); JIMMY CARTER & JAMES A. BAKER,
III ET AL., COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS: REPORT
OF THE COMMISSION ON FEDERAL ELECTION REFORM ¶ 4.4.6, at 39 (2005); GERALD R. FORD &
JIMMY CARTER ET AL., NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND
CONFIDENCE IN THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 43 (2001); INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 98;
Huefner, Lessons, supra note 111, at 878; Inbody, Voting, supra note 68, at 58–59.
277. See Compilations and Hearings and Markups: Hearings and Markups Before the S. Comm.
on Rules & Admin., 113th Cong. 130, 159, 168, 169, 170 (2014).
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technology containing biometric and other data which enables the user to
access a host of secure online military computer systems and networks as
well as physical military facilities and installations.278 Election
administrators, veterans, and scholars alike have urged Congress to
require states to accept the CAC and its digital authentication procedures
as sufficient to identify a military voter for purposes of registration
and voting.279
To be clear, other sources of constitutional authority may empower
Congress to enact some of the existing law and proposed legislation. The
important point here is that the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement
Clause also authorizes congressional action.280
IV. POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS
A. Scope: Purposeful Discrimination vs. Disparate Impact
The first possible objection to potential Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation to address felon disenfranchisement and military
voting concerns discriminatory purpose. Burdens on voting that merely
impact men more than women—what might be termed “unconscious or
accidental discrimination”281—are beyond the reach of Congress, the
argument goes, because the creators of those burdens did not intend to
deny or abridge men’s voting rights. However, the Woman Suffrage
Amendment’s legislative history and the background legal environment in

278. See Technology for Secure Identity Documents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Government Management, Organization, and Procurement of the Comm. on Oversight and
Government Reform, Serial No. 110-90, 110th Cong. 18, 22 (2007) (testimony of Benjamin Brink,
Assistant Public Printer for Security and Intelligent Documents, Government Printing Office);
Mathison Hall, Commentary, Testing the Security of Government Sites, BALT. SUN, Mar. 10, 2016
(News), at 15; Jon R. Lindsay, Surviving the Quantum Cryptocalypse, STRATEGIC STUD. Q., Summer
2020, at 49, 53.
279. See Military and Overseas Voting in 2012: Hearing Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 113th
Cong. 11, 21–23, 28, 33, 57–58, 60–61 (2013); Hearing on Military and Overseas Voting: Obstacles
and Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the H.R. Comm. on H. Admin.,
111th Cong. 33–34 (2009) (testimony of Jessie Jane Duff, retired, U.S. Marine Corps.); INBODY,
SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 159.
280. This Article takes no position on the merits of existing statutory protections or proposals
for future legislation. Given the breadth of current protections and policy proposals—consider the
wide gap between, for instance, requiring states to count military ballots received by mail in the days
following election day and requiring states to accept military ballots cast via the Internet using
Common Access Card authentication—policy questions lie beyond this Article’s scope. This Article
seeks only to establish the bounds of congressional authority, not to attempt a normative defense of
any particular idea.
281. David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the
Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 285, 289 (1998).

1196

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:1147

1919 demonstrate that the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power can
reach barriers to the ballot lacking a discriminatory purpose.282
1. Intratextualist Analysis
Several scholars have argued that the discriminatory purpose
requirement of other constitutional provisions limits the ability of
Congress to enforce those constitutional provisions. These scholars
observe that election rules or procedures violate neither the Fourteenth nor
Fifteenth Amendment absent a discriminatory purpose to deny or abridge
the right to vote on the basis of race or color.283 In light of the
discriminatory intent requirement, these scholars argue that enforcement
legislation which abrogates state felon disenfranchisement laws on the
basis of a racially disparate impact alone is constitutionally
questionable.284 Both courts and scholars have used a similar “intent” or
“purpose” framework when analyzing the Twenty-sixth Amendment in
light of the parallel language in the Fifteenth and Twenty-sixth
Amendments.285 Applying these analyses to the similarly worded
Nineteenth Amendment would suggest that the Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement power cannot reach felon disenfranchisement laws
or the voting difficulties that accompany military service unless states
282. This Article takes no position on whether the Nineteenth Amendment—of its own force,
independently of any enforcement legislation—reaches state conduct lacking a discriminatory
purpose. Cf. Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 69 & n.276; Fish, supra note 65, at 1216.
283. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 62–70 (1980) (plurality opinion),
superseded by statute, Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, sec. 3, § 2(a), 96
Stat. 131, 134 (1982) (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a)); Travis Crum, The Superfluous
Fifteenth Amendment?, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 1549, 1563–64 (2020). Election regulations may violate
the Fourteenth Amendment even in the absence of a racially discriminatory purpose if they fail a
balancing test which weighs the burdens on voting against the state’s interest in its regulation. See
Edward B. Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836, 1847–51
(2013); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: Explanations
and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 318 (2007). That burdens/interests balancing test is not at
issue here.
284. See Clegg et al., Case Against, supra note 61, at 14–16; Roger Clegg et al., The Bullet and
the Ballot? The Case for Felon Disenfranchisement Statutes, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
1, 19–22 (2006); Clegg, Who Should Vote?, supra note 54, at 168–72; Hasen, Uncertain
Congressional Power, supra note 54, at 780–83; von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1379–83.
No scholarship engages in a similar analysis with regard to military voters.
285. See Luft v. Evers, 963 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2020); League of Women Voters of Fla., Inc.
v. Detzner, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1205, 1221 (N.D. Fla. 2018); Lee v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 188 F.
Supp. 3d 577, 609–10 (E.D. Va.), aff’d, 843 F.3d 592, 607 (4th Cir. 2016); N.C. State Conf. of NAACP
v. McCrory, 182 F. Supp. 3d 320, 522–23 (M.D.N.C.), rev’d on other grounds, 831 F.3d 204, 242 (4th
Cir. 2016); Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–77; Fish, supra note 65, at 1216; Caitlin Foley, Comment,
A Twenty-sixth Amendment Challenge to State Voter ID Laws, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 585, 615–16;
Nancy Turner, Comment, The Young and the Restless: How the Twenty-sixth Amendment Could Play
a Role in the Current Debate over Voting Laws, 64 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1515 (2015). Compare U.S.
CONST. amend. XV, § 1, with U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
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design these burdens with the intent of denying or abridging the voting
rights of men.
These intratextualist analyses do not compel the conclusion that
Congress is bound by a discriminatory purpose requirement when enacting
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. Arguments to engraft a
discriminatory purpose restriction onto the Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement power “simply [due to] the similarity of its text to that of the
Fifteenth [and Twenty-sixth] Amendment[s], without further
explanation,” rest “on thin reasoning.”286 Intratextualist arguments that
would limit the reach of enforcement legislation to state conduct bearing
a discriminatory purpose ignore the background against which the Sixtysixth Congress proposed the Woman Suffrage Amendment to the states.287
Indeed, courts explicitly recognize the possibility that an
intentional discrimination requirement similar to that found in the
Reconstruction Amendments may not carry over to other similarly worded
constitutional provisions.288
To be clear, courts and scholars need not jettison the intratextualist
principle that “strongly parallel language is a strong (presumptive)
argument for parallel interpretation”289 to reject the contention that
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation may reach only
purposeful discrimination. Rather, they need only recognize that the
presumption for parallel interpretation can be overcome.290 As to the
Nineteenth Amendment, that presumption is particularly weak. The
presumption for parallel interpretation may be strongest when the history
of a constitutional provision reveals little about original intent: when
“advocates and opponents of [a provision] had a range of goals and
rationales, many of which shifted over time,” turning the “search[] for a

286. Yael Bromberg, Youth Voting Rights and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-sixth
Amendment, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1105, 1161–64 (2019).
287. Cf. Fish, supra note 65, at 1216.
288. See Lee, 843 F.3d at 607; Walgren v. Bd. of Selectmen of Amherst, 519 F.2d 1364, 1367
(1st Cir. 1975); Nashville Student Org. Comm. v. Hargett, 155 F. Supp. 3d 749, 757 (M.D. Tenn.
2015).
289. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 789; see also Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–75;
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?, supra note 133, at 1198 n.12.
290. Even intratextualism’s primary scholarly champion agrees that “perhaps doctrinal rules for
implementing the Fifteenth Amendment . . . should [in certain circumstances] diverge from those
doctrinal rules implementing the Nineteenth Amendment, despite their textually parallel form.” Amar,
Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 800 n.202. This quote preceded language suggesting that if two
textually similar constitutional provisions “were initially designed to work together, [but] their
underlying problems have evolved in different ways,” then constitutional interpreters should “adapt
each clause’s doctrine to fit the new shape of problems.” Id. at 800. But good cause to vary the
constitutional interpretation of textually similar constitutional provisions can also arise for other
reasons. See infra section IV.B.1.
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dominant ‘original intent’ behind [the provision into] a quixotic task.” 291
But the clarity and consistency of the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s
historical record and the subsequent (though limited) Nineteenth
Amendment jurisprudence easily overcomes the intratextualist
presumption to impute a purposeful discrimination requirement from the
Reconstruction Amendments into the Nineteenth Amendment’s
enforcement power.
2. Legislative and Judicial history
The legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 and its
predecessors demonstrates that the Nineteenth Amendment empowers
Congress to address barriers to the ballot that fall unequally between the
sexes, irrespective of the intent behind those barriers. For instance, one
report of the Senate Committee on Woman Suffrage stated that “ballot
box . . . regulations [should be] designed to protect the voter and guarantee
the freedom of elections,” and explained that if women are entitled to vote,
“her right is equivalent to man, and like man, she should have [that right]
unhampered by any restriction that is not common to both.” 292 In other
words, the suffrage supporters in Congress concerned themselves with
ensuring equal access to the ballot between men and women, not on the
motivation for any barriers to equal access.
Supporting this broad read of congressional authority are the major
concerns motivating the Sixty-sixth Congress to propose the Woman
Suffrage Amendment to the states. Proponents of House Joint Resolution
1 and its predecessors desired to reward women both for their public
contributions to society (especially the war effort) and their private
contributions as caregivers to the family, but suffrage supporters in
Congress also sought to secure for themselves and their allies the political
and electoral benefits of enfranchising a new class of voters.293 To
accomplish those ends, the Sixty-sixth Congress sought to extend the
ballot to women.294 If voting restrictions deprived women of the honor the
franchise—and therefore also deprived members and their allies of this
new source of electoral support—suffrage supporters undoubtedly would
have mobilized in Congress to end these barriers, “whether or not [they]
intentionally target[ed] women.”295

291. Cheng, supra note 133, at 668 (“ranges of goals and rationales”); id. at 673 (“quixotic task”).
292. See S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 1, 4 (1916).
293. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 554–59; supra Section II.B.2.
294. See H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong., 41 Stat. 362 (1919).
295. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 561.
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The Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence in existence during the
1919 passage of House Joint Resolution 1 supports this theory.296 The
Supreme Court’s Fifteenth Amendment decisions as of 1919 required only
that enforcement legislation bear some connection to the constitutional
proscription against voting discrimination on account of race or color.297
Beyond that, the Court respected the breadth and depth of the
congressional enforcement power to protect voting rights. 298
“The Sixty-Sixth Congress understood this; it believed that its power to
draft enforcement legislation was broad and that it had discretion to
construct long chains connecting enforcement legislation to the
constitutional prohibition.” 299
Legislative activity pursuant to the then-recently ratified Eighteenth
Amendment further supports the argument that the Nineteenth
Amendment enforcement power authorizes Congress to attack restrictions
on the franchise even if the Nineteenth Amendment does not itself prohibit
those restrictions.300 The Sixty-sixth Congress enacted Eighteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation which prohibited a broader swath of
conduct than prohibited by the Eighteenth Amendment itself, suggesting
Congress possesses similar authority under its Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement power.
The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited only “the manufacture, sale,
or transportation of intoxicating liquors . . . for beverage purposes.”301
The Sixty-sixth Congress—the same Congress to propose the Woman
Suffrage Amendment to the states—enacted Eighteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation which exceed the scope of the Eighteenth
Amendment’s prohibition in two important ways. First, the legislation—
formally entitled the National Prohibition Act and commonly called the
Volstead Act—prohibited (among other things) the possession of
intoxicating liquors,302 even though the Eighteenth Amendment did not.
Second, the statute defined “intoxicating liquor” as
alcohol, brandy, whisky [sic], rum, gin, beer, ale, porter, and wine,
and in addition thereto any spirituous, vinous, malt, or fermented
296. For additional discussion of the state of Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence in 1919, see
id. at 549–51.
297. See id. at 549–51.
298. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884).
299. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 551.
300. For additional discussion of the role the Eighteenth Amendment plays in the interpretation
of the Nineteenth Amendment, see id. at 546–49.
301. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1 (emphasis added).
302. National Prohibition Act, Pub. L. No. 66-66, tit. II, § 3, 41 Stat. 305, 308 (1919) (emphasis
added) (repealed 1935). The informal title “Volstead Act” came from the statute’s chief sponsor, Rep.
Andrew Volstead of Minnesota. See Scott Schaeffer, The Legislative Rise and Populist Fall of the
Eighteenth Amendment: Chicago and the Failure of Prohibition, 26 J.L. & POL. 385, 398 (2011).
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liquor, liquids, and compounds, whether medicated, proprietary,
patented, or not, and by whatever name called, containing onehalf of 1 per centum or more of alcohol by volume which are fit
for use for beverage purposes[.]303
This contrasted with the Eighteenth Amendment itself, which
contained but did not define the term “intoxicating liquor.” However,
“leading physicians, chemists, and toxicologists” of the era believed “that
liquids containing less than 2.75 per cent alcohol are not intoxicating”
because a human body could not consume a sufficient volume of these
liquids quickly enough to introduce alcohol into the bloodstream faster
than the body would metabolize the alcohol out of the bloodstream.304 As
a biological matter, these medical and scientific professionals opined, such
a “liquid cannot possibly intoxicate.”305 In other words, while the
Eighteenth Amendment prohibited only intoxicating liquors, Congress
prohibited non-intoxicating fluids, as well.
Courts sanctioned the statute’s overbreadth on both counts. Lower
courts repeatedly upheld congressional authority to prohibit the possession
of alcoholic beverages, notwithstanding that the Eighteenth Amendment
did not prohibit possession. 306 In a decision issued three days after the
ratification of the Woman Suffrage Amendment, the Supreme Court
upheld the National Prohibition Act against claims that its one-half-ofone-percent definition impermissibly broadened the Eighteenth
Amendment’s scope:
While recognizing that there are limits beyond which Congress
cannot go in treating beverages as within its power of
enforcement, we think those limits are not transcended by the
provision of the Volstead Act (title 2, § 1), wherein liquors
containing as much as one-half of 1 per cent. of alcohol by volume
and fit for use for beverage purposes are treated as within that
power.307
Contemporaneous scholarship agreed that Congress could prohibit
beverages with only minimal alcohol content and even non-alcoholic

303. Pub. L. No. 66-66, tit. II, § 1, 41 Stat. at 307–08 (emphasis added).
304. Defining the Term “Intoxicating Liquors” Under the Wartime Prohibition Act and the
Eighteenth Amendment, 89 CENT. L.J. 57, 58 (1919).
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Riggs v. United States, 14 F.2d 5, 7–9 (4th Cir. 1926); Jordan v. United States,
299 F. 298, 299 (9th Cir. 1924); Massey v. United States, 281 F.3d 293, 294–95 (8th 1922); Page v.
United States, 278 F. 41, 43–44 (9th Cir. 1922); Rose v. United States, 274 F. 245, 248–49 (6th Cir.
1921).
307. National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 387–88 (1920); see also Vigliotti v.
Pennsylvania, 258 U.S. 403, 408–09 (1922).

2020] The Woman Suffrage Amendment & the Voting Rights of Men 1201
beverages in its quest to enforce the Eighteenth Amendment’s prohibition
on intoxicating liquors.308
In other words, both the Supreme Court and the literature endorsed
the view of the Sixty-sixth Congress that the Eighteenth Amendment
enforcement power allowed legislation to sweep more broadly than the
Eighteenth Amendment itself.309 Given the similarly worded enforcement
language in the Woman Suffrage Amendment (which, again, was
proposed by the same Congress that enacted the National Prohibition Act),
the Supreme Court’s decision suggests that the Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement power reaches barriers to the ballot restricting one
sex more heavily than the other, irrespective of the intent or purpose
behind the restriction.
Nothing in the limited Nineteenth Amendment jurisprudence
contradicts this read of the legislative history and the background
jurisprudence of the Fifteenth and Eighteenth Amendment Enforcement
Clauses. The Supreme Court has never held that the Woman Suffrage
Amendment limits Congress to combating only those voting restrictions
intended to keep voters from the voting booth on account of sex.310 In fact,
the Supreme Court has applied the Nineteenth Amendment in only two
decisions, the first of which merely decided that the Woman Suffrage
Amendment became a valid part of the Constitution. 311
To be clear, the second decision used language suggesting that state
action purposefully designed to depress the vote of one sex over another
would violate the Woman Suffrage Amendment. On review of a
Nineteenth Amendment challenge to a Georgia state statute, the Supreme
Court wrote, “It is fanciful to suggest that the Georgia law is a mere
disguise under which to deny or abridge the right of men to vote on account
of their sex.”312 But neither the quoted language nor the decision as whole
concern the congressional enforcement power and cannot be said to

308. See Wayne B. Wheeler, The Power of Congress to Define the Term Intoxicating Liquor, 89
CENT. L.J. 320, 321 (1919); see also George Cyrus Thorpe, Intoxicating Liquor Law, 14 Geo. L.J.
315, 319–20 (1926). But see W.W. Thornton, Legislative Definition of Constitutional Terms—
”Intoxicating Liquors,” 90 CENT. L.J. 389, 393–94 (1920).
309. The judiciary continued its endorsement of a broad Eighteenth Amendment enforcement
power in later years. For instance, the Supreme Court upheld a 1921 statute enacted by the SixtySeventh Congress barring the prescription of malt liquors for medical purposes, even though the
Eighteenth Amendment itself only prohibited liquor for beverage purposes. See James Everard’s
Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559–63 (1924).
310. Modern scholars even question whether “discriminatory purpose is always required to
establish a constitutional violation,” independent of any enforcement legislation. Hasen & Litman,
supra note 4, at 69 n.276.
311. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1922).
312. See Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 284 (1937), overruled on other grounds, Harper v.
Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966).
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address the limits of that power.313 Additionally, scholars have identified
a series of objections to the decision—its explicit sexism, implicit racism,
intellectual shortcomings, and inconsistency with modern voting rights
jurisprudence—suggesting that the decision possesses little precedential
value, whatever its holding.314
Between the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1, the state
of Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence in 1919, the enactment by the
Sixty-sixth Congress of Eighteenth Amendment enforcement legislation,
and the limited Nineteenth Amendment jurisprudence to date, the evidence
demonstrates that the congressional power to enforce the Woman Suffrage
Amendment sweeps more broadly than the congressional power to enforce
the Reconstruction Amendments. Whether or not the Nineteenth
Amendment itself—of its own force, independently of any enforcement
legislation—reaches beyond intentional voting discrimination, the
Woman Suffrage Amendment empowers Congress to combat so-called
“unconscious or accidental discrimination”315 in voting on account of sex.
B. Standard of Review: “Congruence and Proportionality” Versus
“Reasonable Relation”
A second possible objection to a robust Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement power capable of addressing felon disenfranchisement and
military voting relates to the standard of review. This possible objection
argues that courts must subject Nineteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation to the demanding “congruence and proportionality” standard of
review that has become a hallmark of the Supreme Court’s recent
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, rather than to the deferential
“reasonable relation” standard of review the Sixty-sixth Congress
expected. Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation addressing
felon disenfranchisement and military voting, the argument goes, would
not meet this heightened level of scrutiny. However, the Woman Suffrage
Amendment sufficiently differs from the Fourteenth Amendment such that

313. See id. at 283–84. In any event, language suggesting that the Nineteenth Amendment
prohibits purposeful discrimination does not negate the possibility that the provision also prohibits the
denial or abridgment of the right to vote absent a discriminatory purpose. Cf. Bromberg, supra note
286, at 1164.
314. Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 35–38; Kolbert, supra note 1, at 539. But see Ronnie L.
Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage: Female Voting Rights and the Women’s Poll Tax Repeal
Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 839, 887 (1998). For an account
of the legal history leading from Breedlove to Harper, see Bruce Ackerman & Jennifer Nou,
Canonizing the Civil Rights Revolution: The People and the Poll Tax, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 75–123
(2009).
315. Crump, supra note 281, at 289.
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the Fourteenth Amendment standard of review does not apply to
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation.
1. Intratextualist Analysis
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, “The Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.”316 “For Congress’s action to fall within its
Section 5 authority, . . . ‘[t]here must be a congruence and proportionality
between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means
adopted to that end.’”317 This standard is more demanding than the
standard previously applied to enforcement legislation under the
Reconstruction Amendments.318
The question of whether this new Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence applies to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation
has received little attention.319 However, a robust debate in the literature
questions whether Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation must
meet this heightened standard.320 Lower courts are divided.321 To scholars’
dismay, the Supreme Court has twice declined to decide the issue.322
316. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
317. Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 520 (1997)).
318. See, e.g., Edward Cantu, Normative History and Congress’s Enforcement Power Under the
Reconstruction Amendments, 21 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 119, 128–29 (2016); Crum, Superfluous, supra
note 283, at 1627–28; Vik Kanwar, A Fugitive From the Camp of the Conquerors: The Revival of
Equal Sovereignty Doctrine in Shelby County v. Holder, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 272,
305–306 (2015).
319. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 559–60.
320. Compare Joshua S. Sellers, The Irony of Intent: Statutory Interpretation and the
Constitutionality of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 LA. L. REV. 43, 46 (2015), with Janai S.
Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 635 n.273 (2013), and
Evan Tsen Lee, The Trouble With City of Boerne, and Why It Matters for the Fifteenth Amendment
As Well, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 483, 503 (2012).
321. Compare Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 241–46
(D.D.C. 2008) (three-judge court) (rational basis), rev’d on statutory grounds, 557 U.S. 193, 204
(2009) (expressing no opinion), with Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 457–62 (D.D.C.
2011) (congruence and proportionality), aff’d, 679 F.3d 848, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (congruence and
proportionality), rev’d, 570 U.S. 529, 542 n.1 (2013) (noting cryptically that “Northwest Austin guides
our review under both [the Fourteenth and Fifteenth] Amendments”).
322. See William D. Araiza, After the Tiers: Windsor, Congressional Power to Enforce Equal
Protection, and the Challenge of Pointillist Constitutionalism, 94 B.U. L. REV. 367, 384–85 (2014);
Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1576; Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, States’
Rights, Last Rites, and Voting Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 484 (2014); Christopher S. Elmendorf,
Advisory Rulemaking and the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 14 ELECTION L.J. 260, 262 n.19 (2015);
Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713,
727–28 (2014); Franita Tolson, The Law of Democracy at a Crossroads: Reflecting on Fifty Years of
Voting Rights and the Judicial Regulation of the Political Thicket, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 345, 348
n.18 (2016). But see Calvin Massey, The Effect of Shelby County on Enforcement of the
Reconstruction Amendments, 29 J. L. & POL. 397, 404 (2014).
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One set of scholarship argues that the stricter congruence and
proportionality standard applies to Fifteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation:
Both Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the
Fifteenth Amendment have materially identical language,
empowering Congress to “enforce” the respective provisions of
each Amendment “by appropriate legislation.” They were enacted
barely a half year apart from each other as part of Reconstruction.
The Court has previously interpreted both provisions in an
identical manner, analogizing both provisions to the Necessary
and Proper Clause. And both provisions raise the same separationof-powers concerns about the respective roles of Congress and the
courts in constitutional interpretation.323
Related scholarship analyzes potential Fifteenth Amendment
legislation abrogating state felon disenfranchisement laws.324 This
literature generally contends that such enforcement legislation would fail
to demonstrate the congruence and proportionality necessary to withstand
a constitutional challenge.325
Two of the arguments for extending the congruence and
proportionality standard from the Fourteenth Amendment to the Fifteenth
Amendment rely on the related nature of these Reconstruction
Amendments: their shared purpose and their ratification in close temporal
proximity.326 These points plainly do not apply to the Nineteenth
Amendment. For instance, while the states may have ratified both the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments within two years of one another,
the Nineteenth Amendment became part of the Constitution over a half323. Michael T. Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting? Congress’s Section 5 Power and the New
Equal Protection Right to Vote, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2053, 2078 (2018) (footnotes omitted); see
also Roger Clegg & Linda Chavez, An Analysis of the Reauthorized Sections 5 and 203 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965: Bad Policy and Unconstitutional, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 561, 569–70 (2007);
Mark A. Posner, Time is Still on Its Side: Why Congressional Reauthorization of Section 5 of the
Voting Rights Act Represents a Congruent and Proportional Response to Our Nation’s History of
Discrimination in Voting, 10 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 88–89 (2006); Joshua P. Thompson,
Towards a Post-Shelby County Section 5 Where a Constitutional Coverage Formula Does Not
Reauthorize the Effects Test, 34 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 585, 590 (2014); Glenn Kunkes, Note, The Times,
They Are Changing: The VRA Is No Longer Constitutional, 27 J.L. & POL. 357, 365 (2012). Some
scholarship merely predicts that the congruence-and-proportionality standard will apply in the
Fifteenth Amendment context without defending the proposition. See Evan H. Caminker,
“Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1191 n.269
(2001); Pamela S. Karlan, Two Section Twos and Two Section Fives: Voting Rights and Remedies
After Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 725 n.5 (1998).
324. No scholarship discusses whether Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to protect
military voting rights would meet the test of congruence and proportionality.
325. See Clegg, Who Should Vote?, supra note 54, at 171–72; Hasen, Uncertain Congressional
Power, supra note 54, at 780–83.
326. See, e.g., Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting, supra note 323, at 2078.
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century after Reconstruction.327 “When the parallel provisions featured by
intratextualist analysis are found in parts of the document enacted at
different times, the originalist evidentiary value of the comparison drops
off sharply.”328 Additionally, the Nineteenth Amendment lacks the
common congressional purpose of the Reconstruction Amendments: while
the Fourteenth and Fifteen Amendments were both adopted to protect
newly freed slaves, the Nineteenth Amendment was adopted to extend the
franchise to women.329
The third argument points to the nearly identical text of the
enforcement language in both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments.330 The Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause also
contains language nearly identical to section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.331 All else being equal, the intratextualist principle that
“strongly parallel language is a strong (presumptive) argument for parallel
interpretation”332 would suggest that the congruence and proportionality
test applies to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation just as it
does to Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation.
All else is not equal: key differences between the Fourteenth and
Nineteenth Amendments overcome the intratextualist presumption to
interpret similar language similarly.333 Scholars have identified multiple
arguments concerning the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments which
counsel against applying the congruence and proportionality test to
Fifteenth Amendment enforcement legislation.334 Each applies with equal
force to the Nineteenth Amendment.
The first argument might be characterized as an application of the
constitutional canon against surplusage: the presumption that no

327. Compare Ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 15 Stat. 708, 710–11 (1868), and
Ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, 16 Stat. 1131, 1131–32 (1870), with Ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment, 41 Stat. 1823, 1823 (1920).
328. Adrian Vermeule and Ernest A. Young, Hercules, Herbert, and Amar: The Trouble With
Intratextualism, 113 HARV. L. REV. 730, 765 (2000).
329. Compare KEYSSAR, supra note 87, at 69–83, with id. at 139–78.
330. See, e.g., Morley, Prophylactic Redistricting, supra note 323, at 2078.
331. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 with U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 2.
332. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 789; see also Cheng, supra note 133, at 674–75;
Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?, supra note 133, at 1198 n.12.
333. Cf. Amar, Intratextualism, supra note 133, at 800 n.202.
334. This Article assumes that congruence-and-proportionality review properly applies to
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation and seeks to establish why the same is not true of
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation. The soundness of that assumption is beyond this
Article’s scope. For contrary arguments, see AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA ’S CONSTITUTION: A
BIOGRAPHY 361–63 (1st ed. 2005); Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1801, 1810–15 (2010); Caminker, supra note 323, at 1133; Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at
1625; Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores,
111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 188 (1997). But see Cantu, supra note 318, at 124.
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constitutional provision renders another provision superfluous or
redundant.335 This argument contends that the Fifteenth Amendment’s
protection of the right to vote against denial and abridgment on account of
race or color must have some legal effect distinct from the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection of the laws.336 Because the
two constitutional provisions operate in different spheres, the argument
goes, they warrant different standards of review—especially in light of the
importance of the right to vote protected by the Fifteenth Amendment.337
The second point relates to the “specificity maxim”—that is, the
principle that when two statutory or constitutional provisions “arguably
cover the same subject, the one more specifically addressing the shared
topic governs, displacing whatever authority the more general statute [or
constitutional provision] might have provided on the question.”338
Applying the specificity maxim would employ the Fifteenth Amendment’s
more specific race-based protection in lieu of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s more general race-neutral voting rights protections when
both provisions could conceivably apply.339 “Giving the Fifteenth
Amendment independent meaning for Congress’s enforcement authority,”
this argument goes, “follows the principle that the specific should control
over the general.”340
The third argument concerns checks and balances. Scholars making
this point maintain that a tougher standard of review acts to guard against
congressional abuse of its broad Fourteenth Amendment powers, while the
narrow, voting-focused scope of the Fifteenth Amendment already serves

335. See John M. Golden, Redundancy: When Law Repeats Itself, 94 TEX. L. REV. 629, 654–55
(2016).
336. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1565–66; Jeremy Amar-Dolan, Comment, The
Voting Rights Act and the Fifteenth Amendment Standard of Review, 16 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1477,
1500–01 (2014).
337. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1565–66; Michael J. Pitts, Georgia v. Ashcroft:
It’s the End of Section 5 as We Know It (and I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 265, 287–88 (2005);
Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: A Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV.
225, 274 (2003); Amar-Dolan, supra note 336, at 1500–01.
338. John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1939, 2012 (2011).
339. See Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1566. For an explanation of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s race-neutral voting rights protection, see id. at 1563–64; Elmendorf, Structuring
Judicial Review, supra note 283, at 318; Foley, Voting Rules and Constitutional Law, supra note 283,
at 1847–51.
340. See Crum, Superfluous, supra not 283, at 1626.
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to limit congressional authority.341 Therefore, the argument goes, courts
should apply less scrutiny to Fifteenth Amendment legislation.342
Each of these arguments concerning the Fifteenth Amendment
applies with equal force to the Nineteenth Amendment.343 In fact, two
scholars have already applied the third argument to the Nineteenth
Amendment.344 But factors unique to the Woman Suffrage Amendment
also demonstrate that Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation
need not demonstrate congruence and proportionality in order to withstand
a constitutional challenge. Perhaps most persuasive of all is the legislative
history of the Woman Suffrage Amendment and the background legal
environment in which the Sixty-sixth Congress adopted House Joint
Resolution 1.345
2. Legislative and Judicial history
The congruence-and-proportionality doctrine did not exist at the time
of the 1919 adoption of House Joint Resolution 1 or the 1920 ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment.346 However, the Sixty-sixth Congress was
very familiar with a less stringent “reasonable relation” standard of review
for enforcement legislation, having enacted Eighteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation—the National Prohibition Act—on the express
assumption that courts would uphold the legislation so long as it was
reasonably related to a legitimate congressional purpose.

341. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Lawfulness of Section 5—and Thus of Section 5, 126 HARV. L.
REV. F. 109, 119–20 (2013); Crum, Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1626; Kanwar, supra note 318, at
306; Pitts, Once and Future Remedy, supra note 337, at 274–75; Amar-Dolan, supra note 336, at
1499–1500; Michael James Burns, Note, Shelby County v. Holder and the Voting Rights Act: Getting
the Right Answer With the Wrong Standard, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 227, 251–52 (2012); Rosemarie
Unite, Comment, The Perrymander, Polarization, and Peyote v. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 46
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1075, 1118–19 (2013).
342. See Amar, Lawfulness, supra note 341, at 119–20; Kanwar, supra note 318, at 306; AmarDolan, supra note 336, at 1499–1500; Burns, supra note 341, at 251–52.
343. A fourth point contends that courts should apply a more deferential standard of review to
ease the extraordinary cost required for Congress to develop—and for the executive branch to
defend—an evidentiary record sufficient to satisfy the congruence-and-proportionality inquiry. See
Burns, supra note 341, at 250–51. This is more of an argument against congruence-and-proportionality
as a general matter than it is an argument to distinguish the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment
standards of review. A fifth argument concerns fidelity to existing Supreme Court precedent applying
a less stringent standard to Fifteenth Amendment legislation. See id. at 247–49; Crum, Superfluous,
supra note 283, at 1568; Pitts, I Feel Fine, supra note 337, at 287; Pitts, A Once and Future Remedy,
supra note 337, at 273–74. This argument does not apply to the Woman Suffrage Amendment given
the absence of Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation and the consequent absence of
decisions reviewing such legislation’s constitutionality.
344. See Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 66.
345. Cf. Fish, supra note 65, at 1226–27.
346. See Balkin, supra note 334, at 1810–12; Caminker, supra note 323, at 1143.
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In the House, the Judiciary Committee’s report on the National
Prohibition Act stated that Eighteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation would withstand constitutional challenge unless “Congress
could have no reason to believe that its provisions are either necessary or
appropriate for carrying such power into execution.”347 For support, the
report cited then-recent Supreme Court decisions describing the inquiry as
whether the challenged legislation had “any reasonable relation to the
object sought.”348 The Senate’s Judiciary Committee claimed Congress
had similar authority: that committee’s report on the National Prohibition
Act claimed the Eighteenth Amendment enforcement power “carries with
it the power to enact any law having a reasonable relation to the end sought
by the original authorized act.”349
When the Supreme Court repeatedly upheld congressional
Eighteenth Amendment enforcement legislation several years later, it
essentially ratified the two committees’ views concerning the scope of
judicial review.350 Given that the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments
used substantially identical language to vest Congress with enforcement
authority,351 this Eighteenth Amendment legislative activity suggests that
Congress expected courts to subject Nineteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation to similarly deferential review.
Supporting this conclusion is the Fifteenth Amendment
jurisprudence existing in 1919. Those decisions endorsed a robust
congressional enforcement power352—so long as the legislation
maintained the relevant anchor to the voting discrimination on account of
race or color.353
Finally, the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 and its
predecessors demonstrates that the Sixty-sixth Congress expected to vest
itself with substantial authority to enforce the Woman Suffrage
Amendment against the states.354 Combined with the Eighteenth
Amendment legislative activity and the Fifteenth Amendment
jurisprudence, this history demonstrates that the Sixty-sixth Congress
understood that any enforcement legislation would receive deferential
review from the courts. This judicial deference is inconsistent with the
347. H.R. REP. NO. 66-91, at 4 (1919).
348. Id. at 6.
349. S. REP. NO. 66-151, at 12 (1919).
350. See Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U.S. 581, 593–97 (1926); Selzman v. United States, 268
U.S. 466, 468–69 (1925); James Everard’s Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 559–60 (1924).
351. Compare U.S. CONST. amend XVIII, § 2, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1, with
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 2.
352. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 665 (1884).
353. See, e.g., James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 142 (1903).
354. See Hasen & Litman, supra note 4, at 67; Kolbert, supra note 1, at 544–46.

2020] The Woman Suffrage Amendment & the Voting Rights of Men 1209
congruence-and-proportionality standard applied to Fourteenth
Amendment legislation which the Supreme Court first began applying
nearly eight decades after the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s ratification.
Accordingly, Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation need not
meet such a heightened standard.
C. Federalism: State Power vs. Congressional Authority
A third potential objection argues that other constitutional provisions
empower Congress to enact the voting rights legislation discussed in this
Article, rendering the Nineteenth Amendment supplementary at best and
superfluous at worst.355 This objection warrants two responses.
The first response is that this objection undervalues complementary
sources of congressional power. When multiple constitutional provisions
provide authority for Congress to enact a single piece of legislation, this
strengthens the constitutionality of that legislation.356 The existence of
multiple sources of authority not only entitles the legislative record
supporting enactment to increased judicial deference, but also enlarges the
set of tools available to Congress for furthering its legislative aims.357 Even
if other constitutional provisions authorize Congress to enact the existing
and proposed voting rights legislation outlined in this Article, the
Nineteenth Amendment nonetheless strengthens the constitutional basis
for this legislation.
The second response to the “supplementary or superfluous”
objection is that other constitutional provisions may not provide Congress
sufficient authority to adequately address felon disenfranchisement and
military voting. In addition to the standard federalism concerns about
federal intrusion into state prerogatives,358 the states’ explicit
constitutional authority under the Voter Qualifications Clauses359 to fix the
355. For instance, the Postal Clause plainly empowers Congress to permit mailing of military
election materials free of postage, irrespective of the Nineteenth Amendment. See David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: The Second Congress, 1791–1793, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 633–34 (1996).
Likewise, Congress does not need the Nineteenth Amendment in order to require federal criminal
justice agencies to assist federal probationers, parolees, and inmates with determining whether they
are eligible to vote and (if eligible) with voter registration; little doubt exists that Congress may instead
rely on its power to create and assign duties to federal agencies arising from the Necessary and Proper
Clause. See David M. Driesen, Toward a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 71, 91 (2009).
356. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1086–
88 (2016).
357. See Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 120, at 329–37.
358. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Federalism as a Constitutional Concept, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
961, 971–72 (2017).
359. “[T]he Electors [voting in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives] in each State
shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State
Legislature.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1. “The electors [voting in elections for the U.S. Senate] in
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qualifications of their voters360 may further limit congressional power
under other constitutional provisions. The discussion that follows
considers several alternate sources of congressional power to protect
voting rights, proceeding in the order in which the provisions appear in the
Constitution.
1. Elections Clause361
Multiple scholars argue that the Elections Clause should serve as the
primary constitutional authority for new voting rights legislation. 362 The
Elections Clause certainly empowers Congress to enact at least some of
the existing and proposed federal legislation to protect voters with criminal
convictions and voters serving in the armed forces. However, the provision
is subject to two important limitations: the Elections Clause offers
Congress minimal authority over (1) non-federal elections and (2) voter
qualifications standards.
To be clear, the Elections Clause offers Congress a broad array of
powers to enforce voting rights notwithstanding its limitations. Under the
Elections Clause, Congress may regulate virtually all aspects of the
election ecosystem.363 The provision offers Congress plenary authority
over federal elections, but also over non-federal elections to the extent that
the state uses some part of the federal election machinery to conduct the
non-federal election.364 Under the Elections Clause, Congress may both
displace state election law and commandeer state officials to administer
the federal election regime.365
In fact, the Elections Clause likely justifies much of the existing and
proposed legislation to assist voters with felony convictions and voters in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
legislatures.” U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, para. 1. Existing scholarship argues that these two provisions
should be interpreted identically. See Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sovereignty of the People: The
Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 10–11 (1996).
360. See, e.g., Husted v. A Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018).
361. “The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall
be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make
or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing [sic] Senators.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4,
cl. 1.
362. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 95, 107–13 (2013); Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, supra note 71, at 800.
363. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 5331 U.S. 510, 511–12 (2001); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S.
15, 24–25 (1972); Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
364. “So, for example, defendants have been convicted in federal court for vote buying with
respect to local offices that appeared on the same ballot as even uncontested primaries for
congressional office.” Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and
Amend the Voting Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 19 (2007) (citing United States v. McCranie, 169
F.3d 723, 727 (11th Cir. 1999)).
365. See, e.g., Franita Tolson, Election Law “Federalism” and the Limits of the
Antidiscrimination Framework, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2211, 2278–83 (2018).
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the armed forces. For instance, there appears to be no serious dispute that
the Elections Clause justifies most of UOCAVA’s procedural rules that
pertain to federal elections.366 The Elections Clause likely also provides
constitutional authority, at minimum, for the legislative proposals to
support voters with criminal convictions that stop short of directly
abrogating state felon disenfranchisement rules.367
However, the Elections Clause does not provide Congress with all
the power necessary to protect voting rights. Because the Elections Clause
does not fully extend to non-federal elections and because states’ power to
set voter qualifications limits the provision’s reach, the Elections Clause
represents an imperfect tool for Congress to protect military voters and
voters with criminal convictions.
i. Non-Federal Elections
The first challenge facing Elections Clause legislation is that the
Elections Clause does not empower Congress with authority over matters
relating solely to state or local elections.368 By its terms, the Elections
Clause applies only to “Elections for Senators and Representatives.”369
Given this limitation, the Elections Clause cannot support legislation—
like the SCRA’s voting provision—which by its terms applies to “voting
for . . . a State or local office.”370
The Elections Clause’s restricted scope has not historically proven
significant because states—as a matter of administrative convenience—
generally use the same systems and processes for both federal and nonfederal elections.371 However, the limitation may soon have more force
366. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 81, at 463; Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 120, at 370; Justin
Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 864–65 (2017).
367. For instance, the Elections Clause would likely justify federal legislation requiring (1) states
to designate probation and parole offices and corrections institutions as voter registration agencies
under the NVRA, (2) probation, parole, and corrections officers to assist their supervised or
incarcerated population with determinations of voting eligibility and (for those eligible to vote) with
voter registration, and (3) judges to make pre-trial or pre-plea disclosure to defendants concerning the
impact of a criminal conviction on the right to vote. Cf. ACORN v. Miller, 129 F.3d 833, 836–37 (6th
Cir. 1997); Voting Rights Coal. v. Wilson, 60 F.3d 1411, 1415 (9th Cir. 1995); ACRON v. Edgar, 56
F.3d 791, 94–96 (7th Cir. 1995).
368. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); David S. Louk, Reconstructing the
Congressional Guarantee of Republican Government, 73 VAND. L. REV. 673, 738 (2020); Daniel P.
Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 71, 106
(2014).
369. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has similar
regulatory authority over presidential elections. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544–
48 (1934).
370. 50 U.S.C. § 4025(a) (2018); see also Louk, supra note 368, at 738; Tokaji, Grand Election
Bargain, supra note 368, at 106.
371. See Pamela S. Karlan, Turnout, Tenuousness, and Getting Results in Section 2 Vote Denial
Claims, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 763, 779 n.87 (2016); Michael T. Morley, Dismantling the Unitary Election

1212

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:1147

given the recent trend of states seeking to divide their federal and nonfederal election machinery.372 Arizona, Illinois, Kansas, Mississippi, and
Virginia have all attempted—so far, mostly without success—to avoid
applying certain federally-mandated election rules to state and local
elections by creating dual election regimes.373 Recent scholarship
encourages more states to follow suit so they can partially escape the
dictates of Elections Clause legislation.374
Scholars disagree on the likelihood that states will segregate their
federal election systems and processes from their non-federal election
systems and processes.375 To the extent that states do consummate the
divorce, the Elections Clause will be a less effective tool for enforcing the
voting rights of servicemembers and individuals with criminal
convictions. For example, states with dual registration systems might use
the FPCA to register servicemembers to vote for only federal elections but
not state or local contests. States might send blank absentee ballots to
military voters fewer than forty-five days ahead of elections with no
federal contests on the ballot—or (in an extreme case) fail to send absentee
ballots for these exclusively non-federal elections at all. If future
legislation were to require states to count late-arriving military votes,
states could refuse to count these votes in state or local contests. States
might also refuse to count FWABs in state or local contests. Elections
Clause legislation may not be able to reach these burdens because they do
not impact federal elections. States might permit voters with felony
convictions enfranchised by Elections Clause legislation to vote only for
presidential electors and members of Congress, but not state or local
offices or ballot initiatives.
The literature suggests one potential solution: that other
constitutional provisions may “prohibit[] states from divorcing state and
federal [election systems] in order to impose more onerous requirements
on those seeking to participate in state elections.”376 Far from giving states
System? Uncooperative Federalism in State and Local Elections, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 103,
103–04 (2017).
372. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (With Notes on Voting Rights After
Shelby), 123 YALE L.J. 2838, 2871 (2014); Daniel P. Tokaji, Intent and Its Alternatives: Defending
the New Voting Rights Act, 58 ALA. L. REV. 349, 366–68 (2006).
373. See Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1997) (Mississippi); LULAC v. Reagan, No.
CV17-4102 PHX DGC, 2018 WL 5983009, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 14, 2018) (Arizona); Belenky v.
Kobach, No. 13-4150-EFM-KMH, 2014 WL 1374048, at *1 (D. Kan. Apr. 8, 2014) (Kansas); Haskins
v. Davis, 253 F. Supp. 642, 642 (E.D. Va. 1966) (per curiam) (three-judge court) (Virginia); Orr v.
Edgar, 670 N.E.2d 1243, 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996) (Illinois).
374. See Morley, Unitary Election System, supra note 371, at 118–24.
375. Compare Tokaji, Grand Election Bargain, supra note 368, at 106, with Louk, supra note
368, at 738–39.
376. Franita Tolson, Protecting Political Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause
of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 211 (2015).
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carte blanche to burden the right to vote in state or local elections, this
scholarship argues that the two Voter Qualifications Clauses “require[]
that states aggressively protect political participation.”377 However,
even if this argument proves valid, its dependence on judicial enforcement
still leaves the Elections Clause at a disadvantage compared to the
Nineteenth Amendment.
According to the scholarship originating the theory, the Founders
inserted the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I in order to defend the
franchise—well protected under Founding-era state constitutions—from
federal government encroachment.378 To protect against this perceived
federal threat, this scholarship argues, the Voter Qualifications Clause
barred the disenfranchisement in federal elections of voters already
entitled to vote under state law.379
The scholarship further contends that Founding-era “alter or abolish”
authority380—a remarkable democratic mechanism which enabled a state’s
citizens “to displace state laws with which they disagreed; to hold
constitutional conventions independent of the legislature; to revise their
state constitutions without official ratification; and to form new states”—
best exemplifies the “citizen political participation and state political
norms” the Founders expected the Voter Qualifications Clause (of Article
I) to protect.381 During Reconstruction, the argument continues, expanded
access to the franchise succeeded the “alter or abolish” authority as the
means by which the people would exercise political power.382 Therefore,
the scholarship reasons, the Voter Qualifications Clauses must be read to
require protection of the right to vote against state infringement, much as
it protected Founding-era forms of political participation over two
centuries ago.383 This state obligation to protect voting rights, the
scholarship concludes, manifests itself in the form of heightened judicial
scrutiny of restrictive state election regulations.384 Courts applying this
377. Id. at 161. Although focusing mostly on the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, the
cited piece recognizes the equivalent function of the Seventeenth Amendment’s identical Voter
Qualifications Clause. See id. at 211.
378. See id. at 180–86. Unlike today, Founding-era citizens expected “that the states would pose
less of a threat to voting rights than the federal government.” Id. at 180–81. Even in the modern era,
state constitutions explicitly protect the right to vote. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under
State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 101 (2014).
379. See Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 180–86; see also Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 227–28 (1986).
380. The “alter or abolish” power was the Founding-era “right of citizens to ‘alter or abolish’
their governments, which was similar to the ‘right of revolution’ exercised by the colonists against the
British during the Revolutionary War.” Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 163.
381. See id. at 187–89.
382. Id. at 189.
383. Id. at 162–63.
384. See id. at 205.
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heightened scrutiny would bar states from separating their federal and
non-federal election machinery in order to impose more burdens on voting
in non-federal elections than Elections Clause legislation allows for
federal elections.385
Assuming it otherwise proves sound, this argument’s reliance on
judicial enforcement could prove problematic. Courts faced with
constitutional arguments for protection of the franchise have both
historically and recently proven inconsistent guardians of the right to
vote.386 If the judiciary proves unwilling to strike dual election systems
notwithstanding their inconsistency with states’ obligation under the Voter
Qualifications Clauses to protect voting rights, then states will remain free
to shield their non-federal elections from Elections Clause legislation.
This potential vulnerability shows the utility of the Nineteenth
Amendment. Because the Woman Suffrage Amendment entrusts Congress
rather than courts with enforcement authority, the Nineteenth Amendment
does not depend on judges’ willingness to strike dual election systems
before Congress may legislate with respect to state and local elections.
Unlike the Elections Clause, the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement
power extends to all elections,387 allowing Congress to regulate purely
state or local elections irrespective of whether a state divides its federal
and non-federal election system. The broader reach of the Nineteenth
Amendment therefore advantages its enforcement legislation over similar
legislation enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause.
ii. Voter Qualifications Clauses
The second challenge facing the Elections Clause is its limited reach
into state over voter qualifications.388 This limitation impedes Elections
Clause legislation that attempts to protect the voting rights of
servicemembers and individuals with criminal convictions by
means which intrude on the state prerogative to determine the bounds of
the electorate.
385. See id. at 211–12.
386. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–08 (2019); Crawford v. Marion
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (controlling opinion); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24, 41–56 (1974); Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–53 (1959);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), abrogated by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962);
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 280–83 (1937), overruled in part by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903); Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874).
387. Unlike the Elections Clause, the Nineteenth Amendment contains no language limiting its
application to certain elections. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1., with id. amend. XIX, para. 1.
388. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 16–17 (2013); Stephen E.
Mortellaro, The Unconstitutionality of the Federal Ban on Noncitizen Voting and CongressionallyImposed Voter Qualifications, 63 LOY. L. REV. 447, 480–98 (2017).
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The Supreme Court has long recognized states’ authority to set the
qualifications of their voters.389 In a departure from earlier precedent,390
the Supreme Court recently held that the Voter Qualifications Clauses
empower states alone to determine the bounds of their electorate—without
interference from Elections Clause legislation.391 Several scholars argue
that Elections Clause legislation cannot abrogate state felon
disenfranchisement rules because states, not Congress, possess the power
to decide whether a criminal record disqualifies a person from voting.392
Likewise, the SCRA’s voting provision may not constitute valid Elections
Clause legislation—even as applied to federal elections—because the
statute requires states to include in the electorate certain servicemembers
who would, by virtue of their temporary residence in the state, not
otherwise be eligible voters.
State authority to set voter qualifications can also pose an obstacle to
Elections Clause legislation which regulates the time, place, or manner of
federal elections even if that legislation does not purport to define the
contours of the electorate. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court
suggested that the Voter Qualifications Clauses directly limit
congressional Elections Clause authority: “it would raise serious
constitutional doubts,” the Court explained, “if a federal statute precluded
a State from obtaining the information necessary to enforce its voter
qualifications.”393 Scholars caution that this language bolsters state power
to resist Elections Clause legislation.394
The principle that Elections Clause legislation cannot interfere with
a state’s ability to determine a voter’s qualifications could create an
obstacle for Elections Clause legislation to assist military voters. For
instance, if Congress were to require states to permit servicemembers to
register or vote electronically using their Common Access Card, a state
might argue that the Common Access Card does not sufficiently permit
the state to determine such a servicemember’s identity, interfering with the
389. See, e.g., Husted v. A Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018); Lassiter, 360
U.S. at 50–51.
390. Compare Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 16 n.8 with Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
117–18 (1970) (opinion of Black, J., announcing judgments of the Court).
391. See Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 16–17; see also Mortellaro, supra note 388, at 508–
15.
392. See Clegg, Who Should Vote?, supra note 54, at 166–68; Crain, supra note 52, at 9–14;
Hasen, Uncertain Congressional Power, supra note 54, at 780–83; von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra
note 54, at 1379–83. Most contrary scholarship predates Inter Tribal Council. See, e.g., Katz, Final
Frontier, supra note 54, at 60–64; King & Weiss, supra note 60, at 414.
393. Inter Tribal Council, 570 U.S. at 17.
394. See Richard Briffault, Three Questions for the “Right to Vote” Amendment, 23 WM. &
MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 27, 32 (2014); Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 569 n.96, 592 (2015); Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Anti-Carolene Court,
2019 SUP. CT. REV. 111, 161.
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state’s ability to gauge the servicemember’s eligibility to vote. A state
might likewise argue that the standard oath printed on the FPCA and
FWAB are insufficient for the state to determine the eligibility of a
servicemember to register or vote, and that UOCAVA’s language
requiring the state to accept this oath precludes the state from enforcing its
voter qualifications. In an extreme case, a state might even object to
providing absentee voting at all—notwithstanding UOCAVA’s
requirement to provide servicemembers with absentee ballots—by arguing
that only in-person appearance at a polling place suffices for the state to
determine the identity of a servicemember (and therefore, the
servicemember’s eligibility to vote).
The Elections Clause’s limited reach into voter qualifications could
also prove problematic for legislation to assist voters with criminal
convictions. Consider a state law conditioning the restoration of a felon’s
voting rights on the payment of financial obligations associated with the
conviction. Like many election rules, such a state law defies easy
classification as either a time, place, and manner regulation (over which
Congress exercises plenary authority) on one hand or a voter qualifications
standard (over which states maintain firm control) on the other.395 If the
financial obligations are mere procedural incidents of the voting rights
restoration process, Elections Clause legislation could justifiably prohibit
the state law. If the payment of these financial obligations constitutes an
independent qualification for voting—separate and apart from the
conviction itself—then Election Clause legislation would not suffice to bar
states from conditioning restoration on payment.
The literature offers two theories to strengthen Elections Clause
legislation against state efforts to weaponize their qualifications-setting
authority to voters’ detriment. As discussed earlier, the first theory posits
that the Voter Qualifications Clauses impose an affirmative duty on states
to use their qualifications-setting power to protect voting rights rather than
burden them.396 To the extent states fail to do so, this theory argues that
courts should apply heightened scrutiny to qualification-based burdens on
the franchise.397 If courts strike states’ restrictive qualification standards
under the Voter Qualifications Clause, these standards cannot then
override Elections Clause legislation protecting voters.
As discussed in the preceding subsection, the weakness in this first
theory is that it relies on courts to police restrictive voter qualifications.
The judiciary’s mixed record of protecting voting rights when faced with

395. See Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 120, at 373–81.
396. See Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 161–63.
397. See id. at 205.
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constitutional claims398 suggests that a theory relying on judicial
enforcement may not suffice to combat restrictive state voter qualifications
standards. The Nineteenth Amendment’s grant of enforcement authority
to Congress may give the Nineteenth Amendment an advantage.
The second theory posits that the Elections Clause itself (rather than
the Voter Qualifications Clauses) empowers Congress (rather than courts)
to override state voter qualifications rules in two limited circumstances “so
that states cannot use their power over voter qualifications to undermine
the legitimacy and health of federal elections.”399 The first circumstance
arises when states enact voter qualification standards in order to reduce
participation in federal elections.400 The second circumstance involves
states seeking to indirectly obtain the same result via voter qualifications
rules with vague or undefined terms, allowing election administrators or
other third parties to interpret the qualifications in a manner hostile to
voting rights.401
One scholar argues that this second theory might enable Congress to
prohibit states from conditioning the restoration of voting rights on the
payment of financial obligations associated with a criminal conviction or
from disenfranchising voters using an unduly broad list of disqualifying
crimes.402 To the extent that states have used their voter qualifications rules
to exclude servicemembers from the political process, this theory might
strengthen UOCAVA, the SCRA’s voting provision, and several of the
legislative proposals concerning military voting against state claims that
these federal statutes (and legislative proposals) infringe on a states’ right
to set and enforce their voter qualifications. However, disenfranchisement
of military voters mostly occurs as a result of legislative oversight and
administrative inefficiency, rather than a concerted effort to exclude
servicemembers from the polls.403

398. See, e.g., Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–08 (2019); Crawford v. Marion
Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (controlling opinion); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S.
24, 41–56 (1974); Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50–53 (1959);
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), abrogated by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962);
Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 280–83 (1937), overruled in part by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903); Minor v. Happersett,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874).
399. See Tolson, Spectrum, supra note 120, at 328. “[T]his approach is analytically similar to
the Court’s Commerce Clause cases, where it has held that Congress can reach noneconomic, intrastate
activity where the failure to do so could undermine a lawful regulation of interstate commerce.” See
id. at 382 n.292.
400. See id. at 382–87.
401. See id. at 387–92.
402. See Franita Tolson, The Elections Clause and the Underenforcement of Federal Law, 129
YALE L.J.F. 171, 178–79 (2019).
403. See supra Section I.B.
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Under either the first theory (states’ affirmative obligation under the
Voter Qualifications Clauses to protect voting rights) or the second theory
(congressional Elections Clause authority to protect federal elections’
health and legitimacy), Elections Clause legislation must jump additional
hurdles in order to overcome the state’s power to set voter qualifications
in the event of a conflict. In other words, these two theories limit
congressional authority to counteract restrictive state voter qualifications
rules to the circumstances described in the theories. The Nineteenth
Amendment holds an advantage in this regard because it requires no such
showing: so long as the enforcement legislation falls within the ambit of
the Woman Suffrage Amendment, state voter qualifications standards
must yield to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation.
Unlike the Elections Clause, the Nineteenth Amendment itself alters
state voting qualifications to the extent those qualifications impose
restrictions on account of sex.404 Both the legislative history of the
Nineteenth Amendment, as well as inferences from the state of analogous
Fifteenth Amendment jurisprudence at the time of the Sixty-sixth
Congress, confirm that altering state voter qualifications was the
Nineteenth Amendment’s primary purpose.
The Sixty-sixth Congress repeatedly made clear that it expected the
Nineteenth Amendment would override state voter qualifications
excluding women from eligibility to vote. For instance, House Joint
Resolution 1 contains a descriptive clause, reading, “Proposing an
amendment to the Constitution extending the right of suffrage to
women.”405 The brief report of the House’s Committee on Woman
Suffrage—numbering only forty-four words—contains identical
language.406
The committee reports of earlier Congresses—much lengthier than
forty-four words—centrally featured discussion concerning whether, as a
policy matter, women ought to be eligible to vote.407 Those committees

404. See U.S. CONST. amend XIX, para. 1; Mortellaro, supra note 388, at 475.
405. H.R.J. Res. 1, 66th Cong., 41 Stat. 362 (1919).
406. H.R. REP. NO. 66-1, at 1 (1919)).
407. See H.R. REP. NO. 65-234, at 2 (1918); H.R. REP. NO. 65-219, pt. 2, at 2 (1917) (minority
views); S. REP. NO. 64-35, at 2 (1916); S. REP. NO. 63-64, at 3 (1913).
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had for years heard testimony about the issue.408 This policy question
featured prominently in debate in both chambers.409
That legislative history is buttressed by the state of Fifteenth
Amendment jurisprudence as it stood at the time of the Sixty-sixth
Congress. By 1919, the Court had held that the Fifteenth Amendment
directly abrogated certain state voter qualifications by automatically
excising the word “white” from all state voter eligibility requirements.410
In two additional decisions, the Court held that the Fifteenth Amendment
invalidated even a facially race-neutral state voter qualification, where the
qualification effectively abridged the right to vote of only newly freed
slaves and their descendants.411 Indeed, the Court in one of the decisions
found that the Fifteenth Amendment invalidated even a second voter
qualification that had no race-related effects, because the second
qualification was so intertwined with the first as part of the entire voter
qualification regime that one part could not stand without the other.412
In light of the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s legislative history and
the state of the jurisprudence of the similarly-worded Fifteenth
Amendment at the time of House Joint Resolution 1’s adoption, the
evidence demonstrates that the Sixty-sixth Congress understood that it was
altering state voter qualifications on a nationwide scale. Shortly after
ratification, the Supreme Court agreed that the Nineteenth Amendment’s
reach extended to voter qualifications.413
Given the provision’s reach into to state voter qualifications,
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation affecting state voter
qualifications rules stands on a stronger foundation than similar legislation
enacted pursuant to the Elections Clause. Unlike the Elections Clause, the
Nineteenth Amendment itself alters state voter qualifications regulations
to the extent those qualifications impose restrictions on account of sex.
Enforcement legislation may therefore reach state voter qualifications
requirements—and may do so in ways beyond merely requiring states to
408. See, e.g., Woman Suffrage: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Woman Suffrage, 65th Cong.
12 (1917) (testimony of Sen. John B. Kendrick); id. at 27–28 (testimony of Sen. Charles Spalding
Thomas); id. at 31 (testimony of Sen. Reed Smoot); Woman Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm.
on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt. 4, 64th Cong. 161 (1916) (testimony of Rep. John E. Raker);
Woman Suffrage: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Serial No. 11, pt. 1, 63d Cong. 11–
12 (1914) (testimony of Rep. Frank W. Mondell); id. at 83–84 (testimony of Rep. J. Thomas Heflin).
409. See, e.g., 58 CONG. REC. 619–20 (1919) (statement of Sen. Frank Brandegee); id. at 88–89
(statement of Rep. Frank Clark).
410. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 98–109 (1884); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389–90
(1880).
411. See Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347, 354–58 (1915); see also Myers v. Anderson, 238
U.S. 368, 377–82 (1915).
412. Guinn, 238 U.S. at 365–67.
413. Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 135–36 (1922).
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abide by the Woman Suffrage Amendment’s operative prohibition. 414 This
ability advantages the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power over
the Elections Clause’s more restricted authority for Congress to abrogate
state voter qualifications standards in only limited circumstances.
2. War Powers415
The congressional War Powers have traditionally served as the
constitutional basis for both pre-UOCAVA and pre-SCRA safeguards for
military voting.416 One might argue that those War Powers also suffice to
justify UOCAVA, the SCRA’s voting protections, and military voting
legislative proposals.417 At best, the War Powers offer an uncertain basis
for some of these provisions, suggesting the necessity of the Nineteenth
Amendment as a source of constitutional authority.
i. Continuity of Government
To be clear, Congress possesses substantial authority under its War
Powers to legislate concerning domestic policy.418 The Supreme Court has
recently gone so far as to say that the “outer boundaries of [the] war powers
[remain] undefined.”419 Scholarship even argues that in unique
414. See supra Section IV.A.2.
415. “The Congress shall have Power . . . [¶] To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; [¶] To raise and support Armies,
but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; [¶] To provide
and maintain a Navy; [and] [¶] To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–14.
416. See Manning, Fighting to Lose the Vote, supra note 96, at 365–66; Norman Silber &
Geoffrey Miller, Toward “Neutral Principles” in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert
Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 880 (1993). For background on the use of the War Powers to justify
domestic legal protections for servicemembers outside the voting context, see H.R. REP. NO. 108-81,
at 33–34 (2003); Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 324–25 (1953); Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 493, 506–07 (1870).
417. There is no immediately apparent argument that the War Powers authorize Congress to
legislate concerning state felon disenfranchisement laws.
418. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1981); United States v. Cent. Eureka
Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141–44 (1948);
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93 (1943); Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse Co.,
251 U.S. 146, 163 (1919); Michael Stokes Paulsen, A Government of Adequate Powers, 31 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 991, 1000–01 (2008); Matthew C. Waxman, The Power to Wage War Successfully, 117
COLUM. L. REV. 613, 628–30 (2017). Hirabayashi has rightly suffered significant criticism. See, e.g.,
Eric L. Muller, Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and the Second Monster, 98 TEX. L. REV. 735, 749–53
(2020). Nearly a half-century after his conviction, Hirabayashi obtained a writ of coram nobis vacating
his convictions in light of the government misconduct that pervaded his prosecution and the racial bias
that infected the underlying legal regime. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 828 F.2d 591, 608 (9th
Cir. 1987). Nearly a quarter-century after the coram nobis proceedings, the Solicitor General publicly
confessed error in the case for similar reasons. See Neal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and
Confession of Error, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027, 3037 (2013).
419. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797–98 (2008).
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circumstances, the War Powers permit Congress to modify
constitutional election requirements—or even obviate the requirement to
hold elections at all.420
However, the literature concedes that this extraordinary authority to
modify constitutional election requirements exists only “to ensure
continuity of government” and “can be resorted to only when the normal
procedures fail” due to a military conflict on domestic soil that frustrates
standard democratic processes.421 This is consistent with early War Powers
caselaw, which conditioned the validity of Civil War-era domestic
legislation on the statute’s necessity during actual wartime.422
A constitutional authority contingent on the existence of military
conflict—especially if the conflict must represent an existential threat to
the nation—would not justify UOCAVA’s and the SCRA’s permanent,
peacetime intrusion into state election rules.
ii. Voter Qualifications Clauses
While the War Powers do authorize Congress to protect military
personnel even during peacetime, the extent to which this authority covers
the right to vote remains an open question. On one hand, the Supreme
Court has held that the War Powers authorize Congress to enact the
provision in the SCRA’s predecessor statute shielding servicemembers
against simultaneous taxation by multiple states.423 The SCRA’s current
voting language tracks the former statute’s taxation language that the
Court upheld.424 Testimony before Congress argued that the voting
protection might therefore survive judicial scrutiny.425 On the other hand,
the Court’s decision upholding the pre-SCRA tax protection relied on
cases authorizing the federal government to protect its operations
and functions—including its agents—from state taxation.426 This
principle—known as intergovernmental tax immunity—reaches back over

420. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Sweeping Domestic War Powers of Congress, 113
MICH. L. REV. 1337, 1392–95 (2015).
421. Id. at 1395.
422. See Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 506–07 (1870).
423. See Dameron, 345 U.S. at 324–25. Many other Supreme Court decisions address the SCRA
or its predecessors without deciding any constitutional questions. See, e.g., Boone v. Lightner, 319
U.S. 561, 565 (1943); Ebert v. Poston, 266 U.S. 548, 550 n.1 (1925); cf. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S.
511, 512–13 (1993).
424. Compare 50 U.S.C. § 4025(a) (2018), with id. § 4001(a)(1).
425. See, e.g., Military Voting Rights Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 699 Before the H.R. Comm.
on Veterans’ Affairs, Serial No. 105-11, 105th Cong. 13, 44–45 (1997) (testimony of John H. Killian,
Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service).
426. See Dameron, 345 U.S. at 324–25.
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two centuries.427 No similar principle exists allowing the federal
government to protect the voting domicile of its agents from state voter
qualifications rules.
Instead, the Voter Qualifications Clauses bestow on states the power
to fix the qualifications of their voters.428 What happens when this
state power faces off against the congressional War Powers? The answer
is unclear.
On one hand, congressional authority derived from Article I—like
the War Powers—may prove no match for the state’s sovereign
prerogative to determine the bounds of its electorate. The Supreme Court
has never decided whether any provision of Article I empowers Congress
to abrogate state voter qualifications standards. However, the Court has
developed a substantial jurisprudence concerning congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity. 429 Both immunity from private
lawsuits and the right to set suffrage requirements are important attributes
of state sovereignty.430 Sovereign immunity jurisprudence, therefore,
may shed light on congressional authority to override state voter
qualifications rules.
The sovereign immunity jurisprudence does not favor Congress. The
Supreme Court recently decided that no Article I power enables Congress
to abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity. 431 In its earlier decisions, the
Court held that while Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation
could subject a state to private suits without the state’s consent, neither
limited Article I authorities like the patent power nor substantial Article I
authorities like the power over American Indian tribes could do so.432
The Supreme Court’s ruling concerning the Indian Commerce
Clause holds particular relevance because that provision “grants Congress
broad general powers to legislate in respect to Indian tribes, powers that
[the Supreme Court has] consistently described as ‘plenary and

427. See Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and
Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682,
700–01 (1976).
428. See, e.g., Husted v. A Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1846 (2018).
429. See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 35 (2011) (plurality opinion).
430. Compare N. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Chatham Cnty., 547 U.S. 189, 193 (2006) (sovereign
immunity), with Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013) (voter qualifications).
431. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002–03 (2020). The Bankruptcy Clause is the “goodfor-one-clause-only” exception. Allen, 140 S. Ct. at 1003; see also Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546
U.S. 356, 369–79 (2006).
432. Compare Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 518 (2004) (Fourteenth Amendment), and Nev.
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726 (2003) (Fourteenth Amendment), with Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (Article I: Patent
Clause); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72–73 (1996) (Article I: Indian Commerce
Clause).
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exclusive.’”433 In this regard, the Indian Commerce Clause resembles the
War Powers. While the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue, lower
courts almost unanimously agree that the War Powers do not authorize
Congress to pierce state sovereign immunity for private plaintiffs.434 If
even considerable Article I powers like the “plenary and exclusive” Indian
Commerce Clause authority or the substantial War Powers do not allow
Congress to invade a state’s sovereign prerogative of immunity from suit,
these powers may not allow Congress to invade a state’s sovereign
prerogative to set the qualifications of its voters.
Some scholarship suggests that a “state[‘s] interest” in “conduct[ing]
its own elections”—presumably including the state’s right to set voter
qualifications rules—”is arguably less weighty than the abrogation of
sovereign immunity.”435 This suggestion may undervalue the state’s
sovereignty interest in determining the bounds of the franchise.436 If, as the
Supreme Court has held, a state’s power to determine the qualifications of
its governing officers implicates the most fundamental nature of
sovereignty,437 then the same might hold true of a state’s power to
determine the qualifications of its voters—who, after all, are the ultimate
source of state power. Indeed, the Court itself has drawn this
comparison.438 Additionally, the scholarship’s suggestion fails to consider
the degree to which federal intrusions into state voter qualification regimes
impose other federalism costs.439 Courts may conceivably determine
that the states’ sovereignty interest in determining the qualifications

433. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004) (quoting Washington v. Confed. Bands &
Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979)).
434. See, e.g., Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2000); Velasquez v.
Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 394 (7th Cir.), vacated on unrelated grounds, 165 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1998)
(per curiam); Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 362–63 (Ala.
2001); Janowski v. Div. of State Police, Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., 981 A.2d 1166, 1170 (Del.
2009); Clark v. Va. Dep’t of State Police, 793 S.E.2d 1, 5–7 (Va. 2016). Contra Diaz-Gandia v.
Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 509, 616 (1st Cir. 1996). Commentators—writing before Allen in 2020—
disagree, arguing that the War Powers do authorize Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
See Timothy M. Harner, The Soldier and the State: Whether the Abrogation of State Sovereign
Immunity in USERRA Actions Is a Valid Exercise of the Congressional War Powers, 195 MIL. L. REV.
91, 125 (2008); Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military Employees
from State Sovereign Immunity?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 999, 1050 (2004).
435. Developments in the Law, Securing Indian Voting Rights, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1754
(2016). This scholarship makes this argument in the context of justifying voting rights legislation
under the Indian Commerce Clause. See id.
436. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013); Nw. Austin Mun. Util.
Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 217 (2009).
437. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991); see also Ariz. State Leg. v. Ariz. Indep.
Redist’g Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 816–17 (2015).
438. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461–62 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
439. See Mortellaro, supra note 388, at 455–66.
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for suffrage meets or even exceeds their sovereignty interest in immunity
from suit.
On the other hand, a state’s sovereignty interest in determining who
qualifies to vote may be weakest when the state uses its authority to
restrict, rather than expand, suffrage. As discussed earlier, existing
scholarship argues that the Voter Qualifications Clauses may impose an
affirmative obligation on states to safeguard the right to vote.440 If this
affirmative obligation limits states’ power under the Voter Qualifications
Clauses to curtail access to the franchise,441 then states may possess only
a minimal sovereignty interest in setting restrictive voter qualification
rules. If the state’s sovereignty interest is minimal, the War Powers may
suffice to overcome that interest.
In short, whether the War Powers empower Congress to override the
states’ explicit constitutional authority under the Voter Qualifications
Clauses remains unclear.442 What is clear is that Article I—including the
War Powers—does not authorize the same degree of intrusion into state
sovereignty as the Reconstruction Amendments. This poses potential
problems if the War Powers form the constitutional basis for the SCRA’s
voting domicile protections or other legislative proposals that could
interfere with state voter qualifications. Considering this uncertainty, the
War Powers cannot entirely displace the need for other sources of
constitutional authority. Because the Nineteenth Amendment empowers
Congress to reach state voter qualifications,443 the Nineteenth Amendment
may hold an advantage over the War Powers.
iii. Non-Federal Elections
If the War Powers do not justify the SCRA’s modification of state
rules governing voter qualifications, Congress may argue that its War
Powers at least authorize UOCAVA’s time, place, and manner regulations
as applied to non-federal elections.444 However, this argument may also be
in doubt: because the Elections Clause explicitly limits congressional
authority to “Elections for Senators and Representatives,”445 that
may suggest that other provisions of Article I—including the War
440. See Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 161–62; supra Section
IV.C.1.ii.
441. See Tolson, Voter Qualifications Clause, supra note 376, at 205.
442. See, e.g., Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 130 n.9 (2001) (Leval, J., writing separately); id.
at 134 n.7 (Walker, C.J., concurring).
443. See supra Section IV.C.1.ii.
444. No serious dispute exists over congressional authority under the Elections Clause to apply
UOCAVA to federal elections. See, e.g., Kalt, supra note 81, at 463; Tolson, Spectrum, supra note
120, at 370; Weinstein-Tull, Abdication and Federalism, supra note 366, at 864–65.
445. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.
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Powers—do not imply an unwritten congressional power over state and
local elections.446
This argument has arisen in another, similar context: whether the
Elections Clause’s explicit grant of authority over congressional elections
(without mentioning presidential elections) should suggest the absence of
an unwritten power over presidential elections.447 For two reasons, the
Supreme Court held that congressional power over congressional elections
extends to presidential elections.448
First, the Court conditioned its holding on the fact that the specific
statute at issue was “confined to situations which, if not beyond the power
of the state to deal with at all, are beyond its power to deal with adequately.
It in no sense invades any exclusive state power.”449 But states do not lack
the capacity to administer their own elections.450 Likewise, the application
of UOCAVA to non-federal elections likely intrudes on the states’
sovereign prerogatives to administer their own internal elections.451
Second, the Court held that power over presidential elections
constituted a type of implied “power essential to preserve the departments
and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction,
whether threatened by force or by corruption.” 452 But the
disenfranchisement of military voters, while obviously repugnant to basic

446. Put another way, this argument applies the “canon of construction holding that to express
or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other, or of the alternative.” Expressio Unius Est
Exclusio Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). “For example, the rule that ‘each
citizen is entitled to vote’ implies that noncitizens are not entitled to vote.” Id.
447. Compare Dan T. Coenen & Edward J. Larson, Congressional Power Over Presidential
Elections: Lessons From the Past and Reforms for the Future, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 851, 899–
902 (2002), with James A. Gardner, Liberty, Community and the Constitutional Structure of Political
Influence: A Reconsideration of the Right to Vote, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 893, 984 (1997), and Vasan
Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1749–52 (2002).
448. See Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544–47 (1934).
449. Id. at 544–45.
450. See, e.g., STEVEN F. HUEFNER ET AL., FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS REVISITED:
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE MIDWESTERN STATES 5–69 (2011); STEVEN
F. HUEFNER ET AL., FROM REGISTRATION TO RECOUNTS: THE ELECTION ECOSYSTEMS OF FIVE
MIDWESTERN STATES 21–159 (2007); KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. R45549,
THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 3–11 (2019);
Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Democracy and the Secretary: The Crucial Role of State Election
Administrators in Promoting Accuracy and Access to Democracy, 27 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 343,
361–80 (2008).
451. See Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 217 (2009); William S.
Consovoy & Thomas R. McCarthy, Shelby County v. Holder: The Restoration of Constitutional
Order, 2013 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 31; Bradley W. Joondeph, Bush v. Gore, Federalism, and the
Distrust of Politics, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1781, 1788 (2001); Tolson, Constitutional Structure, supra note
148, at 399.
452. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 545.
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principles of democracy,453 does not create an existential threat against the
federal government.454
Accordingly, while the negative implication of the phrase “Elections
for Senators and Representatives” does not prevent Congress from
exercising authority over presidential elections,455 whether it bars
Congress from exercising authority over non-federal elections remains
unresolved. This open question demonstrates the potential need for other
constitutional bases for military voting legislation. Because the Nineteenth
Amendment does reach non-federal elections,456 the provision may
provide a stronger constitutional footing for UOCAVA and other time,
place, and manner regulations that support military voters.
3. Fourteenth Amendment Enforcement Power457
The Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power provides another
potential source of congressional authority to combat felon
disenfranchisement and protect military voters. However, questions attend
the provision’s application in either domain.458 The Nineteenth
Amendment provides a better constitutional authority for attacking these
two issues.
The Supreme Court has held that felon disenfranchisement generally
does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.459 Scholars have exhaustively
covered both this decision and the broader interplay between the
Fourteenth Amendment and felon disenfranchisement.460 Much of this
scholarship specifically contends that Congress could not constitutionally
abrogate state felon disenfranchisement via its Fourteenth Amendment

453. See, e.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 97 (1965); Karlan, Ballots and Bullets, supra
note 90, at 1346.
454. Cf. Prakash, supra note 420, at 1392–95.
455. Burroughs, 290 U.S. at 544–47.
456. Unlike the Elections Clause, the Nineteenth Amendment contains no language limiting its
application to federal elections. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1., with U.S. CONST. amend. XIX,
para. 1.
457. “The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend XIV § 5.
458. For instance, consider the interplay between sections 2 and 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment:
does section 2’s extraordinary congressional authority to reduce a state’s representation in the House
suggest that courts should read the congressional section 5 enforcement power more broadly?
Compare Tolson, Constitutional Structure, supra note 148, at 401, and Franita Tolson, What Is
Abridgment? A Critique of Two Section Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 440 (2015), with Crum,
Superfluous, supra note 283, at 1618–19, and Michael T. Morley, Remedial Equilibration and the
Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 279, 331. As
noted below, a full exposition on the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power is
beyond the scope of this Article.
459. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974).
460. See supra Section I.A.
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enforcement power.461 While a complete analysis of this enforcement
power’s reach is beyond the scope of this Article, the existing scholarship
demonstrates that, at minimum, constitutional questions would attend
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation abrogating state felon
disenfranchisement laws. The Nineteenth Amendment may offer a better
constitutional tool for Congress to address voting by individuals with
criminal convictions.
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to protect military
voters is another matter. No litigation has challenged whether the
Fourteenth Amendment could justify the voting protections military voters
receive under UOCAVA and the SCRA. The literature has not covered the
topic. However, some scholars have argued that the Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power does not justify the enactment of
UOCAVA as it pertains to the legislation’s non-military constituency:
overseas civilians.462 As one of those scholars notes, “many of the
constitutional arguments against [UOCAVA’s statutory predecessor] and
UOCAVA apply with equal force to [military voters].” 463
For instance, one argument contends that legislation to enfranchise
non-resident overseas civilians does not constitute a constitutionally valid
remedy to the problem of residency restrictions on the franchise because
bona fide residency requirements do not violate the Constitution.464 As
applied to military voters, this argument would contend that the SCRA’s
protection of servicemembers’ voting domicile likewise cannot abrogate
state voting domicile rules because bona fide residency requirements do
not violate the Constitution, even as applied to military voters.465
Whether the Fourteenth Amendment could justify the SCRA’s
voting provision is an open question. Courts subject Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation to congruence-and-proportionality
review,466 which proceeds in three stages. First, courts must identify the
constitutional right that Congress sought to enforce with its legislation.467
Second, courts review the legislative record for a history and pattern of

461. Clegg et al., Case Against, supra note 61, at 14–16; Clegg et al., The Bullet and the Ballot?,
supra note 284, at 19–22; Hasen, Uncertain Congressional Power, supra note 54, at 779–83; Re &
Re, supra note 52, at 1644–45; von Spakovsky & Clegg, supra note 54, at 1383–84.
462. See Kalt, supra note 81, at 462–73, 485–86; Gura, supra note 81, at 192–94.
463. Kalt, supra note 81, at 502.
464. Id. at 486.
465. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 93–94 (1965); see also Holt Civic Club v. City of
Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68–69 (1978); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343–44 (1972).
466. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529–36 (1997).
467. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 522 (2004); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001),
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recent state violations of that right.468 Finally, courts review the legislation
itself to determine whether Congress chose means appropriately tailored
to the targeted constitutional harm.469 While enforcement legislation may
proscribe state conduct that does not itself violate the Fourteenth
Amendment in order to more effectively deter and remedy conduct that
does, Congress may not redefine the substantive scope of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.470 The range of state conduct affected by the
legislation, statutory limits imposed on the legislation, the depth of the
legislation’s intrusion into state sovereignty, financial cost, and the
availability of potential alternative remedies all factor into whether the
legislation constitutes a congruent and proportional exercise of the
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power.471
With regard to the initial inquiry, Congress might stand a better
chance at justifying the SCRA’s protection of servicemember voting
domicile if it characterized the provision as enforcing the Fourteenth
Amendment right of bona fide residents to register and vote,
notwithstanding the absences occasioned by the obligations of their
military service.472 In other words, Congress would argue that the SCRA
attacks only unconstitutionally restrictive residency requirements,473 but
not bona fide residency requirements.
Next, Congress would have to discover sufficient evidence of
unconstitutionally restrictive residency requirements. This would require
canvassing state law and potentially reviewing state election practices and
procedures to determine whether military voters face difficulty registering
and voting on account of their service-related absences from their voting
domiciles.
Assuming Congress develops a sufficient record, the next step in the
congruence-and-proportionality analysis would be to determine whether
Congress sufficiently tailored the SCRA’s remedy to these constitutional
violations. Whether the SCRA’s voting language would survive this
analysis remains unclear.
On one hand, Congress has long possessed authority under its
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power to abrogate state voter
468. See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 37 (2012) (plurality opinion);
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 639 (1999).
469. See, e.g., Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 728 (2003); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 625–26 (2000).
470. See, e.g., Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1004 (2020); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528
U.S. 62, 81 (2000). Of course, Congress may proscribe unconstitutional conduct, as well. See United
States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151, 158 (2006).
471. See Kolbert, supra note 1, at 563–64.
472. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96–97 (1965).
473. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343–60 (1972); Greabe, supra note 84, at 71–74.
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qualification rules—like states’ restriction of the franchise to bona fide
residents—even if those rules themselves comport with the
Constitution.474 Additionally, testimony before Congress suggested that
the SCRA’s voting provision would withstand constitutional scrutiny
because the voting language merely enforced servicemembers’ right to
register and vote in their place of domicile, even if military absences took
them elsewhere.475 This strengthens the case for upholding the SCRA’s
voting provision because existing equal protection jurisprudence forbids
states from using residency requirements to disenfranchise
servicemembers because of their military service.476 If the SCRA
nonetheless protected some servicemembers lacking bona fide residency,
Congress could argue this overbreadth was appropriate to preclude
challenges to servicemembers who do qualify as bona fide residents.
On the other hand, the congressional testimony cited above—which
dates from three weeks before the introduction of congruence-andproportionality jurisprudence477—minimizes the scope of the SCRA’s
voting provision. Congress enacted this voting language in the wake of
litigation showing that servicemembers were registering and voting in
locations in which the servicemembers had no plausible claim to bona fide
residency.478 The legislation imposes its will not only in federal elections,
but also state and local elections, and contains no internal limits on its
application.479 Additionally, the SCRA’s intrusion into state rules
governing voter qualifications may impose substantial sovereignty and
other federalism costs.480 Less intrusive measures may be available to
protect bona fide residents from losing their voting domicile due to
military-connected absences.481 In short, the question of whether the
474. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651–56 (1966).
475. See Military Voting Rights Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 699 Before the H.R. Comm. on
Veterans’ Affairs, Serial No. 105-11, 105th Cong. 13–14, 45 (1997) (testimony of John H. Killian,
Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service).
476. See Carrington, 380 U.S. at 96–97.
477. Compare Military Voting Rights Act of 1997: Hearing on H.R. 699 Before the H.R. Comm.
on Veterans’ Affairs, Serial No. 105-11, 105th Cong. 45 (1997) (testimony of John H. Killian,
Legislative Attorney, Congressional Research Service), with City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
520 (1997).
478. Discovery in the litigation revealed that a servicemember purporting to have a voting
domicile in Texas had not returned to that domicile in two decades and in fact owned a home in Illinois.
See Katz, Ballot War, supra note 255, at A27. Another servicemember registered to vote at his
grandmother’s Texas address because he had spent three days there during his honeymoon twentyfive years earlier. See Shannon, supra note 255, at A14.
479. See 50 U.S.C. § 4025(a).
480. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 570 U.S. 1, 17 (2013); Nw. Austin Mun.
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 217 (2009); Mortellaro, supra note 388, at 455–66.
481. For instance, Congress could have shifted the burden to states (and off servicemembers) to
establish that a servicemember has gained, lost, or changed his or her voting domicile. Cf. Steve Barber
et al., The Purging of Empowerment: Voter Purge Laws and the Voting Rights Act, 23 HARV. C.R.–
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SCRA’s voting provision constitutes a congruent and proportional remedy
admits of no clear answer. Given this uncertainty, the Nineteenth
Amendment offers a more stable constitutional basis for the SCRA’s
voting provision.
This same analysis attends UOCAVA’s facilitation of absentee
voting for military personnel, or the proposed UOCAVA amendment to
abrogate state sovereign immunity by permitting a private cause of action.
Even if Congress might plausibly justify UOCAVA’s application to nonfederal elections as legislation to enforce the right to vote as protected by
the Equal Protection Clause,482 the statute must still undergo the
demanding Fourteenth Amendment standard of review. The deferential
standard of review afforded Nineteenth Amendment enforcement
legislation483 offers a substantial advantage over similar legislation
enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Twenty-sixth Amendment Enforcement Power484
Congress might also attempt to use its Twenty-sixth Amendment
enforcement power to combat felon disenfranchisement or bolster military
voting. The Twenty-sixth Amendment enforcement power shares many of
the same advantages as the Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power.
For instance, like the Nineteenth Amendment, “the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment can be used by Congress to prohibit conduct that has a
discriminatory effect even absent a discriminatory purpose.”485 Just as the
demanding congruence and proportionality test does not apply to
Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation, a lenient, forgiving
standard of review likewise applies to Twenty-sixth Amendment
enforcement legislation.486 Also similar to the Nineteenth Amendment, the
Twenty-sixth Amendment’s scope directly modifies state voter
C.L. L. REV. 483, 497 (1988). Congress could also have required states to explain in writing to any
military voter why it has determined the servicemember to have gained, lost, or changed his or her
voting domicile. Cf. Gilda R. Daniels, A Vote Delayed Is a Vote Denied: A Preemptive Approach to
Eliminating Election Administration Legislation That Disenfranchises Unwanted Voters, 47 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 57, 94–97 (2008); Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model, supra note 362,
at 120–25 (2013). Whether or not these measures would be adequate or even desirable is a separate
question, though SCRA opponents would surely argue both.
482. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000); Phillip M. Kannan, A Constitutionally
Protected Right to Vote, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 747, 774–77 (2017); cf. Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right
to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 200–01 (2008).
483. See supra Section part IV.B.
484. “The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.” U.S. CONST.
amend XXVI, § 1. “The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”
Id. § 2.
485. Fish, supra note 65, at 1216.
486. See id. at 1224–29.
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qualifications rules and permits intrusion into state and local election rules,
exceeding the Elections Clause’s more limited authority over regulations
of the time, place, and manner of federal elections.487
The Twenty-sixth Amendment might therefore make a good source
of constitutional authority for protecting the voting rights of military
personnel. Just as the military is overwhelmingly male, “[a]ctive-duty
military personnel are substantially younger than the population at
large.”488 The enactment histories of both the Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth
Amendments share a common theme: support for the new
constitutional provisions in light of the to-be-enfranchised population’s
contributions to a war effort.489 Accordingly, the Nineteenth and Twentysixth Amendments might serve as equally plausible sources of
constitutional authority for enforcement legislation to protect
servicemembers’ voting rights.
However, the Twenty-sixth Amendment’s power to combat felon
disenfranchisement is less clear. In order for Congress to constitutionally
enact Twenty-sixth Amendment enforcement legislation, the age
discrimination in question must be sufficient for Congress to “draw a
rational connection between the protections it is enacting and the general
goal of combating age discrimination.”490 This may not be the case for
felon disenfranchisement: “While felons are slightly younger than the
general population, the difference between the average age of a felon and
the average age of the general population [may be] too small to draw a
rational connection between age discrimination and the abolition of felon
disenfranchisement.”491
D. Caselaw: Howard v. Gilmore
A fourth objection might suggest that Howard v. Gilmore forecloses
any Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation to abrogate state
felon disenfranchisement provisions. In an unpublished decision, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected a pro se litigant’s
Nineteenth Amendment claim almost in passing, using a mere seventythree words:

487. See id. at 1174–77.
488. Id. at 1219. As of 2004, “41% of active-duty military [were] twenty-four years old or
younger, as compared with only 14% of the general population, and 76% [were] thirty-four years old
or younger, as compared with only 28% of the general population.” Id.
489. See id.
490. See id. at 1229.
491. Id. at 1229–30. “In 2006, the median age of felons convicted in state court was thirty-one
at the time of sentencing (with a mean sentence length of four years and eleven months), while the
median age of the general population [in 2012 was] 36.9.” Id. at 1230 n.273.
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To the extent that Howard relies upon the Nineteenth Amendment,
he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The
Nineteenth Amendment prohibits denying the franchise based
upon the basis of sex. Howard makes no attempt to frame his claim
in terms of discrimination based upon sex. The Nineteenth
Amendment is therefore inapplicable and the district court
correctly dismissed the complaint to the extent it relies upon the
Nineteenth Amendment.492
For three reasons, this decision cannot be a serious bar to Nineteenth
Amendment enforcement legislation on felon disenfranchisement.
First, the Fourth Circuit itself treats unpublished decisions as
nonprecedential, negating Howard’s contribution to Nineteenth
Amendment jurisprudence.493 Second, to the extent the decision has any
force, Howard concerns only whether a litigant may use the Nineteenth
Amendment to prohibit states from disenfranchising voters on the
basis of a criminal conviction.494 The Fourth Circuit’s decision says
nothing about whether the Woman Suffrage Amendment empowers
Congress to abrogate state felon disenfranchisement provisions by
enforcement legislation.
But the most important reason to doubt Howard’s impact is its
holding: that a Nineteenth Amendment claim which “makes no attempt to
frame [the] claim in terms of discrimination based upon sex” cannot
succeed.495 In other words, Howard stands for the unremarkable
proposition—well-established in the Fourth Circuit and elsewhere—that
“perfunctory and undeveloped claim[s]” without sufficient evidence or
argument in support will fail. 496 The Fourth Circuit’s decision is therefore
best understood as a routine application of standard litigation principles
rather than a groundbreaking exposition on the contours of the Nineteenth
Amendment. This is especially true when considering both the decision’s
brevity and its nonprecedential status. Accordingly, Howard does not limit
congressional authority to enforce the Nineteenth Amendment.
492. Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333, 2000 WL 203984, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2000) (per
curiam) (unpublished table disposition). Howard dealt specifically with felon disenfranchisement,
making it particularly noteworthy in this Article. But much of this analysis applies to the multitude of
other decisions addressing undeveloped, conclusory arguments—generally made by pro se litigants—
concerning the Nineteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Muhammad v. Newark Hous. Auth., 515 F. App’x
122, 125 (3d Cir. 2013); Chapman v. Baker, 430 F. App’x 731, 731 (10th Cir. 2011); New v. Pelosi,
374 F. App’x 158, 159 (2d Cir. 2010); Kohnke v. Reed, 18 F.3d 936, 1994 WL 83724, at *1 (5th Cir.
Feb. 25, 1994) (unpublished table decision).
493. See, e.g., Booker v. S.C. Dep’t of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 543 (4th Cir. 2017); see also 4TH
CIR. R. 32.1.
494. See Howard, 2000 WL 203984, at *1.
495. Id.
496. Russell v. Absolute Collect’n Servs., Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 396 n.* (4th Cir. 2014).
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E. Politics: The Unlikelihood of Restrictive State Action
Finally, one last objection might argue that Nineteenth Amendment
enforcement legislation, even if constitutionally viable, is unnecessary.
Given the widespread political support for military voting and the
increasing unpopularity of felon disenfranchisement, the argument goes,
states will protect the voting rights of these two groups without any need
for federal legislation. This argument neglects two realities: first, that
political popularity vacillates over time, and second, that state bureaucratic
inertia can defeat even politically popular policy initiatives. Federal
legislation may still be necessary if Congress wants to ensure felons’ and
servicemembers’ voting rights withstand the ebbs and flows of both
popular opinion and competence in public administration.
To be clear, “support for reinstating felons’ right to vote appears to
be gaining momentum across the political spectrum.”497 But despite the
trend, the restoration of voting rights for individuals convicted of crimes
remains controversial.498 Views vary widely based on party affiliation.499
This matters because “partisan politics drives changes to the state laws
governing felon voter eligibility.”500 In other words, the fate of felon
disenfranchisement policy may depend on the shifting electoral fortunes
of the major political parties. If Congress wants to see action in this area,
it cannot rely on the rising unpopularity of felon disenfranchisement to
prompt unilateral action by states.
Unlike felon disenfranchisement, military voting enjoys widespread
support across the political spectrum.501 This popularity is unsurprising.
Political support for servicemember voting has often peaked during wars
involving overseas deployment of large numbers of military personnel.502
Today, the United States remains mired in “the longest period of hostilities
in U.S. history—a period that some have dubbed the Forever Wars.”503
However, the unprecedented support for military voting is a recent
497. Christian Ketter, A Jury of Citizens Both Free and Imprisoned: If Voter Rights Are Ensured
for the Incarcerated, Is a Prisoner’s Right to Serve on a Jury Far-Fetched?, 51 U. TOL. L. REV. 37,
37 (2019); see also Demleitner, supra note 17, at 1282.
498. See Tolson, Underenforcement, supra note 402, at 178.
499. See Cain & Parker, supra note 22, at 946 tbl.3 & n.37.
500. See Conn, supra note 41, at 499. This effect extends beyond felon disenfranchisement: the
restrictiveness vel non of a state’s voting rules (including but not limited to felon voter eligibility)
strongly correlates with partisan control of the state’s election policymaking apparatus. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Ballot Bedlam, 64 DUKE L.J. 1363, 1405 (2015).
501. See, e.g., Alvarez et al., Military Voting and the Law, supra note 121, at 981; Inbody, Voting,
supra note 68, at 54.
502. See INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 160.
503. Zachary R. New, Ending Citizenship for Service in the Forever Wars, 129 YALE L.J.F. 552,
553 (2020); see also Alberto Mora, The First Thomas J. Romig Lecture in Principled Legal Practice,
227 MIL. L. REV. 433, 452 (2019).
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development, historically speaking. In the early part of American history,
states actively sought to disenfranchise military voters.504 As late as 1965,
states burdened servicemembers’ right to vote—or even outright barred
them from the polling place—because of their service.505 More recent
litigation has challenged military ballots with the hope of tipping a close
election result.506 In short, even the modern consensus in support of
military voting has its limits.
Additionally, the political popularity of military voters will not
mitigate the challenges military voters face as a consequence of the unique
nature of election administration in the United States:
[Military] voting difficulties persist in part because elections
continue to be conducted at the state level, and voting procedures
vary widely across states. These state differences have made it
harder for various groups and individuals, including the [Federal
Voting Assistance Program], military voting assistance offices,
voting assistance officers, state department officials, and nongovernmental organizations, to help individual voters navigate the
particular requirements applicable to them individually. In
addition, the federal overlay on state election administration adds
complexity and increases the risk of problems . . . .507
Even garden-variety state bureaucratic friction—whether between
state agencies, between the state political branches, or between state and
local governments508—can interfere with successful state administration
of military voting. No matter how much popular support servicemembers
enjoy, election officials may nonetheless fail to effectively execute their
duties relating to military voting due to communication breakdowns,
explicit conflicts, or even misunderstandings over the proper allocation of
responsibilities.509 If Congress wants to see action in this area, it cannot
rely on the consensus support of military voting to prompt unilateral action
by states.

504. INBODY, SOLDIER VOTE, supra note 72, at 155.
505. See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 89 (1965).
506. See Harris v. Fla. Elections Canvassing Comm’n, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1317, 1320 (N.D. Fla.),
aff’d, 235 F.3d 578 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); Casarez v. Val Verde Cnty., 16 F. Supp. 2d 727,
730 (W.D. Tex. 1998); aff’d mem., 194 F.3d 1308 (5th Cir. 1999).
507. Huefner, Lessons, supra note 111, at 878–79 (footnote omitted). The Federal Voting
Assistance Program is the federal agency responsible for military voting. See Federal Voting
Assistance Program, Instruction No. 1000.04 § G.2, at 19 (U.S. Dep’t of Def. Nov. 12, 2019).
508. See Justin Weinstein-Tull, State Bureaucratic Undermining, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083,
1101–08 (2018).
509. Cf. id. at 1108–17.
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CONCLUSION
Felons and servicemembers each face unique but serious barriers to
the ballot. The Nineteenth Amendment empowers Congress to address
those barriers in light of the sex-based burden both groups face.
This may prove to be an unconventional conclusion, given that “[t]he
prevailing understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment is that it merely
requires that women be permitted to vote—no more, no less.”510 But “the
conventional wisdom is wrong.”511 While the Sixty-sixth Congress
initially aimed the Woman Suffrage Amendment at women’s right to vote,
its gender-neutral language establishes (and later Supreme Court
precedent confirms) that the Nineteenth Amendment protects men, as
well. Because men make up an overwhelming proportion of both voters
with criminal convictions and voters serving in the armed forces, the
Nineteenth Amendment could serve as a powerful constitutional tool to
protect these groups’ voting rights. A review of the primary concerns
animating the Sixty-sixth Congress to propose the Woman Suffrage
Amendment to the states confirms this hypothesis, given how each of the
concerns dovetails with the nature of the population burdened by either
felon disenfranchisement or military service. Additionally, many of the
restrictions attendant to other constitutional provisions—a requirement for
intentional discrimination, a heightened standard of review, a limited
reach into state voter qualifications or non-federal election procedures—
do not apply to Nineteenth Amendment enforcement legislation.
Yet for a century after ratification of the Woman Suffrage
Amendment, its Enforcement Clause has remained dormant. Congress has
never taken advantage of its “power to enforce this article by appropriate
legislation.”512 After 100 years of inaction, this symposium on the
centennial of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment marks an
appropriate time to reexamine the provision. To answer the question in this
Article’s title—Does the Woman Suffrage Amendment Protect the Voting
Rights of Men?—yes. If Congress chooses to take action on felon
disenfranchisement or military voting, the Nineteenth Amendment offers
a potent tool for doing so.

510. Kolbert, supra note 1, at 509 (footnote omitted).
511. Fish, supra note 65, at 1234.
512. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, para. 2.

